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 Introduction1  
Jessica Fischer and Gesa Stedman 
 
 
Who would have thought it? Neoliberalism has survived the economic 
crisis of 2007-2008 although it has proved to be illogical, dysfunctional 
and dangerous (Harvey). “Nothing substantial has been altered in the 
infrastructure of the global financial system from its state before the cri-
sis. […] Neoliberalism is alive and well” (Mirowski 8, 28). Or, as Ngai-
Ling Sum and Bob Jessop attest, “the neoliberal imaginary remains 
dominant and continues to shape imagined economic recoveries” (Sum 
and Jessop 428). Apparently unquestioned, solutions for the disaster are 
based on the structural causes of the disaster. Trying to make sense of 
this situation, numerous publications are dedicated to the post-crisis cir-
cumstances, with fitting titles such as The Strange Non-Death of Neolib-
eralism (Crouch). It is strange indeed: neoliberal models continue to 
play a major role in public policies of the 21st century. Great Britain, for 
instance, suffered severely from the consequences of the financial crash. 
The Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government intro-
duced the United Kingdom government austerity programme in 2010, 
thereby making the average citizen responsible for the failures of the 
financial system. Instead of rethinking a political agenda once set by 
                                                             
1  This introduction derives in part from Jessica Fischer, Agency. The Entre-
preneurial Self in Narratives of Transformation: Debuting in the Literary 
Field at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century. Publisher tba, forthcoming. 
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Margaret Thatcher, and continued in slightly changed shape under Tony 
Blair, former Prime Minister David Cameron’s vision of a Big Society 
with a small welfare state extended neoliberal reforms. Instead of pin-
pointing structural conditions which led to the financial crisis, he 
strengthened the focus on the individual subject. Unimaginable?  
In fact, it is its imaginability that allows neoliberal capitalism to stay 
alive after the crash. In Das Gespenst des Kapitals (2010), Joseph Vogl 
analyses the (in)coherence of economic models as well as the incon-
sistent interpretations of irregular events in finance business. He also 
highlights the unreadability of the markets. Most importantly, he brings 
to the fore the discrepancy between economic theories and economic 
realities. Theoretically, rational agents compete on decentralised mar-
kets undisturbed by chaotic coincidences. In our realities, neither en-
tirely decentralised markets nor a balanced distribution of economic re-
sources by rational agents exist. Thus, economic theorists deal with a 
powerful imaginary. They keep alive a liberal “Oikodizee” by projecting 
a reality (Vogl 54, 55). “This forms the double structure of modern eco-
nomic thought or […] its performative power: Its concept of the market 
is both model and veridiction and hence connected with the imperative 
to make the laws of the market real yourself” (55).2 Subjects are com-
pelled to enact an idea which is framed as ‘truth’. By enacting the idea, 
they make it real and, hence, true. If the realisation fails, it is the indi-
vidual’s failure to perform truth. So, a vital part of (imagined) economies 
are certain types of subjects that are willing to perform these imagi-
naries. 
Michel Foucault, Ulrich Bröckling and Marnie Holborow, for exam-
ple, have identified the homo economicus as key to the reproduction of 
contemporary economies. Economist Michael Hutter and legal scholar 
                                                             
2  Translation by Jessica Fischer. The original text says: “Das prägt die dop-
pelte Struktur des modernen ökonomischen Wissens oder […] seine per-
formative Kraft: Das Konzept des Markts ist darin Modell und Wahrheits-
programm zugleich und also mit der Aufforderung verbunden, Marktgesetze 
selbst wahr zu machen.” 
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Gunther Teubner termed the homo economicus a “Realfiktion” (Hutter 
and Teubner), both a fiction and a reality. This real fiction shapes our 
everyday discourses and practices, aids neoliberalism and makes subjec-
tification to it natural or common-sense in a Gramscian logic. This real 
fiction is a way to “conduct the conduct of men” (Foucault 186). Ad-
dressed as homo economicus, we accept the market as a site of veridic-
tion and are inclined to commodify every aspect of our life. By making 
us economic men, a particular regime of truth (in the Foucauldian sense) 
allows neoliberalism to become real. Moreover, neoliberalism is able to 
become real because we want to turn ourselves into economic men. The 
expectations by society intersect with the desire of the individual. We 
want to be entrepreneurial – and we should be. Nevertheless, the real 
fiction of the homo economicus is but one facet of a wider imaginary. 
Many more facets can be traced. “The Economy now commands the 
stage, such that […] other domains [such as politics, culture, sociality, 
the state] appear subordinate or even subservient to the Economy and its 
needs,” claims John Clarke in his chapter (Clarke 18). Thus, it is nec-
essary to keep investigating our everyday discourses and practices in or-
der to question the assumed hegemony3 of the Economy. It is particu-
larly necessary for the investigation to think of economies as imagined. 
“The idea of imagined economies opens the space for a certain type of 
critical engagement with contemporary political economy,” promises 
Clarke (95). The idea of economies as real fictions invites a less obvious 
approach and more variety, an analysis against the grain.  
A look back into the history of economic thought and historical mod-
els of the economy shows how heavily intertwined the imagination and 
the economy – both in thought and act – have always been. It is remark-
able how the presentism of the neoliberal age has managed to make us 
forget the historicity of the economy, and hence the possibility of imag-
ining it otherwise, and of enacting it otherwise. In her recently published 
book Kapitalismus, Märkte und Moral (2019), the historian Ute Frevert 
                                                             
3  It is important to note that we follow Antonio Gramsci’s idea that hegemony 
is never static or completed (Gramsci). 
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explores early examples of the criticism directed at what we now call 
capitalism. She points out that its early reformers argued on a moral ba-
sis and thus forced capitalism in its then current form to adapt and that 
it is this moral criticism, even outrage, based as it is on imagining things 
otherwise, which forces historical change up to this day. Whether that 
was always the case must remain for the historians to decide. We would 
argue that it is necessary not only to imagine the economy differently, 
but to actually enact it differently, since capitalism is adept at incorpo-
rating elements of criticism, e.g. ecological concerns, by turning them 
into consumerism but without ever changing the fundamental opposition 
between the many and the few.  
How to make alternatives to the current economic model, e.g. an 
economy which incorporates the concept of a guaranteed basic income 
(Bauman), become real fictions, rather than outlandish minority posi-
tions, is a question addressed by some of the contributions to this vol-
ume. They do so by re-writing the history of economic thought and re-
minding us that, at least in the British case, this history rests on racist 
exploitation, forgotten in most of today’s accounts (cf. Gohrisch in this 
volume) or morphed into nostalgic pseudo-histories which, rather than 
being true explorations and analyses of the past, serve contemporary 
needs for nostalgia (cf. Bramall in this volume; Bauman). Luke Martell 
tackles alternative models of economic thought and action with his anal-
ysis of the Labour Party’s positions and their application in Preston in 
the North of England, where an attempt has been made to set up a com-
munity-based circular economy to keep profit in the community, rather 
than letting it go to transnational conglomerate bodies. That this kind of 
action can be harnessed both by right-wing and left-wing political 
groups is down less to the actual workings of the model, but rather to the 
attached imagined communities to which it appeals. Does wealth in the 
community necessarily entail a parochial, nationalist or even regionalist 
worldview and political agenda? Who defines who belongs to such a 
community? How can one avoid social and political exclusion on the 
one hand and transnational profiteering on the other? 
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Rebecca Bramall’s chapter explores a related issue, namely, the nos-
talgic, constructed character of The High Street and how it is repre-
sented, invoked and used for contemporary political and economic ar-
guments. She shows that “(t)he idealised high street sustains both reac-
tionary and radical visions of national identity and of the role of the 
economy in a future society. Both have a nostalgic dimension, and so it 
is vital to scrutinise the ways in which nostalgia for former modes of 
economic organisation can naturalise exclusions on the basis of race or 
class.” (Bramall 134). The high street can be mobilised both for reac-
tionary causes or for the Labour Party’s new policies and similar pro-
gressive political projects. Jana Gohrisch throws a light on how current 
ethnic exclusion mechanisms and institutional racism in Britain rest on 
the way in which the management of anger has allowed the majority 
society to conveniently forget that its position of power rests on the ex-
ploitation of slave workers in the past. By reading recent anti-racist pub-
lications by prominent Black writers such as Reno Eddo-Lodge or Afua 
Hirsch in conjunction with the 19th-century novel Lutchmee and Dilloo. 
A Study of West Indian Life by Edward Jenkins (1877), she is able to 
show how “emotions always key into the economy – imagined and real” 
(Gohrisch 74). 
Melissa Kennedy also makes a case for the importance of fictional 
narratives or literary and cultural studies in relation to economics. With 
Aesop’s fable “The Ant and the Grasshopper” as an example, she ex-
plains economics as a “narrative of human interaction, invented and im-
agined into being” (Kennedy 158) and assigns to literary criticism the 
ability to discuss these narratives in new ways. Framing economics as 
social science and ‘the economy’ not in the narrow meaning of finance 
and market but in the broader sense of human economies further con-
nects economics to literary studies: both disciplines shape, analyse and 
critique the “symbolic, cultural, social, and political expressions of hu-
man exchange and interaction” (Kennedy 160). Drawing this connection 
between economics and fictional narratives or literary/cultural studies 
also encourages alternative imaginaries to hegemonic discourses about 
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‘the economy’. Several popular economics texts published after the fi-
nancial crisis, for instance, tap into literary/cultural imagery in order to 
question dominant ideas about what the economy is and how the econ-
omy works. These texts propose a rethinking of human interaction under 
the heading ‘economy’. This, moreover, “offers a reinvigorated role for 
the humanities, particularly literary studies” (Kennedy 164). 
Christiane Eisenberg takes a historical view on a rethinking of hu-
man exchange. In her chapter about the rise and decline of doux com-
merce, she investigates the changing perception of this figure of thought 
from the late 17th and 18th centuries and the changing experience to 
which it led. In France and Germany, the term ‘commerce’ mostly meant 
“sociability, communication and social intercourse (also between the 
sexes)” whereas the British “also included the economic relations be-
tween market participants” (Eisenberg 35). Doux commerce according 
to the British definition premised activities such as trading, buying or 
selling as a way of bringing subjects peacefully together even if they had 
opposing interests. These activities were hoped to increase mutual trust 
and eventually decrease unequal power relations. In other words: by 
generalising commerce “society as a whole would benefit” (Eisenberg 
36). For her diachronic approach to doux commerce, Christiane Eisen-
berg takes into account the history of markets and the market economy 
in Britain as well as the changing social and political power relations 
with which they were entangled. Her aim is to raise an awareness for the 
complexity of equalling market society and civil society.  
Olivier Butzbach historicises another real fiction of British economy 
– that of ‘the City’, London’s financial district. In his chapter, he 
acknowledges the status of the City as one of the “most entrenched vi-
sions of modern capitalism” (Butzbach 101) and explores its contradic-
tions. The City seems to be both the embodiment of the markets and a 
representation of concentrated power. Butzbach investigates the City as 
a problematic example of some misleading connotations it has evoked. 
He also analyses the performative power which it has nevertheless 
gained in the past. A simplified conception of the British financial sys-
tem as a system of markets or as a small but strong network of financial 
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institutions in London had far-reaching political consequences. It influ-
enced Thatcherite and New Labour policy-makers with regard to finan-
cial regulation. In both cases the City had to be upheld as a centre of 
global finance and as an autonomous space with unchained financial 
markets – which was assumed to be a guarantee for continuous eco-
nomic growth. “The disastrous outcomes of such approaches, revealed 
by the 2007-08 financial crisis, thus show how necessary it is to rethink 
the place and role of the City in British finance” (Butzbach 104). Hence, 
Butzbach argues for a more nuanced characterisation of British finance 
and of economies in both their material as well as symbolic aspects. 
Jason Allen’s chapter looks at a fundamental element of the econ-
omy, at least in its Western incarnation: money. Difficult to define, with 
multiple functions and shapes, lawyers try to circumscribe the functions 
and use of money. With the advent of virtual forms of money, as well as 
high finance, the always rather tenuous relationship between money and 
its material base has become even more flimsy. This historical shift also 
argues for a shift in imagination: “Perhaps the crucial virtue in anyone 
thinking about the future of money at the present time would be imagi-
nation – the courage to take a moment, to reject the inevitability of leg-
acy conventions, and to imagine what might be possible in the future” 
(Allen 96). Allen’s statement about the future of money also applies to 
‘the economy’ in general. Future possibilities are imagined and commu-
nicated, for instance by Thomas Piketty in his new book on capitalism 
and ideology (Piketty)4. Next to contextualising our current economic 
system and its conceptual underpinnings, Piketty promises a new model 
which is meant to overcome social inequalities. 
This edited collection developed from the lecture series ‘Imagined 
Economies’ which took place at the Centre for British Studies, Hum-
boldt-Universität zu Berlin, in 2018. We are aware that imagined econ-
omies are “discursively constituted and materially reproduced on many 
sites and scales, in different spatio-temporal contexts, and over various 
                                                             
4  The English translation of Piketty’s publication is available from March 
2020. 
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spatio-temporal horizons” (Sum and Jessop 174), that there is an endless 
array of research fields and potential questions we could follow. With 
Imagined Economies – Real Fictions. New Perspectives on Economic 
Thinking in Great Britain our authors identify some of the sites and 
scales of (Britain’s) imagined economies. The aim is to connect seem-
ingly separate fields such as finance and fiction in order to better under-
stand current political changes in Great Britain and beyond. In addition, 
this publication offers an urgently needed interdisciplinary view of the 
performative power of economic thought. It opens a space not only for 
a critical engagement with ‘economies’ but also for fresh imaginations. 
We owe a debt of gratitude to all authors who shared first ideas and 
final articles about imagined economies. A special thank-you goes to 
Corinna Radke, Catherine Smith and David Bell for proofreading and 
copy-editing our manuscripts. We could not have completed our publi-
cation without them or the staff of transcript Verlag. Further, we want to 
thank photographer Janina Fischer for the cover image. Many thanks to 
those who helped to make this collection become ‘real’. We are also 
grateful to our colleagues and students at the Centre for British Studies 
of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin who stimulate interdisciplinary re-
search and constantly foster the development of new ideas for lecture 
series, projects, and books.  
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 Why Imagined Economies? 
John Clarke 
 
 
I begin with a puzzle: why talk about imagined economies? In everyday 
life, economies appear to be exactly the opposite of ‘imagined’: they are 
material, substantial, overpowering, forceful and constantly demanding 
our attention. Indeed, we are immersed in economies: we inhabit a 
global economy, a regional economy, a national economy (and live with 
the unsettling intersection between them). More abstractly, there are dis-
cussions about financial economies (and their opposite ‘real econo-
mies’); the learning economy and the knowledge economy are offered 
as new formations; some talk about the relationships between the Global 
North and South in terms of neo-colonial economies. In other settings, 
including academic ones, people have talked and written of political 
economies, moral economies and social economies, while more re-
cently, I have encountered ideas of cultural economies, affective econo-
mies and domestic economies. This feels like a lot of economies and one 
of the things that adding the word ‘imagined’ does for me is to interrupt 
the apparent ubiquity of economies: it creates what might be called ‘a 
pause for thought’. Such a pause for thought is potentially productive 
given the ubiquity and omnipotence of the economy and all these econ-
omies. 
Thinking about imagined economies creates the possibility of ques-
tioning both the proliferation of economies and the assumed potency of 
the Economy (in the singular). From being one social domain among 
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many (politics, culture, sociality, the state, etc.), the Economy now com-
mands the stage, such that those other domains now appear subordinate 
or even subservient to the Economy and its needs. For many this is as-
sociated with the rise of neoliberalism as a political and ideological pro-
ject that includes what Harvey calls the ‘commodification of everything’ 
(Harvey 165). The dominance of the Economy (and its shadow self – 
logics of economic calculation) has transformed social, political and cul-
tural domains, subjecting them to the rule of the market, either in the 
direct form of ‘market forces’, or through the creation of quasi-markets 
(forms of regulation that aim to mimic the dynamics of ‘real’ markets 
via mechanisms of competition and contracting [Le Grand]). I will come 
back to markets later, but for now, they form part of the sheer cultural 
weight of the Economy in its singular forcefulness: the proclaimed ab-
sence of any alternative to the logic of the economy’s need to grow and 
be unbounded, especially its need to be liberated from state regulation 
or political interference. This logic of ‘economic realism’ – summed up 
in Margaret Thatcher’s famous phrase ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) 
– has dominated debates about social reform, public spending and the 
role of the state on a global scale (both in terms of its spread across 
countries and its domination of global institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organiza-
tion). 
For a brief period, the global financial crisis of 2007-8 threatened to 
unlock this economic realist logic, but by 2010 the various rescue mis-
sions (designed to save capitalism from itself) had restored the condi-
tions for ‘business as usual’ and much of the world became subject to a 
new form of economic realism – Austerity politics and policies (see, in-
ter alia, Evans and McBride; Forkert). Austerity announced the eco-
nomic necessity (in the form of public debt) for reductions in public 
spending, the greater privatisation of the public realm and the reform of 
welfare provisions. The needs of the Economy had to be put first. This 
voracious and needy Economy circulates in the form of representations: 
images, ideas, moral tales, official reports, statistical indices, graphs and 
Why Imagined Economies? | 19 
charts and the ubiquitous stock exchange data (addressing us as mem-
bers of a ‘share owning society’). These representations both demand 
our attention (as the basic stuff of life) and simultaneously demand our 
critical attention. As David Ruccio has argued:  
 
The fact is, there are diverse representations of the economy – what it is, how 
it operates, how it is intertwined with the rest of the natural and social world, 
what concepts are appropriate to analyzing it, and so on – in all three arenas: 
within the official discipline of economics, in academic departments and re-
search centers other than departments of economics within colleges and uni-
versities, and in activities and institutions outside the academy. And the di-
versity of economic representations that exists in these arenas simply cannot 
be reduced to or captured by a singular definition, including the all-too-com-
mon statements about ‘how economists think’ or what the ‘central economic 
question is’ that one finds in the textbooks that are used every year, around 
the world, to teach hundreds of thousands of students how to think about the 
economy – in other words, how to represent the economy, to themselves and 
others. (895-6) 
 
As a result, I suggest that there is social and political value in taking a 
step back from the ever-present demands of His Majesty the Economy 
and opening up a small space for thought by inserting the word ‘imag-
ined’ into our thinking about economies. This conceptual move has be-
come increasingly visible across the social sciences, even if both the ob-
ject being ‘imagined’ and the practices of imagining are rather different. 
For example, writers as different as Cornelius Castoriadis and Charles 
Taylor have explored ‘social imaginaries’, while writers like Davina 
Cooper have explored how imagining might function as a social and po-
litical practice. Benedict Anderson famously deconstructed nations as 
‘imagined communities’ and states have been examined as imagined for-
mations following Abrams’ formative exploration of the ‘state idea’ 
(see, for example, Blom Hansen and Stepputat; Cooper et al., Reimag-
ining the State; Mitchell; Painter). Finally, some scholars have begun the 
exploration of imagined economies (Cameron and Palan, in relation to 
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globalisation; see also Clarke, “Imagined, Real”). For me, one critical 
point of orientation has always been Louis Althusser’s thesis that “[i]de-
ology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence” (162). How else do we understand our condi-
tions of existence (economic and more) except through imaginary rela-
tionships? It is true that a whole set of problems flow from Althusser’s 
proposition – about the character of ideology, the nature of the real con-
ditions and more, but those are for another time. Here, I want to under-
line both the diversity and productivity of approaches to the imagined 
and imaginary quality of social phenomena. The singular Economy has 
a number of richly imagined elements – it is productive (and centred on 
the labour of production); it is embodied in private property (as wealth, 
capital or simply the skills that the individual can bring to bear in the 
market); it is driven by the promise of endless growth and it relies (in 
theory) on the market to solve the problems of distribution (everything 
and everyone achieves their value in the market place). In the following 
sections, I consider the imagined nature of the market that has been cen-
tral to the processes of economic realism and neo-liberalisation. In the 
final section, I return to some of these issues (production, private prop-
erty, the promise of growth and the politics of distribution) to explore 
the possibility of thinking economies otherwise. 
 
 
MAKING UP MARKETS 
 
The drive to open up the world to markets involved imagining econo-
mies in particular ways, centred on a contrast between the shackled 
‘managed economies’ of post-war Fordism (driven into decline by ex-
cessive state interference) and the liberated dynamics of a ‘free market’, 
understood as the ‘natural’ state of the economy. Rescuing the market 
from its oppressors would, we were promised, ensure freedom (of 
choice) and entrepreneurialism, uniting producers and consumers in a 
dynamic of expansive growth. Thomas Frank has written about the com-
pelling rise of market imagery and the way it envisages the market as 
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being able to meet all human needs, articulated by ‘market populists’ 
who were 
 
adherents of a powerful new political mythology that had arisen from the 
ruins of the thirty-year backlash. Their fundamental faith was a simple one. 
The market and the people – both understood as grand principles of social 
life rather than particulars – were essentially one and the same. By its very 
nature the market was democratic, perfectly expressing the popular will 
through the machinery of supply and demand, poll and focus group, super-
store and Internet. In fact, the market was more democratic than any of the 
formal institutions of democracy – elections, legislatures, government. The 
market was a community. The market was infinitely diverse, permitting 
without prejudice the articulation of any and all tastes and preferences. Most 
importantly of all, the market was militant about its democracy. It had no 
place for snobs, for hierarchies, for elitism, for pretense, and it would fight 
these things by its very nature. (29) 
 
The market, in these imaginaries, was endlessly dynamic, driving eco-
nomic, social and political change as people were themselves liberated 
from their state of dependency (on the state). One critical element of this 
re-imagining of the relationships between markets, states and societies 
was provided by public choice theory, which offered a market-centric 
critique of public service ‘monopolies’ (Niskanen). Public choice theory 
demonstrated that, without the discipline of market dynamics (competi-
tion) public monopolies would be sclerotic and inefficient, serving the 
vested interests of producers (see, for example, Friedman and Fried-
man’s critique of the ‘tyranny of the status quo’). Across economic text 
books, policy programmes and political discourse, the markets that pop-
ulated this imagined economy were startlingly similar, resembling noth-
ing so much as a projection of how markets might work if abstracted 
from any social and economic conditions. These abstracted markets 
were abstracted from the material effects of time and space – as if ex-
changes took place instantaneously (and between perfectly informed 
transactors). Even if particular markets showed evidence of failure (the 
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housing market or the internal market introduced into UK health ser-
vices, for example), their conditions of failure were always particular. 
The Stanford professor (and Kaiser Permanente healthcare corporation 
advisor) Alain Enthoven’s relationship to the NHS perfectly captures 
this tendency. As one of the original advisors on marketising NHS re-
form he promoted the internal market (Reflections); he later returned to 
review progress and was rather disappointed (In Pursuit), suggesting 
that the initial reforms did not go far enough in marketising health care. 
This is reminiscent of Jamie Peck’s argument that we need to consider 
the ‘turgid reality of neoliberalism variously failing and flailing for-
wards’ (7; my emphasis). 
This recurrent celebration of the market as the natural and necessary 
human condition (as against the artificiality and ‘social engineering’ as-
sociated with the state) was a powerful force in normalising the many 
markets that were created from the mid-1970s onwards. But the natural-
ising imagery tends to conceal the fact that markets of many different 
kinds are the result of social and political labour: they have to be made, 
as Julia Elyachar has argued: 
 
The notion of the market is so familiar that we tend to take it for granted. But 
like so many things that we take for granted, we don’t really know what it is. 
“The market” functions as a folk concept more than a scientific term… Ra-
ther than the market, we need to think about a multiplicity of markets that 
are the outcomes of specific forms of labor, culture, technological mixes, and 
modes of organization specific to time and place. (15, 24) 
 
In particular, it is important to recognise that markets and market-mim-
icking devices (internal contracting, quasi-markets, etc.) require people 
to understand themselves as specific sorts of economic agents (moti-
vated and empowered by economic means). Anthropological work on 
markets, such as Elyachar’s, suggests that economic agents are not born, 
but have to be made. A study of ‘citizen-consumers’ in England revealed 
people who were profoundly reluctant to identify themselves as ‘con-
sumers of public services’, rejecting the impersonal and transactional 
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model that such an identity implied (Clarke et al., Creating Citizen-Con-
sumers). Enabling people to think economically, and especially to im-
agine themselves as economic agents, involves a process of construction 
that requires intensive political and discursive work (this section draws 
on Newman and Clarke, chapter 4). For example, the reform of public 
services through market mechanisms involved the invention of a range 
of economic agents, each invested with a specific form of power or au-
thority; for instance:  
 
• Provider organisations were invited to imagine themselves as a busi-
ness, or at least as performing in ‘business-like’ ways;  
• Senior figures in organisations are invited to understand themselves 
as chief executives, strategic managers or, most recently, leaders. 
Across the range of public services, this development of senior, stra-
tegic, innovative or even transformational management is one of the 
long-term and now deeply embedded effects of the ‘new managerial-
ism’. The proliferation of training and development programmes di-
rected at senior organisational strata encourage two related phenom-
ena: a self-consciousness of being a leader (in the generic sense); and 
a sense of being the embodiment of the specific corporate entity 
(providing the vision that motivates others, being the bulwark against 
external dangers and threats, anticipating the opportunities to ‘grow 
the business’).  
• Clients, contractors and commissioners were invited to see themselves 
as purchasers or providers of services. Ideas of how to contract (and 
manage contracts when established) became part of a new organisa-
tional culture, and led to changing relationships (inter-organisational, 
intra-organisational and inter-personal) that came to be characterised 
by mutual exploitation, uncertainty and adaptation. 
• Workers in organisations were invited to understand themselves as 
(more or less) valued human resources. In particular, they were ex-
pected to imagine themselves as corporate agents – assimilating and 
executing the organisation’s ‘mission’. This identification generated 
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particular sorts of strain in public service organisations, given the his-
toric centrality of bureau-professional roles in which identifications 
and affiliations tended to be directed as much to the profession as to 
the specific employing organisation (teachers, social workers, medical 
staff, etc.). The pressure on organisations to ‘think like a business’ 
increased demands for such corporate identification from employees, 
since professional attachments risked being a distraction from the or-
ganisation’s conception of its ‘core business’.  
 
The making of markets involved a process of redrawing boundaries, re-
constructing relationships, and inventing new assemblages rather than a 
simple process of moving from state to market. The process worked 
through a universalising discourse, albeit one that has not been uni-
formly successful: people retain attachments to other principles of social 
life (intimacy, solidarity, publicness, politics) as alternatives to market 
coordination. People also develop emergent conceptions of alternatives 
in the face of the failures, costs and consequences of market coordina-
tion. Such processes of reform have produced strange new forms of or-
ganisation, regulation, coordination and governance, often described as 
‘hybrids’. Elyachar rightly argues that the process of making markets 
(or, we might add, market-mimicking processes) is inherently political. 
 
The labor of making particular forms of markets is also the labor of politics. 
It is about power. Attempts to teach the poor of Cairo to budget their time 
and money with more streamlined methods resembling those of capitalist 
forms, and to learn accounting, “the language of business” […], are more 
than ethnographic anomalies. They are attempts to reshape the nature of 
power and subjectivity. (Elyachar 24) 
 
Elyachar’s argument here is important: the work of imagining – making 
up – markets is not merely abstract invention or the circulation of ideol-
ogy; rather new forms of power and relationships are brought into being 
and distributed through such processes. The decentralisation of govern-
mental authority to multiple service providers is one example – highly 
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conditional and delimited authority is devolved by central government 
to such organisations. Their exercise of it is subject to double pressures: 
the demands and desires of service users and would-service users on the 
one side; the apparatuses of inspection and evaluation on the other. Nev-
ertheless, as Pollitt and others have shown, the managers of organisa-
tions ‘liberated’ from direct central or local government control have 
often relished the ‘freedom to manage’. Similarly, citizens as service us-
ers are ‘empowered’ or authorised as consumers to exercise choice over 
services (in terms of patient or parent choice and in such policy devel-
opments as direct payments for social care). But there are also realign-
ments of forms of political and economic power at stake in these pro-
cesses (or what others have called forms of public and private authority, 
see Hansen and Salskov-Iversen). These realignments sometimes in-
volve transfers of power and resources (from the state to corporate bod-
ies); they sometimes involve creating fusions or hybrid forms of power 
(trusts, public private partnerships, social enterprise). 
Finally, it might be worth noting an odd disjuncture that occurred in 
the ways in which markets have been represented in public discourse. 
The drive to make up markets stressed their dynamism, their efficacy 
and their energy – markets were transformative institutions. However, 
by 2008-9 it seemed that markets were not what they used to be. They 
had become a shadow of their former virile selves, no longer relentlessly 
expanding but slipping into a period of decline, decay and, above all, 
depression. Depression is an intriguing term in relation to markets be-
cause it condenses two rather different, but significant, clusters of mean-
ings. On the one hand, we encounter the hard evidentiary science of eco-
nomics – in which depression refers to a specified trend in economic 
activity, measurable by a set of particular (if contested) indicators. De-
pressions – like the Great Depression of the 1930s – are profound and 
prolonged slumps in economic activity. On the other hand, depression is 
also a key word for describing mental states, emotional moods and clin-
ical psychological conditions. The exchange between these two sites of 
depression – the economic and the emotional – is intriguing. And there 
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is something fascinating about the proliferation of terms that usually de-
scribe mental states and emotional moods to talk about the state of mar-
kets. After the 2008-9 crisis, we have become accustomed to hearing 
about markets that are anxious, nervous, and unsettled. They are, it 
seems, prone to bouts of panic and hysteria in which they are infected 
by collective mood swings and a sort of viral irrationality. These mood 
swings of markets – moments of manic recovery offset by plummeting 
spirits – threaten to lead us all into depression. And they undermine the 
claims about dynamism, rationality and the transcendent power of mar-
kets.  
 
 
IMAGINING OTHERWISE 
 
However, the purpose of talking about imagined economies is not just 
to engage in a challenge to the current dominant imaginaries (a sort of 
ideology critique). As important is creating the political cultural space 
for imagining other economies, or even for imagining economies other-
wise. In this section I explore some other possible ways of imagining 
economies: working through different framing devices – economy as re-
production rather than production; economy as commons rather than pri-
vate property; the possibility of post-growth economies rather than end-
less growth; and the economy as the focus for a politics of distribution 
rather than market valuation. I do not claim any great originality about 
my selection of these issues or my comments on them – but they offer 
significant contending imaginaries. 
How different might economies look if we start from the question of 
reproduction rather than production? By this I do not mean the simple 
model offered in Volume One of Marx’s Capital of the reproduction of 
the social relations of production and their embodiments – capital and 
labour, but an understanding that social reproduction is necessarily ex-
panded and expansive (it is a dynamic process). It is necessarily complex 
– requiring the reproduction of all social relations – and it is also con-
tested. Contested reproduction implies that both the content of what is 
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reproduced and the means by which it is reproduced are, in principle, 
always open to contestation. Being open to contestation does not mean 
that everything is always and continually in flux. Rather, conflicts arise 
around particular axes of reproduction in specific sites and become re-
solved – temporarily – into forms of settlement, resembling what Gram-
sci described as the ‘life of the state’: a ‘series of unstable equilibria’. 
The existence of heterogeneous social relations within concrete societies 
further implies that we have to think about diverse social forces – and 
their potential for political mobilisation – instead of making the assump-
tion that the only social forces that matter are class forces. The history 
of social reproduction reveals a range of struggles – from the efforts of 
organised labour to win ‘free time’ or protections against market dynam-
ics and market failure, through the struggles of women’s organisations 
over the conditions, costs and consequences of child bearing, to the cit-
izenship rights of groups who have been historically excluded, margin-
alised and subordinated – such rights being one of the collective condi-
tions of social reproduction. In short, the field of the social (that which 
has to be reproduced) is itself both complex and contested. Such a start-
ing point would make more visible than usual the work that has to be 
done to ensure this reproduction – and what happens when that care fails 
to take place. Brigitte Aulenbacher has argued that from this starting 
point we might understand care as the fundamental social practice: that 
without care, nothing – neither people nor the environment – can be ad-
equately reproduced and both suffer profoundly from the carelessness 
of capitalism (Aulenbacher; Aulenbacher et al.). 
This understanding of social and material relations as the focal points 
of economies provides a link to the second imaginary – the idea of the 
commons. Commoning refers to real practices of governing natural re-
sources for collective use and a political imaginary of how social life 
might be organised. Peter Linebaugh has argued for the importance of 
understanding ‘the commons’ as an active process. 
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To speak of the commons as if it were a natural resource is misleading at 
best and dangerous at worst – the commons is an activity and, if anything, it 
expresses relationships in society that are inseparable from relations to na-
ture. It might be better to keep the word as a verb, an activity, rather than as 
a noun, a substantive. (279) 
 
Since Eleanor Ostrom and others challenged Hardin’s 1968 description 
of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (the view that common resources were 
inevitably undermined by the pursuit of economic self-interest), interest 
in commoning has grown. It has combined investigation of existing 
practices of commoning, the articulation of policies and procedures for 
‘governing the commons’ and the development of a politics of common-
ing as an anti-individualist, anti-capitalist ecological economics. It has 
also been extended into debates about whether a ‘social commons’ can 
be imagined, in which questions of social protection and welfare can be 
rethought as communal resources and rights (see, inter alia, Barbagallo 
and Federici; Mestrum; F. Williams). Mestrum has suggested that 
 
[w]hen welfare states or social protection are perceived as commons, after a 
defining and regulating process, they can contribute to collective and indi-
vidual welfare, as emerging from collective and participatory action. The 
commons sustain our common being, our being together, our co-existence. 
They go beyond individual interests. (6) 
 
Two lines of questioning follow from these imaginaries. The first, which 
reflects the centrality of environmental questions to both reproduction 
and commoning, asks whether we can imagine a ‘post-growth econ-
omy’. What Aulenbacher calls ‘careless’ capitalism has been built on 
the presumption of endless growth – the promise that there are always 
new needs to be discovered, new markets to be created, new resources 
to be mined (literally and metaphorically) and new sources of labour to 
be put to work. The global crisis that threatens to engulf us all, and its 
local instantiations (unbreathable air, rising water levels, deforestation, 
species extermination and more) point precisely to the unsustainability 
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of that economic imaginary. A range of approaches have been developed 
as ways of living without growth from Bookchin’s post-scarcity anar-
chism to the Post Growth Institute. Bookchin argued that 
 
[u]nless we realize that the present market society, structured around the bru-
tally competitive imperative of ‘grow or die’, is a thoroughly impersonal, 
self-operating mechanism, we will falsely tend to blame technology as such 
or population growth as such for environmental [and social] problems. We 
will ignore their root causes, such as trade for profit, industrial expansion, 
and the identification of ‘progress’ with corporate self-interest. In short, we 
will tend to focus on the symptoms of a grim social pathology rather than on 
the pathology itself, and our efforts will be directed toward limited goals 
whose attainment is more cosmetic than curative. (463) 
 
The direction and political-cultural dynamics of a post-growth economy 
remain contested (see, for example, some of the discussion in the special 
issue of the journal ephemera). But the urgency of the questions that are 
posed there continues to increase as environmental crises multiply and 
their implications for population movements become more visible. 
The second line of questions intersect forcefully with the first, since 
they concern the future politics of distribution. Ferguson and Li have 
recently suggested that we have come to the end of two potent economic 
imaginaries: in the global north the degradation of waged work, the rise 
of precarity and the rise of automation have meant the end of the ‘proper 
job’ (even as Work is increasingly fetishized as the fundamental human 
activity). In the global south, the ‘myth of development’ is no longer 
sustainable (even as it is recycled in new forms). Neither promise – the 
proper job or urbanising development – can be fulfilled. Indeed, each 
promise was, even in its heyday, only ever selectively and partially de-
livered. In the present though, the question of how people might live and 
how they might make a living, are increasingly pressing matters, locally, 
nationally and globally – and they demand new ways of thinking about 
the social surplus and how to control and distribute it. 
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I have tried to outline one set of things that come into view if we 
consider imagined economies (others are, of course, imaginable). The 
necessary starting point for me is the unlocking of the projected eco-
nomic realism that underpins and constantly demands our acquiescence 
to the contemporary imagined economy (the ‘real’ economy). Under-
standing the myths, stories, fantasies and fictions that work to sustain 
the apparent necessity of the dominant way of ‘doing’ the economy is a 
necessary critical moment. But, as Raymond Williams argued, it is im-
portant to look beyond the dominant to see the residual and emergent 
cultural-political forms that intersect and struggle with it. I have said 
little about the residual, although another essay might have explored 
ideas of the ‘real economy’ (in a world of immaterial flows); the nostal-
gia for ‘proper jobs’ (and its correlate ‘real men’, perhaps); the lingering 
attachment to ideas of social security and social protection (rather than 
thinly punitive welfare); and the varieties of imagined moral economies, 
ruled by principles of fairness and ‘just deserts’, and constrained by the 
obligations of employers as well as workers. Here, though, I have tried 
to concentrate on the ‘emergent’ – economies imagined otherwise 
around questions of reproduction, care, the commons, the ecological cri-
sis and the politics of distribution. These are not simple fantasies (as 
economic realists would insist) nor do they form an integrated and co-
herent political programme. They ask that we think – and act – other-
wise. And that is the best possible reason I can find for exploring imag-
ined economies. 
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 The Rise and Decline of Doux Commerce: 
Change of Experience and Change of 
Perception 
Christiane Eisenberg  
 
 
In his book The Passions and the Interests, the American economist Al-
bert O. Hirschman reconstructed a figure of thought from the late 17th 
and 18th centuries based on the idea that a commercial society is a polite, 
civilised society (Hirschman, The Passions; see also Hirschman, “Rival 
Interpretations”). The key words commerce and doux commerce fit into 
an enlightened intellectual discourse on manners and behaviour that had 
some nationally specific accentuations. While French and German par-
ticipants were accustomed to using the term commerce primarily in the 
sense of sociability, communication and social intercourse (also between 
the sexes) the British also included the economic relations between mar-
ket participants. For thinkers like John Locke, David Hume and Sir 
James Steuart, to name but a few, this was exactly what made the figure 
of thought so attractive. This special accentuation was also noted by for-
eign observers of British relations (for France and Germany: Terjanian; 
Köhnke; Lichtblau; for England and Scotland: Pocock; Hont; from a 
comparative perspective: Oz-Salzberger). Two good examples are the 
French Baron de Montesquieu and the London-based Dutch physician 
Bernard de Mandeville, both of whom readily appropriated the idea. 
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In its specifically British use, the term doux commerce expressed the 
conviction that the activities of buying, selling, bargaining and contract-
ing caused individuals to engage with each other, even and especially in 
the presence of divergences of interest. Since mutual trust, respect, self-
control and, of course, the renunciation of violence are elementary pre-
requisites of trade, it could be expected that an expansion of such rela-
tionships would put an end to arbitrary power relations. The generalisa-
tion of commerce would interest individuals in each other and cause 
them to treat each other with consideration and empathy. As a result, 
society as a whole would benefit. This view was brought to a wider au-
dience when Joseph Addison, co-editor of the magazine The Spectator 
(1711-12, 1714), published a series of articles linking the argument of 
the beneficial effect of the market with an older discourse on politeness 
and civility conducted by aristocrats and wealthy citizens (cf. Knight 
1993). 
Journalistic support, however, does not explain the lasting ac-
ceptance of the figure of thought that remained dominant in England and 
– after the accession of Scotland in 1707 – the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain throughout the 18th century and, at most, faded slightly with the 
publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), the ‘Bible’ of 
future economists. As Hirschman shows, as a description of the function 
and condition of civil society the ideal only went out of fashion around 
1800 at the earliest. Only then did decidedly market-critical positions 
become more pronounced and a few decades later doux commerce at 
best enjoyed the attention of those who – like Herbert Spencer, one of 
the founding fathers of British sociology – specialised in researching ex-
change processes in social life (cf. Gray 171). The general acceptance of 
this market discourse in 18th-century Britain is all the more remarkable 
in view of the fact that foreign observers (with the exception of Montes-
quieu) mostly took a more critical attitude, and that the idea did not meet 
with the same broad approval as in the United Kingdom. While Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel remained sceptical from the outset, Karl Marx 
ridiculed the whole idea of doux commerce (cf. Hirschman, The Pas-
sions 62; Rosanvallon 64). 
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For historians, as well as social scientists and scholars of cultural 
studies, Albert O. Hirschman’s works on commerce and doux commerce 
are extraordinarily stimulating. This is because the author brought to life 
the common word used by contemporaries to describe the early modern 
market economy, commerce. Early modern economics in Britain cannot 
be sufficiently understood with contemporary, socio-scientifically con-
structed terms like “market” and “economy”, which we use today and 
which are also in the title of this anthology. Although “market” was 
known as a noun and verb since the Middle Ages, it was used very un-
specifically, and use of the term “economy” was still extremely rare. 
When Sir James Steuart published his pioneering work Principles of Po-
litical Economy (1767), he first had to laboriously remove the word from 
the context of the Greek word oikos (household), which was detrimental 
to the market success of his work. Seen in this light, Hirschman cut a 
path into the jungle of early modern economic history. 
On the other hand, Hirschman’s explanation for the ups and downs 
of doux commerce is too simple because, as can often be observed with 
economists, he drew conclusions from the theory of contemporary econ-
omists as evidence for what happened in practice. In this specific case, 
it amounts to saying that he attributed the turn away from doux com-
merce to the breakthrough of the Industrial Revolution and the triumph 
of capitalism. From a historical point of view, this is not convincing. The 
English economy had been a market economy long before 1800 and in 
this capacity had also developed capitalist elements. Tellingly, the time 
when the Enlightenment thinkers first put the idea of doux commerce 
down on paper was the period after the Glorious Revolution of 1688/89, 
when a genuinely capitalist institution like the Bank of England (1694) 
was founded and the financial markets of the City of London trans-
formed the pound sterling into the capital that gave capitalism its name.  
Hirschman also relies on an outdated state of research with regard to the 
Industrial Revolution. In the 1970s, when he wrote The Passions and the 
Interests, economic historians did indeed still date the breakthrough to 
the 1780s. According to the current state of research, this can only be 
said for the period after about 1830; only then was commercial mass 
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production, which had previously been decentralised and mostly rural 
(so-called proto-industry) production, moved to centralised factories on 
a large scale (cf., for example, King and Timmins). Thus, there is an 
unexplained chronological gap of around half a century in Hirschman’s 
explanation, which must be bridged by other arguments. 
This article attempts to bring the rise and fall of doux commerce into 
line with chronology. To this end it considers not only the history of 
markets and the market economy in Britain, but also the change of power 
relations in the social, political and media context in which they were 
embedded. In accordance with the focus of this volume, this article is 
limited to the British case. Following Albert O. Hirschman, this discus-
sion aims to capture the complexity of civil society as a market society 
and thus raise the level of debate. In the context of this volume, this 
means at least alluding to the bridge to the “real fictions” of contempo-
rary imagined economies. 
 
 
THE RISE OF COMMERCE AND DOUX 
COMMERCE: BRITISH PECULIARITIES1 
 
Early Start and Slow Pace of the Market Economy 
 
Market relations, and by that I mean the exchange of goods and services 
for money, are probably as old as humanity. The prerequisite for their 
generalisation, however, is an institutional framework. In the case of 
England this framework was set up in 1066 when William the Conqueror 
defeated King Harold II at the Battle of Hastings. William liquidated 
almost the whole of the Anglo-Saxon nobility and declared himself lord 
                                                             
1  The explanations in the following chapter are based on the results of the re-
search in Eisenberg, The Rise of Market Society in England, 1066-1800, un-
less otherwise stated. Therefore, I refrain from providing any further refer-
ences. 
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of the territory which thereby became a unified state. The state was con-
ducted on the basis of Common Law, a part continuation of Anglo-
Saxon law. It was organised centrally, as far as that was possible with 
medieval means. The upshot was an economically and legally integrated 
territory with next to no internal customs control worth mentioning. Free 
persons, with the help of royal justice, were able to bring cases against 
fraudsters and bankrupt persons, lazy debtors and defaulting contractors. 
From 1362 at the latest they could even do so in the vernacular, because 
that was when English became the official language of administration. 
As currency the pound sterling was used as a continuation of Anglo-
Saxon conventions. The old penny coins of the Anglo-Saxons were 
gradually replaced by new ones made of sterling silver. 
In the early modern period, market relations continued to intensify. 
Agricultural labour markets became widespread after the plague wave 
of the 15th century, because the landlords were forced by the high de-
mand for labour to relax feudal dependencies and accept freedom of 
movement. With the decline of the guilds in the 16th and 17th centuries 
free labour markets formed in many trades; sometimes even rudimentary 
trade unions sprang up to compensate for the structural disadvantages 
suffered by suppliers of labour. At about the same time, long-distance 
trade was intensified, equipping the consumer goods markets, which 
then assumed mass character in the 18th century, with the expansion of 
the proto-industrial mode of production in the countryside. A certain de-
gree of underdevelopment in the banking sector was compensated for in 
1694 by the founding of the Bank of England, which at the same time 
issued banknotes covered by tax revenues thus establishing a modern 
money market. The now flourishing financial markets favoured the fi-
nancing of corporations and other larger enterprises, including the state, 
and with the South Sea Bubble in 1719/20, a first speculative crisis on a 
pan-European scale developed. Even in the longer term, individuals and 
collective financiers made substantial investments in the expansion of 
long-distance and domestic trade and infrastructure; wholesale and retail 
trade flourished, as did the press, entertainment and other service indus-
tries, both in urban and rural areas. Around 1800 market relationships in 
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England were so common that only minors and the inhabitants of poor-
houses and other institutions were able to avoid the concomitant oppor-
tunities and demands. Every household made up at least one consump-
tion unit (and quite often one production unit). In order to survive they 
were forced to deal with money. The simple exchange of natural goods 
and bartering was, if at all, widespread only among the inhabitants of 
far-flung villages. 
Seen from such a long-term historical perspective, marketisation in 
England was characterised by several specific features. Firstly, the pro-
cess began at an extraordinarily early date, at the end of the Middle 
Ages, and thence proceeded steadily without setbacks. If the individual 
stages of development created new social problems, they were rectified 
over time. Similarly, there was no accumulation of problems as a result 
of overlapping by other stages of modernisation. The nation state was in 
place before the domestic market took shape. The Industrial Revolution 
only began 750 years afterwards, when the market economy had already 
penetrated the entire British Isles. The fact that a brake was put on the 
dynamics of the English market society as a result of its early start and 
the gradual networking of business and society might be regarded as a 
problematic side-effect of the process. However, contemporaries did not 
regard this as a problem. As pioneers in the area they knew no other 
standards than their own. Thus the slow pace of development supported 
the perception of commerce as doux commerce. 
 
Power Relations and Exchange Relations 
 
In the process outlined, the Crown played a dual role. It guaranteed the 
framework conditions for free exchange, in which it was itself involved 
as an actor, and in the functioning of which it had a high degree of self-
interest as it financed itself through tax revenues dependent on a flour-
ishing community. To the extent that this dual role entailed contradictory 
requirements the Crown usually subordinated the ostentatious demon-
stration of its instruments of power to economic interests. Ever since the 
Magna Carta this priority has been evident in the recurrent negotiations 
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between monarchs and parliament, which have always been occupied 
with the modalities of day-to-day market dealings. The extent of the 
willingness to renounce direct rule was evident not least in the military 
sphere. As early as the 12th century, the kings began to do without the 
active military service of the barons and instead imposed on them the 
costs of a mercenary army – a measure which in the long term meant 
that the English nobility no longer carried weapons but instead devel-
oped into a purely civilian landowning class. Especially in this measure 
medievalists recognise the basis of a specifically English “Bastard Feu-
dalism” (McFarlane). A decisive mechanism for the early dissolution of 
personal dependencies was the fact that, unlike on the European conti-
nent, military service and other feudal services could, in principle, be 
performed in monetary form. 
Another specific feature of the English feudal system was the lack 
of a graded hierarchy between king and subjects. In the interests of di-
vide et impera, since William the Conqueror, the Crown took care to 
distribute baronial property throughout the land to prevent dynasties and 
conspiracies from developing. In their role as subjects of the Crown, the 
barons were on a par with the commoners, and when the Crown had 
monopolies to grant – and these included not only special rights of long-
distance trading companies, but also e.g. entrepreneurs who acquired the 
right to hold markets in specific places – it awarded the contract to those 
who paid the highest price. Because of their formal equality as subjects, 
the English population was largely spared the negative experience of 
their contemporaries in early modern Central Europe, namely that in cer-
tain situations they became the object of power games of selfish inter-
mediate instances of the ruling system, which – like city councils and 
guilds – were endowed with the authority of princes and local authorities 
and were able to enforce their particular interests at the expense of third 
parties (cf. Ogilvie, “The State in Germany” and Institutions and Euro-
pean Trade). In particular, they were spared from arbitrarily fixed feudal 
levies, bans on luxury and other restrictions on their economic activi-
ties, from restrictions on their rights as residents and citizens, from trad-
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ing bans on certain population groups (e.g. foreigners and Jews) and fi-
nally from restrictions on their consumer behaviour. What that meant in 
everyday life becomes clear when we consider that Central European 
conventions of this kind also included the obligation of husbands to su-
pervise the business of their wives and of master craftsmen to discipline 
apprentices and journeymen (cf. Ogilvie, “Consumption”; Kocka 329-
34). 
Insofar as English market actors coordinated themselves with the 
help of group action, organisation and consolidation of their capital in 
order to create a special basis of power in their respective economic en-
vironment, this was done on a voluntary and reciprocal basis. In this 
context it is worth mentioning the professionalisation efforts of insur-
ance experts and stockbrokers, which during the course of the 18th cen-
tury led to the creation of Lloyds of London and the London Stock Ex-
change; the turnpike societies and the private development companies 
to boost construction activity in the cities; the strikes and organisational 
efforts of journeymen; and finally, the countless friendly societies for 
mutual assistance in the event of illness and other dangers in a market 
society, which existed in all classes and strata of society. These coordi-
nated activities not only yielded individual benefits, but also a number 
of welfare effects for society as a whole. All these features seemed to 
confirm the notion of doux commerce. Last but not least, one should 
mention popular culture with its sports competitions, games, theatre per-
formances and concerts. The latter were extraordinarily lively and crea-
tive not least because voluntary associations and commercial initiatives 
were largely unaffected by interventions from the authorities and were 
therefore able to work together without hindrance. 
 
Empathy as a Market Strategy 
 
So far this article has attributed the experience of doux commerce in me-
dieval and early modern England – firstly – to the guarantee of institu-
tional framework conditions by the state and – secondly – to the weak-
ness of feudal power structures, which might have impaired free market 
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exchange. A third observation, which I would now like to elaborate on, 
refers to the necessity for market players in Britain to pay a great deal of 
attention to each other. This peculiarity was not, say, due to the fact that 
they only traded on a face-to-face basis or only with acquaintances, be-
cause even in the early modern era market relations were generally me-
diated by long chains of dealings and were therefore faced with all kinds 
of uncertainties. The decisive factor was rather that most transactions 
were not paid in cash, but with bills of exchange and promissory notes, 
i.e. written and personally signed orders. This convention had social 
consequences: because the inevitability of credit on a “good name” led 
to the fact that everyone was simultaneously a debtor and creditor, this 
made it necessary to have a high measure of self-promotion and sensitive 
external perception. The exchange economy was a reaction to the fact 
that the general shortage of coins in Europe was particularly pronounced 
in England, because, in order to preserve their autonomy externally, the 
monarchs had foreign coins rigorously confiscated and converted into 
pounds sterling. When Englishmen traded with each other they not only 
needed a good reputation, but were inevitably interested in the specific 
situation of their counterparts, which had to be investigated. Anyone 
who failed to submit to this effort – for example by insensitive haggling 
– ran the risk of harming his own reputation and cast doubt on his own 
creditworthiness. (cf. Muldrew). 
Strategic doux commerce of this kind was particularly noticeable in 
the everyday dealings of the so-called “commercial classes”, that is to 
say of the people who were professionally involved in shaping and co-
ordinating market relationships. Contemporary statisticians counted the 
following among these: merchants, traders, agents and other so-called 
middlemen, exchange and share dealers, moneylenders, bankers and 
stock exchange workers. Then there was the so-called itinerant class by 
which I mean the armies of hauliers, mobile traders and representatives. 
And finally, there were also the hundreds of thousands of shopkeepers, 
whose influence on market activities reached a peak in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. We can include government civil servants involved in collect-
ing taxes, members of professions like lawyers and notaries, publishers, 
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journalists and those involved in the arts and entertainment. Many of 
these service people lived in growing towns which, in turn, created an 
additional need for coordination because of their complex social rela-
tionships. But one of the main features of English market society was 
that the thoroughly commercialised and regionally specialised agricul-
tural business, which sold its produce at home and abroad, also relied 
heavily on go-between services. 
Starting at the end of the 17th century, the number of connecting peo-
ple of this kind grew rapidly and exchange relationships intensified. This 
was a further feature that motivated individuals to take an interest in each 
other; it also promoted the impression that commerce was a civilizing 
force. The growth had increased since the Middle Ages but received an 
above-average boost towards the start of the 18th century. Whereas be-
tween 1688 and 1750 the population grew by around 10%, the increase 
in the number of the above-mentioned professions – i.e. long before the 
start of industrialisation – was between 32 and 63% (de Vries and van 
der Woude 528-29).  
Another measure of the outstanding importance of empathy as a mar-
ket strategy of the “commercial classes” in early-modern England was 
the proportion of the service sector to the labour force. According to the 
1801 census this comprised 34% of the economically active population, 
more than twice the figure in other countries in Western and Central Eu-
rope. Contemporaries regarded this as a problem of surplus supply, and 
their perception was clearly correct. For the order of magnitude of 34% 
was equivalent to the service sector of the USA around 1900 (32%), of 
the German Reich in 1936 (36%) and of France in 1937 (37%) (Buch-
heim 33). Anyone who offered services had to make an effort to ensnare 
his customers and clients, accommodate their interests and anticipate 
their expectations – features which were particularly relevant for per-
sonal services which comprised by far the largest sub-category. 
Regarded in these terms, “doux commerce” in early-modern Eng-
land was an expression and an effect of the existential competitive ex-
periences of a surplus population which had been relieved of feudal du-
ties and released into the duties and necessities of surviving in a market 
Rise and Decline of Doux Commerce | 45 
society. Anyone arriving from the countryside in search of a job natu-
rally tended to head in the direction of trading, transport and other activ-
ities in the service sector. And anyone either devoid of a viable business 
idea or sufficient financial or social capital tried to get him- or herself a 
paid job in one of these branches. Seen in this light, market actors in 
early-modern England felt compelled to conduct their activities in the 
sense of doux commerce particularly because their conditions of market 
activities were anything but doux. 
 
 
THE DECLINE OF DOUX COMMERCE 
 
That concludes my argument that the idea of doux commerce had a real 
basis in experience in early-modern England from which it drew its plau-
sibility. How do we now explain the fact that it waned in the 19th cen-
tury? I ask this question because there was, as mentioned previously, not 
only no change in direction or qualitative renewal of the process of mar-
ketisation in the decisive years around 1800, but also because one can 
observe a large number of negative concomitants of the market society 
before 1800 without, however, these facts taking centre-stage in the dis-
course. These include: speculation crises and irrational mass behaviour; 
alienation; the accumulation of capital resources with its concomitant 
accumulation of social power; and an increase in social inequality. I 
would therefore like to propose explanations for the change in market 
discourse that refer less to the economy itself than to the political and 
social context it helped to shape.  
One development which might contribute to explaining the decline 
in the persuasive power of doux commerce is the structural change to 
British public life between 1800 and 1830. The advance of a consumer 
society in the 18th century had created new fashions at an ever increasing 
rate, in clothing, household goods and other everyday objects; the act of 
purchasing had been culturally inflated by the functional architecture of 
businesses and commercial buildings and the attentive behaviour of 
salespersons; and a commercial entertainment culture had reinvented 
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and perfected playful forms of expressions of market exchange in sport, 
theatre, music and other social activities. Fashion-makers, the advertis-
ing business and the enlightened press who mediated these attractions to 
an interested audience had first addressed the upper and middle classes, 
but the market principle extended beyond social boundaries. As far as 
consumption was concerned the lower strata of society and their inter-
ests were involved following the entanglement of luxury and second-
hand markets as early as the 18th century (cf. Lemire), but these classes 
were scarcely taken into consideration in any debates on consumption. 
As paying customers the lower classes were not regarded by journal-
ists and public-relations experts as being sufficiently attractive to be a 
target group, because for many years they did not belong to the groups 
of buyers of newspapers, whose prices had been artificially increased by 
stamp duties, duties on paper and other taxes. These duties were, how-
ever, removed in the early 1830s and the first to profit were Chartist 
papers and the popular Penny Press. When wages began to increase as a 
result of the mid-Victorian boom, new types of newspapers aimed at a 
mass audience were launched onto the market. These competed for new 
classes of readers and therefore cooperated closely with other branches 
of the advertising industry (cf. Wiener). In this new competitive struggle 
journalists were unable to survive with doux commerce rhetoric. Much 
higher sales could be achieved by sensational stories about exploitation, 
blatant fraud and the negative effects of market failure (cf. Johnson; Tay-
lor). A certain exception from the rule was the genre of “business jour-
nalism”, represented for example by the Economist; as this was devel-
oped under the premise that it would be better to withhold certain details 
and practices of market exchange from public attention. This too was a 
contemporary adaptation of doux commerce to changed circumstances 
(cf. Poovey).   
A second change in 19th century Britain, which I should like to put 
forward as an explanation for the waning of this idea, was the successful 
process of democratisation in Great Britain. In order to make this con-
nection understandable it is helpful to recall a general difficulty when 
observing market exchange: the fact that the actors mostly administer 
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their exit option tacitly. On the one hand, this can be explained by the 
fact that failed actors who leave the market do so tacitly. On the other 
hand, an alternative way of reacting, which might be described by Albert 
O. Hirschman as “voice”, i.e. as “the act of complaining or organising 
oneself … with the intention of achieving a direct improvement of qual-
ity,” presupposes a concrete addressee, and such a person or group of 
persons cannot be identified in markets – in contrast to organisations or 
other hierarchical settings (Hirschman, “Abwanderung” 332-33, trans. 
by Eisenberg; cf. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 22-25). In the 17th 
and 18th centuries, this frustration often led to collective protests, say, 
against a rise in prices often being aimed at the nearest addressees, which 
at the time were mostly local political authorities. Edward P. Thompson 
has described this vividly in his work on the “moral economy” of the 
crowd. When, in the wake of the French Revolution, radical politics dis-
covered Parliament as the place to address demands and protests, this 
created a new sounding board for “voice”: one whose comprehensive 
scope corresponded to the nationwide dimension of commercial society. 
The political movements in the 19th century, from the London Corre-
sponding Society via Chartism, the trade union and cooperative move-
ments all the way to the Reform Movement, then took the next step by 
feeding concepts like ‘exploitation’, ‘inequality’ and ‘class’ into market 
discourse. It is irrelevant whether these concepts alone were new or de-
scribed the situation at hand correctly. It is much more important to re-
alise that these new public emphases were highly appropriate to express 
doubts about the integrating capacity of markets in civil society (cf. Noel 
Thompson; Hobsbawm; Stedman Jones).    
This effect was bolstered by concrete experiences which also ex-
tended beyond local levels. With the help of strikes and the collective 
use of economies of scale, trade unions and consumer cooperatives, 
which operated at national levels from the 1860s onward, succeeded in 
intervening in the power relationships of labour and consumer markets. 
This changed public perceptions to such an extent that they were now 
seen as representatives of the interests of market victims. The foundation 
of the Labour Party at the turn of the 20th century finally brought the 
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social question onto the main political stage. As a result, the negotiation 
of explicit rules of interaction between market actors was subjected more 
than ever to the imperatives of political elections and political parties, 
which sought to create a mass appendage under the impression of the 
ever-expanding right to vote. However, the pioneer of this type of mass 
party, which included this in their calculations, was the Chartist Move-
ment of the 1830s, which was the first to make free and universal (male) 
suffrage its banner and thus set the standards for others to come. Alt-
hough the Chartists failed, they greatly accelerated the transformation of 
the old Whig Party into the Liberal Party and the Tories into the Con-
servative Party, as well as the demand for participation in the general 
press. The rules and expectations of conduct that specific social groups 
wanted to generalise were now the subject of controversial discussion 
and made the potential for social conflict more apparent than before (cf. 
Searle; Johnson).  
The more these processes of democratisation progressed, the paler 
the idea of doux commerce became and soon it disappeared completely 
from public discourse. On the one hand, it was hardly possible to convey 
to the general public that the market that gave rise to such disputes could 
prompt members of civil society to conduct themselves with self-con-
trol, respect and mutual trust. Towards the end of the 19th century, the 
central question of market discourse to the British public was therefore 
no longer “How can markets, how can commerce contribute to fending 
off arbitrary claims to power brought to society from outside”, but “Why 
do markets threaten civil society from within?” (Keane 30).  On the other 
hand, the market became the subject of an expert discourse. Parliamen-
tary and journalistic debates on stock speculation, liability obligations 
of partnerships, employee profit-sharing and the right of coalition led to 
a number of new laws, and some industrialists adopted high-profile ini-
tiatives on company social policy. This development profiled the oppor-
tunities of corporate market actors and took the experience-based per-
spectives of individuals off the agenda. This was not least at the expense 
of consumers, who had always experienced doux commerce to a special 
degree and were now moved to the margins of public discourse (this is 
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the argument of Parry 164-86, especially 185; see also Searle 264-68; 
and Johnson).  
 
 
COMMERCE AND DOUX COMMERCE  
IN THE LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE 
 
The market was traditionally seen as a place where real people met to 
exchange and do business – a place for commerce and doux commerce 
alike. This interactive, sociable dimension of the market had been par-
ticularly pronounced in Britain since the Middle Ages, probably stronger 
than in continental European countries that I have not examined further 
in this paper. But in Britain, too, it increasingly faded into the back-
ground over the course of the 19th century, with the result that doux com-
merce as a figure of thought became obsolete. At least when Hirschman 
reintroduced it into economic discourse in the 1970s and 1980s, it had 
been widely forgotten, and it has remained so. Even the collapse of So-
viet-style socialism, which gave the market economy an unexpected 
boost and legitimacy, did not change this state of affairs. When the po-
litical scientist and philosopher John Keane, a proven leftist, introduced 
the first issue of the Journal of Civil Society at the beginning of the 21st 
century with an homage to this old idea, he did so as a deliberate provo-
cation to ignite a controversy. But some of the contributors from other 
European countries reacted so sharply that the debate was nipped in the 
bud.   
The historical processes underlying this development are obvious: 
when it is not a question of selling a highly specialised workforce or 
buying houses or used cars, today’s market players are confronted with 
fixed prices that make bargaining superfluous. The legislator has stand-
ardised contracting, and the interactions required for transactions are in-
creasingly carried out through computers and other vending machines. 
This has further weakened the imagination of the commercial society 
and the possibilities for shaping it. Commerce has definitely disappeared 
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from the scientific as well as the general political discourse. The substi-
tute term “market”, on the other hand, is in its typical uses an empty 
abstraction, even a phantom, which can be imagined at will.  
Accordingly, current research in this field is largely limited to tech-
nical questions like examining the market pricing mechanism or indi-
vidual responses to the challenge of uncertainty. It is mostly about the 
efficiency of either “the economy” or “capitalism”. The cultural-studies 
correlate of this type of ‘market research’ are analyses of “fictions” and 
“real fictions” of the market, as collected in this volume. This opens up 
a new, original field of experimentation for critical researchers. How-
ever, in most research of this kind the term “market” typically refers to 
an abstraction, indeed a phantom, whose quality and scope are time-
spanning. What is missing is a historicisation of the modes of linking 
“reality” and “fiction” of the market.  It is difficult to imagine how the 
gap between economics and economic life could be overcome without 
such an analysis. 
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 The Emotional Economies of Colonial 
Capitalism and Its Legacies 
Jana Gohrisch 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In his essay “Imagined, Real and Moral Economies” published in 2014, 
John Clarke defines ‘imagined’ as “the discursive or ideological repre-
sentation of what an economy is” (97). In his contribution to this volume 
“Why Imagined Economies?” he uses the term interchangeably with 
‘imaginary’ as a device to escape the dominant neoliberal narrative of 
‘the Economy’ and to open up intellectual space “for imagining other 
economies, or even for imagining economies otherwise” (see chapter 
Clarke in this volume). However, neither text employs the categories 
race and ethnicity, which are as central as class (and gender) to under-
stand how, since the onset of large-scale colonisation, capitalist agricul-
tural and industrial enterprises owned mainly by whites have managed 
to enlist the state and public funding to secure cheap black and brown 
labour to make private profit. An equally unacknowledged white per-
spective predominates in Ute Frevert’s introduction and survey essay in 
her edited collection Moral Economies. Despite the focus on the – slave-
trading – 18th century that comes with her topic, she mentions colonial-
ism and enslavement as means of accumulating capital only in passing 
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(Frevert, “Moral Economies” 20, 37, 39). Both Frevert and Clarke, how-
ever, borrow E. P. Thompson’s term ‘moral economy’ to understand 
past and present economic thought. While Frevert refutes Thompson’s 
politics and eventually uses the term very generally to specify the “con-
flicting views on economic activities” (Frevert, “Introduction” 11), 
Clarke treats “‘moral economies’ as another form of imagined econ-
omy” (“Imagined, Real” 95). He employs Thompson’s ideas as a spring-
board to reflect convincingly on “whether the moral, political and eco-
nomic can – and should – be related” today (107).1  
Taking literally the second half of this volume’s title, real fictions, I 
will read the colonial novel Lutchmee and Dilloo. A Study of West Indian 
Life (1877) by Edward Jenkins, a British writer and political reformer, 
to highlight the connections between race, class and the economy from 
the perspective of literary studies. With this, I wish to extend the inter-
disciplinary discussion of imagined economies into the past, thus com-
plementing Melissa Kennedy’s literary studies contribution to this vol-
ume. She investigates the potential of the arts and humanities “to inter-
vene in education, public discourse, and economic decision-making” 
(see chapter Kennedy in this volume) for which she conjures up a con-
temporary ‘we’ to imagine a collective subject in opposition to neolib-
eral capitalism. In my chapter, however, I propose to acknowledge the 
conflicting interests of the distinctly racialised agents in capitalist econ-
omy and, from there, to understand the cognitive and emotional effects 
                                                             
1  Clarke writes: “Thompson’s use of the idea [of a moral economy] was lo-
cated in a specific social formation and its disruption, producing a moment 
in which food rioters in 18th century England laid claim to collective under-
standings of how economic relations were structured by moral obligations. 
Rioters – and those who judged them – understood this field of moral ties as 
legitimation for public anger and action. The current instabilities of the dom-
inantly imagined economy have made it more possible to pose questions 
about questions of whether the moral, political and economic can – and 
should – be related.” (107) 
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of these unresolved conflicts in both quotidian and academic discourses 
today.  
Lutchmee and Dilloo. A Study of West Indian Life is set in British 
Guyana’s sugar plantation economy of the 1870s and is, despite the in-
vestigative connotations of ‘study’, marked out as ‘real fiction’ by its 
generically mixed aesthetics. It is a work of artistic imagination self-
confidently embedded in British economic imperialism and its concom-
itant racist colonial ideology. I argue that the novel establishes a racial-
ised emotional economy to normalise the extensive exploitation of un-
derpaid brown and black migrant labour for its implied white middle-
class and metropolitan readership. To take the argument further, this nor-
malising discourse has had both epistemological and emotional reper-
cussions in Britain, which continues to shape the debate about economy 
and race to this very day. The most conspicuous legacies of the emo-
tional economies of colonial capitalism are a select epistemological si-
lence and an equally select emotional eloquence. Together, they serve to 
disconnect what is causally connected: capitalist economy and racist dis-
crimination. 
 
 
LEGACIES IN 21ST-CENTURY NON-FICTION: 
EITHER ECONOMY OR RACE 
 
Neither the British sociologist (John Clarke), the German historian (Ute 
Frevert) nor the literary studies scholar based in Austria (Melissa Ken-
nedy) quoted above mentions race (although the latter has published 
widely on colonial capitalism). Neither do the two US-American repre-
sentatives of economic criticism, a relatively new approach in literary 
criticism, as they dismiss the category to a footnote (Woodmansee and 
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Osteen 43). Conversely, if one takes a look at the long history of Amer-
ican Critical Race Theory2, race is central, but one finds little to no fun-
damental censure of capitalist economy when practised by whites. To 
this field Nancy Leong has recently added a substantial essay on “Racial 
Capitalism” published in the specialist Harvard Law Review. Similar to 
Eva Illouz’s critique of the commodification of emotions and their trans-
formation into “emodities” (Illouz 1ff.), Leong analyses the commer-
cialisation of non-white racial identities. She then suggests legal 
measures to ameliorate the detrimental effects of this process on African 
and white Americans alike.  
Targeting a much larger audience in Britain, award-winning journal-
ist Reni Eddo-Lodge and former barrister-turned-journalist Afua Hirsch, 
popular historian David Olusoga, and rapper Akala (to name but a few) 
write about race in late-capitalist Britain. They keep a high profile on 
the internet with blogs, videos and websites as well as in other media, 
especially documentary and educational film. Eddo-Lodge has won sev-
eral awards; Hirsch was one of the judges for the 2019 Booker Prize; 
and Olusoga is a much sought-after writer, broadcaster, TV presenter 
and filmmaker who, through his work, has continuously drawn attention 
to the importance of race in Britain. While the tone of the academics 
mentioned above is emotionally detached, with some irony added in 
Clarke, the journalists opt for emotional display to make themselves 
heard and, ironically, seen.  
More than 30 years ago, Paul Gilroy published his antiracist polemic 
There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. The Cultural Politics of Race 
                                                             
2  The overwhelmingly rich African American discussion of race is not part of 
my discussion but there is plenty of material dissecting the intricate connec-
tions between race and the economy which, to name just one seminal text, 
Angela Davis’s Women, Race and Class (1981) shows. For an antiracist cri-
tique of Gender Studies see Sabine Broeck’s Gender and the Abjection of 
Blackness (2018). See also her co-edited collection (with Jason R. Am-
broise) Black Knowledges/Black Struggles: Essays in Critical Epistemology 
(2015). 
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and Nation (1987). It is one of the most outstanding in a long line of 
similar texts that have come out since the end of the 20th century and the 
millennium, when New Labour’s policy of multiculturalism encouraged 
fictional and non-fictional writing by black and Asian British writers. 
Why should two young black British professional women (Eddo-Lodge, 
Hirsch) see the need to cover the same ground again and to such public 
acclaim? Fred D’Aguiar, Guyana-born writer and critic of the Gilroy-
generation, explains the reason in a fictive letter to Beryl Gilroy, the 
Guyanese-British author of the autobiographical Black Teacher (1994) 
and mother of Paul Gilroy. 15 years after her death, D’Aguiar honours her 
brave struggle against frequent occurrences of institutional and everyday 
racism. Employing an economic metaphor, he deplores with some bit-
terness that Beryl Gilroy had fought “without an insurance policy against 
their reoccurrence” (“Letter to Beryl Gilroy” 759). He continues: “It is 
this sad and dismaying reality which informs racism in Britain, that it is 
ever lasting, that the vigilance against it must be a perpetual stance, 
never to be relaxed and certainly never retired from use.” (759) Subse-
quently, D’Aguiar retraces his bold statement made 30 years earlier 
when he provocatively opened an essay with the claim: “There is no 
Black British literature, there is only literature with its usual variants of 
class, sex, race, time and place.” (“Against Black British” 106) Despite 
the fact that the “bigger white-owned presses have cashed in on the de-
mand for black creativity” (111), he states in his letter to Beryl Gilroy 
that black British writers “feel that Britishness obliterates difference ra-
ther than seeing difference in others as an enrichment of it” (“Letter to 
Beryl Gilroy” 761). He mentions public administration, police and pris-
ons explicitly as places of racism (759) but not the economy. 
Afua Hirsch and Reni Eddo-Lodge differ in their registers from both 
the earlier writers and from each other. Hirsch’s Brit(ish): On Race, 
Identity and Belonging is a generic mixture of memoir, reportage and 
political analysis, which comes across as personally concerned but calm 
and reflective. Situated at the other end of the emotional spectrum, 
Eddo-Lodge adopts a belligerent stance occasionally resorting to anger 
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and rage as evident in the book’s sarcastic title Why I’m No Longer Talk-
ing to White People about Race taken from a blog posted in 2014. Al-
though the two writers are explicit on the imperial origins and economic 
implications of British racism and refer to the large-scale economically 
motivated immigration after the war, they do not discuss the causal and 
structural links between the neoliberal economy and racial discrimina-
tion. Both, however, comment on social class. Afua Hirsch is very much 
aware of her middle-class status and privilege, especially in contrast to 
black working-class people, which allow her to explore her identity as a 
mixed-race professional woman. Despite this economic belonging, she 
feels emotionally excluded from British society. Based on statistics and 
census data, Reni Eddo-Lodge exposes the phrase ‘white working class’ 
as a construct in the tradition of ‘divide and rule’ (Eddo-Lodge 95-96, 
202, 206) designed to remove from sight black and brown working-class 
people.  
Both writers forcefully denounce that, “in Britain, we are taught not 
to see race” (Hirsch 10). Eddo-Lodge spells out the consequences: “Col-
our-blindness does not accept the legitimacy of structural racism or a 
history of white racial dominance. […] In order to dismantle unjust, racist 
structures, we must see race” (Eddo-Lodge 83-84). Hirsch ends her book 
with the following caveat: “Colour […] blindness […] is not a good 
strategy for seeing what is there. Race is there, as lived experience, as 
the basis for the most dramatic economic and human shifts in history” 
(318). While Hirsch uses the adjective ‘economic’, Eddo-Lodge ex-
plains racism more generally as “the survival strategy of systemic 
power” (64). She convincingly contends that racism is not “about moral 
values” (64) but then does not spell out what ‘systemic power’ would 
comprise in her view. Similar to Hirsch’s style, her diction shows a pref-
erence for passive constructions and abstract references to ‘structure’ 
and ‘system’. Alluding to her (unwillingly taken) role as “the angry 
black woman” (186), she declares: “I have no desire to be equal. I want 
to deconstruct the structural power of a system that marked me out as 
different. […] Equality is fine as a transitional demand but […] it is the 
easy route” (184). Eddo-Lodge’s argument leaves the reader to choose 
The Emotional Economies | 61 
from two imagined camps: white, dominant and complacent or black, 
oppressed and angry. “[R]acism is a white problem. It reveals the anxi-
eties, hypocrisies and double standards of whiteness. It is a problem in 
the psyche of whiteness that white people must take responsibility to 
solve” (219). Eddo-Lodge then warns of pointless “white guilt” and de-
mands: “Instead, get angry. Anger is useful. Use it for good” (221). I 
shall now take up Eddo-Lodge’s call indicating the agents and their con-
flicting interests in the economic processes that constitute the systemic 
power she condemns.  
 
 
MID-19TH-CENTURY COLONIAL FICTION: 
ECONOMY, RACE, EMOTIONS 
 
Someone who unashamedly ‘sees’ race, as well as the hierarchies of 
class and ethnicity, and openly presents them as pillars of 19th-century 
imperial economy is Edward Jenkins (1838-1910). The once well-
known writer disappeared from view for most of the 20th century and 
was only rediscovered by postcolonial-studies scholars in the 21st cen-
tury enquiring into the role of indenture in post-emancipation Caribbean 
economies.  
After the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1833, the for-
mer slave-owners, especially in the newer colonies of Trinidad and Guy-
ana, imported migrant labourers mainly from India and China to replace 
the Africans who left the industrial plantation economy due to oppres-
sive conditions and low wages. “Between 1838 and 1918, approximately 
500,000 Indians and 200,000 Chinese were brought to work in the Car-
ibbean […]” (Klein 4). Describing the situation for Guyana, Brian 
Moore specifies the exact numbers and hints at the tax-based financial 
arrangements underpinning the process: “By 1900 a total of 270,448 im-
migrants, nearly three times the native [African-Guyanese] population 
of 1838, were brought into the colony at public expense: from Madeira 
32,216 […], from India 210,639, from Africa 14,060, and from China 
13,533” (Moore 8). In order to escape their impoverished conditions in 
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colonial India following massive displacements especially in the prov-
inces of Bihar, Bengal and Madras (Klein 67), thousands of Indian peas-
ants and small artisans agreed to contracts offering five years of badly 
but steadily paid plantation work in the Caribbean. In Guyana, “the 
planter-dominated colonial regime” spent “large sums of public money 
to import new immigrant labourers” (Moore 8) which “conflicted di-
rectly with the interests of the native Creoles” whose “wages fell” as 
“jobs became scarcer, taxation to support immigration rose” (Moore 11) 
and land became more difficult to acquire. The British state, that is the 
Colonial Office, administered the process through its representatives in 
London and the colonies such as Guyana. “The state was responsible for 
protecting the economic interests of the plantations, as well as the social 
and political interests of the white minority” (Moore 13). State-paid gov-
ernors, administrators, magistrates and other staff made sure the local 
colonial economies ran smoothly. After the Second World War, the Brit-
ish state was once again responsible for the supply of cheap labour for 
British businesses as well as British public services, such as transport 
and the NHS, and achieved this by importing large contingents of work-
ers from the Caribbean in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by South 
Asians in the 1960s and 1970s. These are similar processes based on the 
same racist principle: state-managed import of cheap black and brown 
labour to serve the needs of privately (but also welfare state-) owned 
white businesses.  
In 1870 Jenkins, then a liberal MP and barrister, went to British Guy-
ana on behalf of the London-based Aboriginal Protection and Anti-Slav-
ery Society to report on the work of a royal commission investigating 
the conditions of indentured labourers on the sugar plantations. In 1871, 
he published the comprehensive study The Coolie. His Rights and 
Wrongs with which he calls for more state control over the plantation 
owners’ abusive treatment of their workforce.3 As the text had not stirred 
                                                             
3  The cover and title page of the 1871 American edition advertised the text as 
“By the Author of Ginx’s Baby” instead of giving the author’s name. Letizia 
Gramaglia used this edition for the re-publication of The Coolie. His Rights 
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the British public into the pity and compassion Jenkins wished it to feel 
for the Indian labourers’ plight, he took to fiction to popularise the mat-
ter. By then, he was already famous for his satires Ginx’s Baby and Little 
Hodge, two slim volumes, which today make for annoying reading com-
pared to the great tradition of English satire. They are both condescend-
ing in tone and conservative in politics because they suggest that the 
working and the peasant classes are in need of help by the middle and 
upper classes. The latter, however, do nothing but meddle incompetently 
with the affairs of the poor instead of alleviating their sufferings.4 Pub-
lished after the two satires, Lutchmee and Dilloo. A Study of West Indian 
Life was widely reviewed in the British quality press. A search in the 
British Library Newspapers Database yields at least eleven longer re-
views and many more short notices, which suggest that the novel was 
indeed read – even if not always favourably. A good summary of the 
general opinion appeared in the Cardiff-based Western Mail, whose re-
viewer juxtaposes Lutchmee and Dilloo with Jenkins’s earlier writings 
to conclude: 
 
“Lutchmee and Dilloo” […] is a dreadfully weary and ill-structured tale, and 
I should think would find no more favour with the public than his account of 
the results of the commission of inquiry in British Guiana on the same sub-
ject. Whatever little reputation Mr. Jenkins has derived from “Ginx’s Baby” 
                                                             
and Wrongs in The Guyana Classics Library in 2010 to which she also con-
tributed an introduction. 
4  The following editions of Ginx’s Baby sold well, not least because the cover 
carried one of the most famous photographs of the 1870s, which represents 
an enraged toddler. Charles Darwin himself had commissioned the picture 
from the controversial art photographer Oscar Gustav Rejlander for his study 
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Neither Darwin 
nor Rejlander ever disclosed that the latter had seriously modified the image 
to bring out better the anger and pain of the depicted infant. The photogra-
pher not only sold the picture to the popular press but also in its hundreds of 
thousands as carte(s)-de-visite (Smith 226). 
64 | Gohrisch 
will not long survive such pitiable literary efforts as “Lutchmee and Dilloo”. 
(“London Correspondence”) 
 
On the other side of the evaluative spectrum resides Lloyd’s Weekly 
Newspaper whose reviewer calls the novel an “admirable work” because 
it will stir the otherwise complacent readers of Mudie’s Lending Library 
into some awareness of injustice (“Literature”). While this review offers 
Jenkins “hearty thanks” for having “striven valiantly on behalf of the 
coolies”, The Saturday Review, reflecting the taste of well-educated 
readers, falls in with the verdict passed by the Western Mail. “Mean-
while no good will be done to the coolie by writing third-rate sensational 
novels about him” (“Lutchmee and Dilloo” 720). Other reviews repeat-
edly problematise Jenkins’s purpose, such as the London Society, a mag-
azine dedicated to “light and amusing literature for the hours of relaxa-
tion”, which sharply quips: “Mr. Jenkins is a novelist who always writes 
with a purpose, and what he gains in purpose he frequently loses in the 
construction of the story” (“New Books” 565). Having pointed out twice 
the “exaggerated” tone of Jenkins’s novels and of Lutchmee and Dilloo 
in particular (565), the reviewer in the end praises the “many scenes of 
pathos and eloquence” (565-66) which he obviously deems fit for his 
readers’ “hours of relaxation”. F. M. Owen, writing for The Academy, 
an intellectual weekly dedicated to raising the quality of fiction, has no 
desire to cover up the novel’s failure, attributing this to “its subject, the 
wrongs of the Coolies in Demerara”, which he thinks “is inartistic” 
(Owen 547). Like most of the other reviewers, he speculates about the 
readers’ feeling sympathy for Dilloo but not “sufficient interest in the 
story as a story to pursue it, except from a high sense of philanthropic 
duty” (547). Unsurprisingly, The Athenaeum and The Saturday Review, 
the two leading review journals with famous writers as reviewers, offer 
the most scathing criticism of the novel’s failed aesthetics: “the reader 
feels that there is something wrong somewhere” (“Literature: Novels of 
the Week” 491). The Athenaeum points to Jenkins’s problematic use of 
sources mixing Mauritius with Guyana, which gives the novel an air of 
“unreality” (“Literature: Novels of the Week” 491), while The Saturday 
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Review, with ironic verve, draws attention to Jenkins’s free copying 
from a variety of Blue Books, especially on Barbados (“Lutchmee and 
Dilloo” 719). Both reviewers systematically discuss the novel’s short-
comings with regard to plot, character, description and dialogue, draw-
ing attention to striking contradictions. Instead of the Uncle-Tom style 
indictment of the hardships of indenture, expected by the reviewers, the 
novel presents an improbably well-off major Indian character and indi-
vidual white mismanagement as cause for some merely minor injustices 
(“Literature: Novels of the Week” 491). Moreover, the reviewers criti-
cise the novel’s unconvincing presentation of the Indian characters’ feel-
ings (“Lutchmee and Dilloo” 720). Taken together, the reviews docu-
ment that the novel was widely read across the social spectrum and var-
iously appreciated or rejected depending on the journals’ inscribed read-
ership. None of the reviewers, however, finds fault with imperial eco-
nomics based on contract labour. Yet, it is this system that Jenkins deems 
useful for the exploited workers if only administered properly. Thus, he 
writes in the preface to his novel: 
 
I have long since expressed the opinion that a Coolie system, under proper 
supervision and restraint, could be made a system of incalculable benefit to 
the Asiatics. But the sole condition on which we can allow it to exist within 
our dominions is that our Government shall exercise over it […] most rigid 
control. (Jenkins 29) 
 
Jenkins was “a staunch British imperialist” (Sutherland 330, Graves and 
Milne) but “no clichéd” one (Dabydeen 8). The few literary critics who 
read the novel today welcome it – despite its shortcomings and obvious 
racism – as the first literary representation of Indian indentured labour-
ers (Dabydeen, Jackson, Klein, Poynting). Indo-Guyanese novelist and 
critic David Dabydeen has made possible the only two existing re-edi-
tions of Lutchmee and Dilloo: in 2003, in the Caribbean Classics series 
of Macmillan Education, introduced by himself, and in 2010, in The 
Guyana Classics Library, with him as general editor. In the preface to 
the series, financed by the Government of Guyana, Bharrat Jagdeo, then 
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President of Guyana, honours Jenkins’s novel as the “only substantial 
fiction on Guiana [sic]” in the 19th century (Jagdeo v). The series’ aim 
is that “all Guyanese can appreciate our monumental achievement in 
moving from Exploitation to Expression” (vi). How exactly would this 
work with Jenkins’s novel, which expresses exploitation in a way that 
makes it inexpressible and thus acceptable, as I shall reveal shortly? The 
answer lies in the very mode of expression it selects, in its imagined 
emotional economy, which functions by derailing and re-directing anger 
and its concomitant cognitions5 of discontent and resentment to render 
it harmless. It is here that the emotional economy of colonial capitalism 
differs from the ‘moral economy’ E. P. Thompson found operating in 
18th-century England on its transition to capitalist market economy. Re-
lying on a wealth of historical sources he studied how the lower classes 
successfully transformed their “fury for corn” (Thompson 135), espe-
cially in times of dearth, into meaningful action by threatening riots to 
force the prices for corn down. “This fury for corn is a curious culmina-
tion of the age of agricultural improvement. […] The breakthrough of 
the new political economy of the free market was also the breakdown of 
the old moral economy of provision” (Thompson 135-36). In the follow-
ing, I will look at the management of fury and anger in fiction, taking 
the concern with real history onto the level of representation and thus 
imagination. 
  
                                                             
5  The cognitive components of emotions refer to the perception of internal 
states and external stimuli, that is, they comprise the processes of evaluating, 
digesting, remembering and controlling emotions on the part of the individ-
ual (Ulich and Mayring 51). 
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MANAGING ANGER  
IN THE IMAGINED PLANTATION ECONOMY 
OF LUTCHMEE AND DILLOO 
 
Whose anger does the novel select for representation? How does the text 
embed anger situationally? Which material and immaterial objects are 
evaluated by the emotion, that is, what is the aim of the anger? Which 
are its dominant cognitions and how does the text manage their display? 
How does the novel link anger to its imagined economy?  
The novel’s first five (of the 59) chapters are set in India. It begins 
with Lutchmee, the light-brown and beautiful female protagonist, who 
is sexually harassed by Hunoomaun, the dark-brown village watchman 
and long-standing opponent to Lutchmee’s “manly” but “low-caste” 
husband Dilloo (Jenkins 34, 36). Lutchmee is saved first by Dilloo and 
then by the British deputy magistrate, whose wife she serves as a maid 
after Dilloo has left for Guyana. Not only does the novel imagine the 
white colonisers as protectors of the jealously warring natives but it also 
keeps quiet about the ravages of colonising rural India that cause emi-
gration in the first place. Instead of hinting at the economic changes, 
which drive men like Dilloo away, the novel blames dark-skinned 
Hunoomaun, typified as “ugly” (36), “villainous” (36, 90) and, later, as 
“cowardly” (97-98), for destroying his opponent’s crop and stealing his 
savings (37-38). The following chapter offers a way out by introducing 
an over-paid and manipulative recruiter whose promises lure Dilloo to 
Guyana, where the three Indians meet again as contract labourers on a 
sugar plantation.  
What seems a mere exposition turns out to be a most effective nar-
rative technique to derail anger, rage and wrath, the disruptive emotions 
the authorial narrator attributes to both white planters and brown labour-
ers, on both sides of the economic divide in Guyana. This character-
centred device serves to contain the economically caused social conflicts 
within an epically told tale of individual jealousy and revenge. The “re-
venge tragedy” (Poynting 218) culminates in a deadly fight between the 
two labourers, described in detail at the end of the novel, in which Dilloo 
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kills his opponent. In accordance with the genre conventions (to which 
the villain also belongs) and with contemporary racist notions of the 
non-white other, the narrator stereotypically refers to Dilloo’s “passion-
ate nature” (Jenkins 252) and “resentful passion” (279). He then presents 
him as melodramatically promising his wife: “‘I will live only to revenge 
myself on those who have done us wrong, on the cursed tyrants who here 
enslave and torment us; and […] I, Dilloo, will give myself to work only 
for their destruction, worry, and death!’” (253). Jenkins’s text immedi-
ately re-directs this anger by replacing its object, although it had shown 
at length that the anger was justified as Dilloo had to serve time in jail 
due to a corrupt interpreter and law court (173ff.). Instead of overpow-
ering economic and legal “tyrants”, Dilloo merely fights a single man of 
his own social, racial and ethnic group. Thus, the only destruction Dilloo 
brings about, apart from Hunoomaun’s, is his own. With this plot device, 
the derailing is complete and the emotional economy firmly in place: the 
Indian labourers fight each other leaving the racialised colonial planta-
tion system intact. 
The novel concludes with a quick reconciliation scene between 
Lutchmee and Dilloo in the local Obeah man’s jungle camp presenting 
this emotional economy as if in a nutshell. Nastily racist, the narrator 
describes the “obe man” as “an African of the lowest type” with “ba-
boon-like features” which “altogether made a creature whose physical 
characteristics were worthy of the terror inspired by his infernal profes-
sion” (Jenkins 353). Thus, the Obeah man functions as the very incarna-
tion of the white owners’ fear (Jenkins 229, 349) of “insurrection” (348) 
that continues to haunt the plantation economy after emancipation. This 
fear had earlier put them into “rage” (227), “passionate excitement” 
(257, 262), “angry excitement” (258) and finally the very “terror” (289) 
that the narrator now ascribes to the Obeah man. His equipment inspires 
“grotesque horror” (355), a hyperbolic description preparing the melo-
dramatic dying scene, which comes with a slightly comic edge, though. 
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This time the butt of the comedy are not the African characters6 but the 
white reverend who offers Dilloo conversion to Christianity. With a final 
instant of derailing anger by directing its cognition of resentment at re-
ligion instead of humiliating exploitation, the novel renders Dilloo’s last 
words in Pidgin English. Tellingly, it reserves the correct standard usage 
of the genitive for his oppressors: “‘No!’ cried the dying Coolie, loudly, 
almost fiercely, and with unconscious but terribly pointed satire […] 
‘No! No! Jesu Kriss Massa Drummond’s God – Massa Marston’s God 
– all Inglees God. No God for Coolie!’” (358) Drummond and Marston, 
the head manager on Dilloo’s estate and the local magistrate, stand out 
as the embodied material objects of Dilloo’s anger. However, the only 
successful resistance the novel allows its dying protagonist is to reject 
the caricature of a clergyman on a civilising mission. 
The immaterial objects of his anger are the exploitative economic 
relations that leave Dilloo and his fellow workers at the mercy of those 
who dictate the conditions of their existence. This group comprises the 
government-paid Bengali recruiter in India, a set of white estate manag-
ers and overseers, white and mixed-race drivers and white colonial ad-
ministrative staff in Guyana. Drummond, the allegedly “naturally kind-
hearted” (66) head-manager, who is repeatedly designated as “planter” 
as if he owned the estate, cautions his Scottish apprentice manager Craig 
against relying on everyday racism acquired in the relations with the 
“dark races by whom his wealth was made for him” (66):  
 
                                                             
6  Employing an impressive array of sub-genres to racialise his characters, Jen-
kins assigns the lowest form of slap-stick comedy to black characters – a 
feature most contemporaneous reviewers mention as “native”. F. D. Owen, 
reviewing the novel for The Academy uses a striking postpositive litotes to 
describe a feature that is quite common in colonial novels set in the Carib-
bean before and after abolition: “[Dialogue] is chiefly represented by a little 
negro foolery of the usual order, not at all unamusing, but merely episodic” 
(Owen 547). 
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“You will never do for Demerara, my fine fellow,” said the planter. “These 
niggers are brought here to work, and you must make them do it by hook or 
by crook. With your squeamish views, they would soon get the whip-hand 
of us; and we might as well shut up shop altogether.” (171) 
 
Craig, however, does not wish to treat the contract labourers, whom the 
manager tellingly equates with (enslaved) Africans disciplined by the 
whip, as suggested by his superior. This is remarkable because earlier in 
the story Craig had been stabbed by a Chinese labourer while attempting 
to arrest him for murder – falsely, as the reader knows, because the cul-
prit once again is Hunoomaun. Craig survives the attack nursed by 
Lutchmee, which gives him some insight into her and her husband’s 
lives. While Drummond, the planter’s deputy, appreciates Dilloo’s ca-
pacities as an exceptionally able worker (66, 96-97) he nevertheless de-
tests him as “the spokesperson for his brethren” and “a firebrand” (169), 
Craig entertains a more respectful view of him. Subsequently, the novel 
sets up Craig as the centre for the readers’ identification, augmenting 
this function with the generic devices of romance. Craig’s love interest, 
however, is not Lutchmee – as she would be in the tradition of plantation 
fiction, which surfaces in Drummond’s Creole “housekeeper” (71) – but 
the fair daughter of the local stipendiary magistrate, a relationship the 
narrator handles with some satirical distance. The relationship between 
Lutchmee and Craig, however, he stages differently – and with a pur-
pose. Focusing on the young Indian woman, the narrator suggestively 
states: 
 
The Coolie [Lutchmee] had hitherto been giving herself up to her genial toil, 
with a devotion which by degrees grew to an enthusiasm, as her intimacy 
with the manly young Briton increased. […] The life was new. It brought 
into her life fresh human elements, feelings she had never experienced be-
fore: ideas – novel, sweet, piquant. […] she could not analyse the meaning 
of the feeling […]. (155) 
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Whereas David Dabydeen recognises here “a nascent feminism, a nas-
cent defiance of patriarchal structures” (Dabydeen 18), I read the Craig-
Lutchmee subplot as part of the novel’s emotional economy which relies 
on derailing. The subplot redirects the discontent and anger arising from 
the racist plantation order in two ways: it provides another object for 
Dilloo’s anger and rage and it constructs two lovable characters that 
emotionally appeal to the British metropolitan readers. When Craig 
shakes Lutchmee’s hand in sincere gratitude, the narrator assures the re-
form-oriented among his readers that, at this moment, “the antipathy of 
race finally died within him; and […] this woman, without reference to 
colour or features, became to him as a fellow-being of one blood and 
one humanity with himself” (Jenkins 156). With this, “the pretty animal” 
(130) that Craig saw in Lutchmee earlier changes from “a subject of 
anxiety” into “an object of sympathy” (259, also 264, 269). Later he be-
nevolently accompanies her to her husband’s deathbed even though this 
makes him complicit in the murder. With Craig, the novel channels the 
readers’ empathy with the dying Indian and his soon-to-be-abandoned 
wife through the emotions of a white man whose shy love affair with the 
magistrate’s daughter makes him all the more likeable. She shortly fol-
lows suit developing “an actual sympathy” for Lutchmee (263, also 
269). 
While Craig and his beloved serve as models for the readers, whom 
the novel calls upon to grow equally benevolent moral sentiments, the 
second function of the subplot is overtly political. To demand their 
rights, the contract labourers, led by rich Dilloo (184, 303) and a free 
Indian banker and money-lender (104), whom the narrator labels “The 
Conspirators” (chapter heading, 145), employ a white lawyer to petition 
the governor (222ff.). Dilloo tells his wife: “‘We are engaged in a great 
plot. Coolies on every estate are pledged to it. At first we are going to 
act peaceably and demand justice from the great Sahib, the Governor. If 
he will not give it to us, then ---’ he stopped […]” (163). While the nar-
rator, repeatedly arguing as if he was a lawyer (230, also 160, 199, 223), 
supports the Indians’ claims, he shows in dramatic detail how their en-
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tering into industrial dispute provokes the planters to such a “West In-
dian rage” (227) that they press the magistrate and the governor to reject 
it. The Craig-Lutchmee subplot, however, serves to remove this legally 
supported industrial action from the readers’ attention focussing it, in 
turn, on a private matter as an object of rage and anger:  
 
But how greatly had his frank, manly nature suffered from the scorching bars 
of unjust justice, and the withering influence of ungenerous treatment! His 
mind was diseased with the sense of wrong, suspicion, resentment, the crav-
ing thirst for revenge, and he regarded the incidents of this meeting between 
his wife and the overseer with jealousy and anger. (303) 
 
While the novel uses the tadja, a fictional blend of Muslim and Hindoo 
procession with dancing and ritual mock battles (cf. Moore 219ff.), to 
send Dilloo out to fight Hunoomaun, the daughter of the magistrate, in-
fluenced by Craig, takes her father to task for not having done his duty 
by the labourers (194ff.). The text suspends the irony and mild satire it 
generally uses for the white legal elite to introduce the moral change of 
the magistrate who begins to resist verbally the close surveillance on the 
part of the planters who press him to serve their interests (199). This is 
the only critical thrust that the novel promotes: it calls for improved legal 
regulations for contract labour, arguing that both sides benefit from such 
diligent and reliable workers as Dilloo to realise their potential (160-61, 
223, 230). To put this across, the text infuses its social realism with ele-
ments of the political and legal pamphlet, which annoyed the reviewer 
of the London Society (“New Books” 565) and others. With the domi-
nant realist narrative and its emotional economy of colonial capitalism, 
however, the novel subverts its own rational argument. Yet, the emo-
tional argument is most successful in silencing anger and rage, emotions 
that threaten the plantation economy and its exploitation of cheap brown 
labour. Instead, the novel’s deep plot encourages the metropolitan mid-
dle-class readers to condescendingly feel sympathy for suffering work-
ing-class Indians and identify with loving and fortunately reforming 
middle-class colonial whites. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
My interpretation of this colonial novel written by a mid-19th-century 
white male uses the category of emotion to connect the conception of 
imagined economies with the antiracist activism of Reni Eddo-Lodge 
and Afua Hirsch by paying special attention to the objects and cognitions 
of anger as fostered by global capitalism. 
With this, I suggest re-reading colonial fiction not primarily in ser-
vice of today’s identity politics which value it for the representation of 
neglected non-white ethnic groups. Instead, I propose the use of this text 
as one of a type to demonstrate the economic and emotional rationale of 
its aesthetics on the level of character, plot and sub-genres. The generic 
blend of social realism and legal pamphlet, of revenge tragedy and melo-
drama, of comedy and satire allows for a multi-layered argument that, 
despite its ambiguities, normalises the extensive exploitation of migrant 
labourers in the colonial plantation economy. To break up this normal-
ising discourse, I propose to analyse these very ambiguities and internal 
contradictions as strategies of racialisation for plainly economic ends. 
As a result, the exploitation of cheap black and brown labour loses its 
alleged ‘normality’ and becomes visible as a condition for private profits 
of which the British (and Western) public has always had its share in 
being able to buy cheap goods, including novels.  
To overcome the select epistemological silence and to make useful 
the equally select emotional eloquence on the connection between race 
and capitalist economy, literary studies scholars can benefit from the im-
pressive work of Catherine Hall and her team of black and white histo-
rians. For more than a decade, they have researched the legacies of Brit-
ish slave-ownership and documented the results in numerous publica-
tions and on a website with a continuously expanding database.  
 
Slave-ownership is virtually invisible in British history. It has been elided by 
strategies of euphemism and evasion originally adopted by the slave-owners 
themselves and subsequently reproduced widely in British culture. […] 
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Against this background, our project is to reinscribe slave-ownership onto 
modern British history.” (Hall et al. 1-2) 
 
In her tellingly titled essay “Gendering Property, Racing Capital”, Cathe-
rine Hall adds an observation that ties in with Reni Eddo-Lodge: “Disa-
vowal and distantiation have been crucial mechanisms facilitating 
avoidance and evasion […]. Our focus on British slave-ownership is a 
way of bringing slavery home and problematizing whiteness as an iden-
tity that carried privilege and power […]” (24-25). In this vein, literary 
studies should transform anger into a motivation to analyse how aes-
thetically constructed emotions mediate the connections between race 
and capitalism. These emotions always key into the economy – imagined 
and real. 
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 Imagining Money 
Jason G. Allen 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
John Clarke presents the theme of this volume by asking why we might 
speak of “imagined economies”. It is, he answers, “to interrupt the ap-
parent ubiquity of economies”, to provide a moment for “a pause for 
thought”. In this chapter, I explore the role that imagination plays in the 
creation and maintenance of a money system. Money is important to the 
existence and functioning of an economy.1 Money, too, seems ubiqui-
tous and naturally-occurring, so I want to pause and consider why it is 
that we might have money and what exactly it is doing. Different objects 
have served as money, or tokens of money, in different societies. Today, 
the main form of money (from an economic perspective, if not from a 
                                                             
1  Granted, non-monetary economies exist, and it is a worthwhile project to 
imagine economies that function without money (as we know it, or at all). 
And granted, money plays a lesser role in the lived experience of numerous 
communities, especially in the Global South, where traditional webs of so-
cial obligation still operate in parallel to the money-based economy. And 
granted further, important categories of economic activity subsist even in 
money-based economies (for example in the domestic sphere). But money is 
central to the type of (financial capitalist) economy with which many chap-
ters in this collection are concerned. 
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strictly legal one) is digital representations of credit-debt relations be-
tween a person and a commercial bank. In other times and places, money 
has taken the form of, or been represented by, scrips of paper, metal 
discs, shells, and various consumable and non-consumable commodi-
ties. But what is money itself, and where does it come from?  
In this chapter, I draw on the concepts of social ontology and make 
some reflections on the role of law and legal systems in constituting 
money. Money, like so much of our social world, is successful because 
it appears natural and self-evident; but it is fundamentally mind-depend-
ent, which is to say that it only exists because a community of people 
think it does. In a meaningful sense, it is “imagined”. This provides the 
opportunity to bring to the volume another tradition of thinking about 
“real fictions” in the analytical idiom typical of English and Scandina-
vian legal philosophy, and to explore the role of “imagination” in the 
constitution of a money system.  
 
 
MONEY IN MACROECONOMICS 
 
The first observation to be made is that, if we want to get to the bottom 
of money, it is not (only) to economics as a discipline that we should 
turn. It is perhaps startling for non-economists that the dominant school 
of macroeconomic thought has no place for money as such. “Dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium” models posit that, given certain assump-
tions, there exists a set of prices for every commodity in an economy in 
general equilibrium (Rogers). In effect, the better an economy works, 
the less conceptual need it has of money. Thus, Frank Hahn observed in 
1983:  
 
The most serious challenge that the existence of money poses to the theorist 
is this: the best developed model of the economy cannot find room for it. The 
best developed model is, of course, the Arrow-Debreu version of Walrasian 
general equilibrium. A world in which all contingent future contracts are 
possible neither needs nor wants intrinsically worthless money. A first, and 
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to a fastidious theorist difficult, task is to find an alternative construction 
without thereby sacrificing the clarity and logical coherence that are such 
outstanding features of Arrow-Debreu. (Hahn 1)2  
 
Since the Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”) of 2008, more heterodox 
economists have stressed the importance of making conceptual room for 
the existence of money in macroeconomic modelling (for example, 
Goodhart et al.). In large part, this requires integration of the financial 
system into macroeconomic models, reflecting the role that financial in-
termediaries, particularly banks, play in money-creation. The best ac-
counts of “modern money” explain that banks do not just accept deposits 
of pre-existing, real resources and then lend them to borrowers; banks 
create money ex nihilo, as it were, by lending (Jakab and Kumhof). The 
traditional arrangement forms a kind of “finance franchise” between 
(private) licensed commercial banks and the (public) central bank, in 
which the former play a systemic role (Hockett and Omarova). Cur-
rently, non-bank financial intermediaries (especially payments services 
providers) are, in turn, encroaching on that traditional role, making ac-
curate theory more important than ever (Omarova).  
Meanwhile, classical economists since the 1970s have been con-
cerned to build macroeconomic models on stable “micro” foundations, 
including actor preferences, responses regulation, technology, and re-
source constraints (Lucas). But their micro-foundations have not always 
been very accurate depictions of the complex social reality of the empir-
ical economy (Lawson, Economics 21; Hodge 182). And a distinctly le-
gal perspective is needed here; as Katharina Pistor has argued, law and 
finance are locked in a dynamic relationship in which new forms of con-
tractual behaviour challenge existing legal rules but seek, in turn, legal 
vindication; this means that the legal structure of finance is critical to 
explaining the behaviour of market participants (Pistor). It is essential, 
                                                             
2  For a critique of Hahn’s efforts to find an alternative construction, see Hy-
man Minsky.  
82 | Allen 
then, not only to include money in macroeconomic models of the econ-
omy, but also to ensure that we have the best account of the nature of 
money itself.  
Both these points underline the need for a complex ontology of 
money, based in complex social practices. And they both suggest a role 
for law and therefore legal theory in explaining what money is and how 
it is made.  
There are various ways in which one could construct a taxonomy of 
monetary theories: one reads of metallist versus non-metallist theories, 
realist versus nominalist, commodity versus credit, orthodox versus het-
erodox, endogenous versus exogenous, currency versus banking, so on 
and so forth. There are important correlations between these various di-
chotomies, and many of them cut across each other, as well.3 All imply 
a set of ontological and metaphysical commitments. Theorists often 
speak at cross purposes across these dichotomies, not least because they 
keep those metaphysical and ontological commitments tacit rather than 
articulating them. It is beyond my ambition to explore the taxonomy of 
monetary theories here. I wish to use just one way of contrasting ap-
proaches to the concept of money – what I will call market theories of 
money and legal theories of money.4 In the former, “money” is created 
through the transactional activities of market participants, typically said 
to evolve from primitive barter through the (spontaneous, or at least mar-
ket-driven) emergence of one commodity (typically a precious metal) as 
a medium of exchange. In the latter, money is posited as the creature of 
legal convention, typically said to derive from the interventions of an 
organised political authority.  
                                                             
3  Joseph Schumpeter’s summa divisio was between commodity and credit the-
ories (Schumpeter 649). 
4  Actually, the law plays a constitutive role in both, as it is in virtue of the legal 
system that we have the prerequisites of a market – i.e. (private) property 
rights that can be transferred by contract. Without these two legal construc-
tions, we would have nothing like a “market” in the modern sense at all.  
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In their starker forms, these approaches are mutually exclusive. In-
deed, the nature of money was one of the focal points of the 
Methodenstreit between the Austrian School and the German Historical 
School. Carl Menger, for the former, argued for a commodity-based 
market theory of money. According to this view, money has to be un-
derstood as the “spontaneous outcome, the unpremeditated resultant, of 
particular, individual efforts of the members of a society, who have little 
by little worked their way to a discrimination of the different degrees of 
saleableness in commodities” (Menger 250). Georg Knapp, for the lat-
ter, presented the “State Theory of Money”, arguing that “[m]oney is a 
creature of law” and that it was a mistake to equate “money” with metal 
coins; “money, whether of metal or paper, is only a special case of a 
means of payment in general”, and this means of payment arises in a 
society when the state stipulates that taxes will be accepted in a certain 
token, giving that token value for individuals transacting inter se (Knapp 
2).  
Both these approaches trace right back to the beginning of the West-
ern tradition of theorising about money – Aristotle here emphasising 
money as a creature of convention, and there emphasising the metallic 
nature of money in the ancient world.5 Both have obvious merit. The 
Austrian School usefully points to the role of individual choices in the 
creation of a money system, and, despite an element of “just so” theo-
rising about the vagaries of barter, presents a credible attempt to under-
stand the metaphysics of money in the Aristotelian tradition (Smith). 
The German Historical School view, on the other hand, seems better 
supported by the archaeological and historical evidence on the evolution 
of money and barter (Ingham 47, 211), affords a greater conceptual role 
for networks of credit and debt that historically operated alongside coin-
based money systems, and does a better job of explaining the forms of 
                                                             
5  Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 156, “this is why we call it νόμισμα, because 
its value is derived, not from nature but from law [νόμος] and can be altered 
or abolished at will.” Cf Aristotle, Politics 42. 
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money that have predominated for the past century (quite possibly much 
longer) (Desan 25).  
Knapp’s approach has become the foundation of what I regard as the 
more credible schools of monetary theory in modern times. The crux of 
Knapp’s view of money appears in his assertion that even full-bodied 
coins are “chartal”, i.e. that their nominal face value provides the 
“money” element, not the metal. Without special agreement between the 
parties, a debt could not be discharged by the delivery of a quantum of 
metal; where such an agreement is general, indeed universal, the “mon-
eyness” of the coin is a matter of law and custom, not its physical prop-
erties (Olivecrona 47-48). Thus Knapp put the metaphysics of the com-
plex institutional landscape which underpins money’s existence – com-
plex credit and debt relationships involving not only individuals but also 
the “state” – into the centre of theoretical efforts.6 In my view, this pro-
vides a more credible answer to the question Menger himself posed, i.e. 
why economic agents are so willing to exchange their goods for “little 
metal disks apparently useless as such, or for documents representing 
[them]” (Menger 239).7  
However, Knapp’s view perhaps puts too little emphasis on the role 
of private transactional behaviour in creating money systems. And it fo-
cusses perhaps too much on the state, and on law as a creature of the 
state, giving too little attention to private payment communities and their 
customary norms (Hodgson 331). Further, Knapp’s account itself ex-
hausts itself precisely where it ought to explain the nature of the mone-
                                                             
6  H.S. Ellis credited Knapp with bringing the metaphysical questions concern-
ing money to the foreground in a manner “unparalleled in the history of eco-
nomics” (Ellis vii). 
7  Georg Simmel rightly noted: “[M]etallic money is also a promise to pay and 
... it differs from the cheque only with respect to the size of the group which 
vouches for its being accepted” (174-79). In a similar vein, J.M. Keynes ob-
served that the Indian Rupee “being a token coin, [was] virtually a note 
printed on silver” (26). 
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tary unit; while he succeeds in explaining the physical media of pay-
ment, he fails, because of his historical method of reference back to “au-
tometallism”, to explain the nominalist unit of value itself (the dollar, 
euro, or pound sterling) as an object in its own right (Olivecrona 99). In 
systems such as our own in which there is no reserve of commodities to 
which the monetary unit refers, we must be concerned with this purely 
nominalistic unit first and foremost. As Karl Olivecrona observed in 
1953, individuals and private (commercial) banks can issue more 
“IOUs” than they can pay; when a central bank, on the other hand, is not 
compelled to honour its debts (e.g. by selling gold on foreign ex-
changes), its solvency is perfect: “Paradoxically enough the claims on 
the central bank are always good because they can never be honoured. 
Payment does not come into question, since there are no media of pay-
ment available” (Olivecrona 63). This creates a debt situation of a par-
ticular kind, which we are only now beginning properly to theorise (e.g. 
McLeay et al.). So-called “Modern Monetary Theory” has been moving 
inwards from the periphery of monetary theory, and has recently been 
receiving attention even from central bankers (e.g. Weber). 
I will leave this discussion here, however, for it is to the theoretical 
presuppositions of both major schools that I wish to turn. In effect, I 
wish to argue that they both require something in the nature of a “real 
fiction”. Karl Elster (an acolyte of Knapp) argued in a 1920 essay on the 
“purchasing power” and “validity” of money:  
 
[Money] is not a commodity, even where it has surely arisen from a com-
modity. Money arises – arises from a commodity – by way of an individual-
psychological process. A good does not become money through being ever 
more greatly valued, it arises rather because the reason for its valuation 
changes fundamentally; a good does not become money in virtue of being 
the most valued commodity, but because it ceases to be a commodity. Die 
and become! Money is created in the same instant in which the good ends its 
conceptual existence. (247; emphasis added) 
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This seems to grasp something fundamental about the nature of money 
– that a thing, whatever it is, assumes a monetary status in virtue of being 
treated as such by individuals within a community. Commodity theories 
of money, especially, distract us with the notion that the money-token 
has “intrinsic worth”, being made of a precious metal. Elster makes clear 
that as soon as a piece of gold is used as money (rather than as a necklace 
or as bullion, or as an electrical conductor for that matter) its natural 
properties fade into the conceptual background. Likewise, if I take a 
gold coin and turn it into an ornament, or use it as a paperweight, or to 
bodge a blown fuse in my car, I wrench it from the monetary domain 
back into the domain of commodities – I stop treating it as if it embodied 
an abstract, intangible monetary unit, and start using it for its physical 
properties (shininess, weight, conductivity).  
Something similar can be said of the liabilities that circulate as 
money in a modern monetary system. They only work because they pass 
around as currency – because they provide a standard unit of measuring 
value. If we were to fix quanta of “book money” into place as bi-lateral 
obligations between two certain, identified parties, their monetary status 
would vanish. This is reflected in the English law of financial instru-
ments; originally, things like debt writings could not circulate as a token 
of payment because they were legal obligations that could only be trans-
ferred through a difficult process called “novation” in which the parties 
agreed that a new party could enter the relationship to replace the old 
one. It was only over time that the financial instruments we know today 
as “negotiable” were recognised to pass “in currency” and therefore to 
play a role that assimilated coin (e.g. Holdsworth 997). Again, modern 
developments including “cryptocurrencies” are challenging settled no-
tions, for example in the question whether a bitcoin is capable of being 
owned and whether ownership can pass with change of “possession”.8 
Christine Desan rightly argues that this brings the monetary unit into 
the foreground of our theoretical focus:  
                                                             
8  The problem is that possession, as traditionally understood, is impossible in 
the case of an intangible object like a bitcoin (Allen). 
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Money is neither an object – the lump of silver that the philosopher imag-
ined, nor an abstraction – the convention that those observing paper money 
assume. Money is, instead, a method of representing and moving resources 
within a group: it is a way of referencing or entailing material value that 
creates a unit to measure other resources over time, pay off obligations fi-
nally, and transfer value immediately. (Desan 21; emphasis added) 
 
As her examples show, we can use various things to achieve this method, 
i.e. to represent the monetary unit. And much of the scholarship on the 
nature of money is focussed squarely on the money token, not this mon-
etary unit. This focus has, in turn, informed the background against 
which much of our law has evolved, and explains the common inability 
to look past the brute object that serves as a token of the monetary unit 
(see Appleby 43). 
Shifting our focus helps to reveal that money (whatever it is, and 
whatever is used for it) has a social ontology. My intuition is that, as 
Tony Lawson has argued, engagement with the social ontology of 
money may in fact reconcile some of the points of disagreement between 
the great schools of monetary theory, showing them to be theories about 
different historical instances of money rather than about the ontological 
nature of money itself (Lawson, “Social Positioning” 961-62). In my 
view, an enquiry into the latter would, however, appear to be an enquiry 
into the nature of an object – albeit a quasi-abstract or “imaginary” one 
that is defined by its function as an economic coordination mechanism 
(Smit et al. 327). But this is a point on which reasonable minds differ – 
just as it served as a major clashpoint in the Methodenstreit, there is a 
live debate within the emerging field of social ontology on precisely this 
question: Is “money” a token of something, or the something for which 
there is a token.9  
 
 
                                                             
9  I thank Tony Lawson for this formulation in his comments on the draft.  
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REAL FICTIONS  
 
The editors have discussed Günther Teubner’s notion of the “Real-
fiktion”. Another branch of theory that deals with the reality of appar-
ently fictional objects is social ontology, a branch of analytical meta-
physics concerned with the existence of socially constructed artefacts. 
Social ontologists have indeed thought and written much on money, and 
their efforts can help us, in turn, to understand the role of “imagination” 
in the creation of a money-based economy. As Uskali Mäki observes, in 
a discussion of the methodology of economics, social ontology has much 
to say about that discipline’s foundations:  
 
Economics deals with preferences and expectations, strategies and interac-
tions, demand and supply, trust and fairness, laws and conventions, agents 
and principals, and markets and governments. One can try to construe these 
items without invoking anything mental or social, but yet it seems obvious 
that whatever those terms are taken to refer to does not exist mind-inde-
pendently and, therefore, are not in the same category with electrons, cells, 
continents and galaxies. (7; emphasis added) 
 
Of the many stories that could be told of money’s development over 
time, one story that has particular resonance today is that of dematerial-
isation. It is important not to stress the linearity of this trend, because 
much of the history of money has over-emphasised the role of coin. The 
amount of coin circulating in medieval European economies, for exam-
ple, has been demonstrated to be much smaller than the economies them-
selves – the rest ran on complex webs of credit and debt (Gleeson ch. 3, 
“Money and Credit”, for a discussion and references). Tally debts are at 
least 2,000 years older than the oldest coins, and account-based money 
systems have been more common throughout history ancient and mod-
ern than the textbooks generally recognise (Wray 45). So a straightfor-
ward story of “metal to paper to digital money” would seriously mis-
characterise the actual course of development.  
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But there is something to be said for exploring the theme of demate-
rialisation over the past century, as we have seen the concept and the 
practice of money loose itself from precious metal, and then from cash 
(in the form of banknotes and non-precious metal coins) as digital infor-
mation systems were used to record and transfer value. Olivecrona ob-
served, somewhat presciently, in 1957:  
 
Theoretically, all payments could be carried out without the use of cash. 
Book money could, indeed, be made the sole medium of payment. Every-
body would then receive his income in the form of drafts on a bank and pay 
for his expenses in the same way. But this would be so cumbersome as to be 
hardly feasible. Cash money is needed besides book money for two reasons: 
(i) to facilitate small payments, and (ii) to make possible instant payment by 
unknown persons and other persons who are not entrusted with credit. (58) 
 
It should be apparent that both of Olivecrona’s impediments have been 
removed by advances in information technology since he wrote. Ironi-
cally, today cash constitutes less than 2% of Olivecrona’s native econ-
omy, and Sweden is leading the way in cashless payment systems in-
cluding proposals for an “e-Krona” issued by the Sverige Riksbank (“E-
krona”). 
Counterintuitively, dematerialisation helps us to see what I perceive 
to be the essential properties of money more clearly. I will demonstrate 
how this is the case by presenting a brief overview of some of the efforts 
made by social ontologists to describe the ontology of money.  
John Searle’s 1995 book presents the basic formula for his account 
of the construction of social reality: an institutional fact (e.g. a marriage, 
a president, or a dollar) is created when a community takes a brute fact 
(i.e. an act, object, or event) to “count as” an institutional fact in a certain 
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context.10 An institutional fact is essentially a bundle of deontic powers 
(i.e. rights, duties, prohibitions, etc.) that give agents desire-independent 
reasons for action. For example, when a wooden figurine becomes a 
“rook”, it starts doing new things within the context of a game of chess, 
such as “castling” or putting a “king” into the status of “check”. Searle 
describes the logico-linguistic operation involved in transforming a fig-
urine into a rook as “X counts as Y in C” where X is the brute object 
(wooden figurine), Y is the institutional object composed of deontic 
powers (the rook with its capacities to move and attack) and C is the 
context (a game of chess).  
For Searle, there are two types of social fact (Brey 70; Searle, The 
Construction; Searle, Making the Social). Both relate to the brute objects 
and events in different ways. First are ordinary social facts, such as that 
this four-legged object is a “chair” or that this sharp object is a “knife”. 
Social facts come into existence when a community of people impose a 
function on an object that is inherently capable of performing the func-
tion – it has properties such as stability or sharpness. Second are institu-
tional facts. These come into existence when a community imposes a 
function on an object that is not inherently capable to perform that func-
tion in virtue of its physical properties alone. Unlike being a chair, for 
example, which involves supporting a human in a sitting position, being 
a “throne” does not depend on a physical property of an object as such 
(although thrones are often decorated as a reflection of their ritual sta-
tus). The essential properties of “throne-ness” exist only in human minds 
– i.e. in shared intentional states and perceptions (Johansson 74). 
In Searle’s scheme, money is an institutional fact par excellence. 
Searle’s formula is, predictably, the subject of a number of disputes 
among social ontologists. First, there is a long-standing dispute with 
Tony Lawson, which is also of interest as a showcase for the differences 
                                                             
10  E.g. that I am married, that we have a contract, that tomorrow is Thursday, 
that the Soviet Union no longer exists. The basic distinction between institu-
tional facts and brute facts is explained in G.E.M. Anscome (69) (generally 
see Searle, The Construction). 
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of approach between the Cambridge and Berkeley schools of social on-
tology. Where Searle seems to stipulate that the X term of a status func-
tion like “money” must not be capable of performing the relevant func-
tion in virtue of its physical properties alone, Lawson insists that in order 
to be “positioned” as money within a “totality”, the thing positioned 
must possess properties that make it capable of being money:  
 
Social positioning is the term for the process whereby, through general ac-
ceptance throughout a community, human individuals, things or other phe-
nomena become incorporated as components of these emergent totalities. In 
all cases, social positioning involves the generalised acceptance of the fol-
lowing three elements in regards to any item that is thereby positioned: 1) 
the allocation of an agreed status, 2) its practical placement as a component 
of a totality, and 3) the harnessing of certain of its capacities already pos-
sessed to serve as one or more system functions of the totality. (“Social Po-
sitioning” 964)  
 
For Lawson, there is (i) a position, (ii) the occupant of a position (qua 
brute fact), (iii) the positioned occupant, and (iv) the token of the posi-
tioned occupant. For Lawson, the essential definition of money relates 
to (iii), whatever (ii) might be. Lawson might argue that the money-to-
ken, in order to be positioned as (occupy the social position of) “money”, 
must be durable, unique, and non-forgeable (“Social Positioning” 968). 
Although I would confess Searleian tendencies, I think Lawson must be 
right that the thing positioned as money must have some basic proper-
ties. Beans make better counters than bananas because they are more 
durable. Gold makes better counters than beans because it is scarcer. 
Cigarettes make better counters than water because they are more read-
ily individualised. Taking this point, I will leave the Searle/Lawson de-
bate for now, because I think that the water example provides a good 
impulse to the next point, which relates to the quasi-abstract mathemat-
ical units that appear in any money system. Suffice it to say that for both 
Lawson and Searle, despite their methodological differences, the estab-
92 | Allen 
lishment of a given social position, and the allocation of people or ob-
jects to it, is ultimately a matter of community acceptance. This keeps 
the story of money squarely in the realm of mind-dependent phenomena.  
The debate within social ontology is highly relevant to the changes 
we are now witnessing with payments technology, too, although it is fair 
to say that a great number of questions remain to be answered. Following 
Searle’s 1995 statement of his basic formula, Barry Smith observed that 
some institutional facts, such as electronic money, do not have a physical 
X term at all. In place of metal and paper, electronic book-money (for 
example) rests on digital information structures that are poorly captured 
by the basic formula. Smith asserted that these were in fact free-standing 
Y terms, i.e. institutional facts (bundles of deontic powers) not resting 
on a brute fact. Searle responded by introducing a variation to his theory; 
he accepted the existence of Y terms for which there is no X term, and 
said that the logico-linguistic operation involved is simply a declaration 
that “Y exists in C” (Barry and Searle 285). We need not get bogged 
down in the finer details of the debate, but Ingvar Johansson has rightly 
observed that no one has yet fully teased out the differences between the 
basic case of institutional facts anchored in a physical object and (appar-
ently) free-standing institutional facts. 
Johansson extends a classical analogy between money and chess, 
which offers some final impulses. A basic game of chess is played on a 
board with physical pieces. The transformation from a wooden figurine 
to a rook is explained by Searle’s basic formula: “X (a wooden figure) 
counts as Y (a rook) in the context C (the game of chess)”. This formula 
expresses the imposition of a function on a brute object: When we accept 
that a figurine counts as a rook, it starts doing things (in the context of a 
game of chess) that a wooden figurine could not. The status moves the 
natural object into a new domain of social reality. Johansson calls this 
basic case real chess.  
Chess players often record their games, however, and for this pur-
pose translate the chess pieces and board into an algebraic system of 
notation. Our rook is no longer a figurine but the letter “R”; the play-
space is no longer a board but a column of notations on a set of Cartesian 
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coordinates (e.g. R moves a1 to d1). In other words, the objects and 
events that constitute a game of chess are represented in documentary 
form. We can thus review particular games of chess as discrete, docu-
mented historical facts. Searle’s basic formula no longer works in this 
context, however, as there is no X term. Johansson suggests that we in-
stead use the formula “Z (our notation for rook) counts in C (a game of 
chess) as a representation of the basic formula (X (wooden figurine) 
counts as Y (a rook))”. In this case we have an algebraic representation 
of a real game of chess. But the act of recording real chess using such 
notation opens up a further possibility, too. Imagine that we live in dif-
ferent cities. We send each other messages such as “R moves a1 to d1”. 
We have now started playing a new form of chess, which Johansson calls 
account chess.  
The interesting thing is that the objects and events that make up a 
game of account chess are particulars, rather than universals, but are nei-
ther straightforward spatio-temporal nor Platonic objects. Account chess 
is, according to Johansson, a fictional object. Intuitively, whatever else 
is said about the true ontological status of fictional objects, “we often 
speak and act as if there were such enduring, identifiable, and re-identi-
fiable fictional particulars” (78-79). But even social ontologists have 
failed to present a persuasive framework for describing fictional social 
objects. To fill the gap, Johansson presents a scheme of fictional institu-
tional facts, representational institutional facts, and primitive institu-
tional facts (95). 
Johansson then applies his scheme to the evolution of money. A tra-
ditional bank book that records movements of coins and banknotes is, 
like an algebraic documentation of a game of real chess, a representation 
of something else. But, like the algebraic chess notation, it bears the pos-
sibility of a new kind of money that exists only in information: 
 
Instead of material money transactions (compare: material chess moves) we 
now often have transactions by means of mere accounts of money (compare: 
moves in account chess). The latter kind of transaction is made in terms of a 
very special kind of fictional object, account money. What since long is 
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called “deposit money” and “checking account money” can be regarded as a 
species of account money. Such money can exist by means of both book-
entries and computer databases. (Johansson 86) 
 
This resonates, in broad terms at least, with a view recently put forward 
by J.P. Smit, Filip Buekens, and Stan du Plessis. A money system, they 
argue, is a set of positions on a relative ratio scale (342). The moving 
balance of this ratio is complex, with variables at the supply end as well 
as constant shifting in the position of money-users. The thing to remem-
ber is that coins and banknotes are only “money” because they are rec-
ords of these positions. The token solves a practical problem of record-
keeping, but it does not solve the basic problem of providing an object 
or tool of economic coordination. The existence of a monetary unit fa-
cilitates economic interactions, for example as captured by the classical 
functions of money as a unit of account, store of value, medium of ex-
change, and standard of deferred payment. The object of coordination is 
the monetary unit itself. Those units might be counted with the aid of 
metal disc, chits of paper, or digital records without any difference at the 
level of logical structure. That is, I think, the case with Johansson’s “ac-
count money”.  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Whatever else money is, and whatever other elements are involved in its 
ontology, there is a substantial element of psychological disposition, 
which I think is aptly caught by the term “imagination”. That is not to 
say that other psychological dispositions, such as trust or motivation, are 
not important to the creation and effective maintenance of a monetary 
system. But imagination is key; my trust, for example, is trust in the fact 
that certain objects represent positions on an imagined set of relations, 
denominated in an ideal unit. Perhaps the “essence” or “spirit” of money 
is a fiction. Money is a collective delusion, as it were, that is extremely 
helpful and effective in structuring certain types of social interactions, 
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including economic transactions. In theorising this fiction, I hope that I 
have provided some points of interest at which social ontology, law, and 
economics might interact and cross-pollinate in future research. 
I have not delved into the questions of politics and political economy 
that naturally arise around money. But I would like to conclude with 
three brief observations. First, once we recognise money as a creature of 
our own imagination, that owes a large part of its existence to that do-
main of social reality we call “law” – rather than as a naturally-existing 
entity – it becomes difficult to deny a constitutional aspect to any mon-
etary system. This appears most strongly in state theories of money, 
which identify money most closely with the organised political commu-
nity. One may reject the notion that “money” is only possible in a mod-
ern, Westphalian state, and point to other forms of political association 
with autonomous payment communities. But that does not negate the 
essential connection between politics, law, and money. This is an onto-
logical argument about money in general, rather than a policy argument 
about the best kind of money system. Money is not a neutral fact of the 
universe to which human societies must conform, like the number of 
hours in the day or molecules of H₂O in a litre of water (Fox et al. 17). 
Money is a creature of social convention that serves certain purposes. 
Secondly, this being the case, in my view money should function 
conformably with the constitutional values and aspirations of the rele-
vant society. Where a money system ceases to do so, or systemically 
creates outcomes unconformable with those values, there is a prima fa-
cie case to change it. This impulse is implicit in the “cryptocurrency” 
movement, which is seeking radically to reform the way that money is 
made. It seeks expressly to replace the need for both commercial banks 
and central banks – to circumvent the “finance franchise” entirely 
(Nakamoto). Given the timing of Bitcoin’s launch, it is likely that its 
initiators wanted to provide a means to avoid outcomes such as central 
bank manipulation of the money supply through unconventional mone-
tary operations like “quantitative easing” in the wake of the GFC. Or, 
put differently, to provide a means to undermine central bank monetary 
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policy. Indeed, others perceive central bank control over the supply of 
money as an essential tool to promote monetary policy.  
Thirdly, technologies, including the “blockchain” technology launched 
together with Bitcoin in 2009, offer new tools and affordances for both 
private and public actors to create money. For example, Rohan Grey has 
recently argued that central banks should embrace the opportunity to is-
sue their own liabilities directly to the public on a much broader scale 
than ever before, in digital form as “central bank digital currency” 
(“CBDC”). While one of the chief risks associated with CBDC is a flight 
from commercial banks, Grey argues that this could catalyse a healthy 
re-alignment within the monetary system, in which commercial banks 
lose their monopoly on payments processing and focus on credit analysis 
and collateral evaluation (170-171). A number of central banks have ex-
plored options for CBDC, and some even have trials in progress (Gnan 
and Mascriando). The proposal in mid-2019 by Facebook and a consor-
tium to launch “Libra”, a digital currency backed by reserves of sover-
eign fiat currencies, may accelerate the time-line for these developments 
(“An Introduction to Libra”; Jones). 
There has probably never been a more exciting time in the long his-
tory of money. It is difficult to predict what the long-term impacts of the 
last decade’s developments will be, but it is safe to say that the monetary 
system will change fundamentally in the next ten years. Perhaps the cru-
cial virtue in anyone thinking about the future of money at the present 
time would be imagination – the courage to take a moment, to reject the 
inevitability of legacy conventions, and to imagine what might be pos-
sible in the future. 
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 Beneath and Beyond the City:  
The Multiple Faces of British Finance 
Olivier Butzbach 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Among the most entrenched visions of modern capitalism stands the 
City, London’s financial district. The City has come to epitomise first 
British financial imperialism, as British capital flooded the emerging 
economies of the late 19th century; and then, once the Empire was gone, 
the might of financial markets, both within and outside the United King-
dom. The City is, of course, a metonymy for the United Kingdom’s fi-
nancial services industry. The City of London refers to a territory of little 
more than a square mile within London (hence it being known, alterna-
tively, as the “Square Mile”) and is one of the 33 administrative districts 
constituting the metropolitan city (without initial capital letter) of Lon-
don. But “The City” distinguishes itself from London’s other 32 dis-
tricts: it is not a borough but a county. In addition, the City of London is 
a corporation. Its governance is very peculiar and dates back centuries.  
There is a lot to say about the spatial dimension of the City of Lon-
don – what territory it includes beyond the administrative boundaries, 
the spatial relationships between the City and the broader metropolitan 
area, and the relationships between the City and other financial districts 
in the UK and elsewhere. However, this is not what this chapter is about. 
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The following pages, by contrast, deal with the metonymy itself – how 
it became taken for granted, what it says about how we view finance in 
general and the British financial system in particular, and, especially, 
what it does not say. To paraphrase Walter Bagehot, the famous editor 
of the Economist in the third quarter of the 19th century, the City is in-
teresting for embodying finance as a “concrete reality”1 – but a partly 
misleading embodiment, as is argued below.  
The metonymy of the City encapsulates two very different charac-
terisations of the British financial system. A first characterisation con-
sists in the identification of the City with “financial markets”2 – espe-
cially money markets – at the centre of Bagehot’s book. Such character-
isation is quite widely shared among financial economists, or scholars 
studying finance and financial systems in a comparative fashion. From 
this point of view, Britain is seen as epitomising “market-based” finance, 
by opposition to or contrast with “bank-based” finance usually associ-
ated with Germany and Japan (Allen and Gale; Demirgüç-Kunt and Lev-
ine). This classification matters as different qualities and/or levels of al-
locative efficiency are associated with each ideal-type (Levine; Beck 
and Levine). Such a view is obviously not completely wrong, especially 
when contrasting ideal-types. It is certainly true that, for instance, Ger-
man capital markets have long been under-developed with respect to 
British ones; and that German universal banks had for a good part of the 
20th century a tighter grip on the domestic economy than the large Lon-
don clearing banks had on the British economy. 
A second characterisation, which is less widespread among econo-
mists but more common, it seems, in cultural representations of the City, 
                                                             
1  In the opening sentences of “Lombard Street”, Bagehot’s seminal 1873 pub-
lished collection of Economist articles, Bagehot wrote: “I venture to call this 
Essay ‘Lombard Street,’ and not the ‘Money Market,’ or any such phrase, 
because I wish to deal, and to show that I mean to deal, with concrete reali-
ties.” (Bagehot 1) 
2  A financial market can be defined as a decentralized system of resource al-
location dealing with financial contracts and services. 
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treats the latter as the symbol of the concentration of financial power. 
This characterisation pervaded Victorian and Edwardian imagery, as 
Ranald Michie has shown (Michie, Guilty Money). English fiction re-
flected the mixed feelings held by the public regarding the City, which 
evolved over time. What did not change, however, was the association 
of the City with immense capital accumulation and increasingly larger 
(mostly joint-stock) organisations. Such imagery has persisted until re-
cent times: in a 2014 study, Shaw showed how several post-2007 crisis 
British works of fiction contrasted the poverty and distress of several 
characters with greedy and powerful City institutions with a global 
reach. Such characterisation of London (and the City within it) as a 
global financial centre, populated with powerful financial institutions, 
is, again, not inaccurate: London is indeed one of the most important 
international financial centres in the world, together with New York. 
London, for instance, has the highest turnover in over-the-counter inter-
est-rate derivative trading (one of the key derivatives markets). London 
also has the highest volume of foreign currency loans made each year 
by international banks; and is home to a handful of truly global banks 
(such as HSBC). 
However, the double characterisation constituting the metonymy is 
no mere reflection, or generalisation of empirical experience – as Bage-
hot’s argument seems to imply. It is a socially constructed image that is, 
in part, both contradictory and misleading. It is contradictory in that the 
first characterisation (the City as the embodiment of markets) clashes 
with the second image (the City as the symbol of concentrated power). 
It is misleading as the British financial system cannot be reduced to a 
system of markets, or to a tight network of all-powerful London-based 
financial institutions. Indeed, as the following pages will attempt to 
show, seeking a more accurate depiction of British finance forces us to 
look both beyond and beneath the City. 
But why would we want to do that? Why, in other words, critically 
analyse the characterisation of the City summarised above? A simple 
answer is that such characterisations may be performative: as a cultural 
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artefact, the City has necessarily had an impact on policy-makers’ per-
spective. This simple argument builds on the more general view of eco-
nomic (and especially financial) theories as performative (MacKenzie; 
see also Scherer and Marti). In the case of the City of London, the double 
characterisation described above was clearly an influential factor in two 
critical regulatory and political turning points in contemporary Britain: 
the Thatcherite “Big Bang” of 1986 and New Labour’s “light touch” 
approach to financial regulation in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Da-
ripa et al.). In both instances, there was (among policy-makers) great 
anxiety about the status of the City as a global financial centre; and the 
belief that unleashing financial markets’ autonomous potential would 
constitute the basis for a successful growth strategy (Jessop; Sikka). The 
disastrous outcomes of such approaches, revealed by the 2007-08 finan-
cial crisis, thus show how necessary it is to rethink the place and role of 
the City in British finance. 
 
 
THE ‘CITY’ IN BRITAIN:  
A BRIEF HISTORICAL RETROSPECT 
 
There is a broad consensus among economic historians on the pivotal 
role played by London-based financial institutions, and in particular fi-
nancial institutions tied to the British capital markets, in the economic 
development of Great Britain over the past three centuries. Such a key 
role for a financial centre is a recurrent feature of modern capitalism, as 
many authors have shown (see, for instance, Arrighi). But the financial 
revolution in 17th-century Britain, centred around London, had a deci-
sive impact on the country’s subsequent fortunes. As a historian recently 
put it:  
 
Comprised of a long-term funded national debt, an active securities market, 
and a widely circulating credit currency, the modern financial system ena-
bled England to create a powerful fiscal-military state, to forge a dominant 
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global empire, and to move in the direction of the Industrial Revolution faster 
than any other nation. (Wennerlind 1) 
 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the London capital markets were the 
central component of English, and then British, finance. In fact, the mod-
ern “financial revolution” in England is commonly attributed by histori-
ans to the joint development of a London-based market for corporate 
securities and a London-based market for government debt, both epito-
mised by the creation of the Bank of England in the late 17th century 
(see, in particular, Dickson). The stock market boom of the late 17th cen-
tury accompanied the multiplication of joint-stock companies and the 
development of an active derivatives market in London. The city, which 
had been central to the country’s trade industry, had a tight hold on the 
nascent financial industry. In fact, as Murphy has pointed out, “[m]ost 
participants in the financial market of the late seventeenth century lived 
either in or around London, and the majority of investors did travel to 
the City in order to complete their transactions” (Murphy 117). This sit-
uation certainly results from the high degree of political and economic 
centralisation characterising England at the time (Murphy; Porter). 
The importance of London as a financial centre, established in the 
late 17th century, was constantly re-affirmed over the next three centuries 
– in particular, of course, during Britain’s hegemony over the world 
economy between the late 18th century and the early 20th century 
(Arrighi). The period when Walter Bagehot directed and wrote in The 
Economist was probably the apex of the city’s domination over world 
finance, which had started a century earlier, when London replaced Am-
sterdam as the centre of international financial networks of flows (Neal). 
London was briefly challenged by Paris as an international financial cen-
tre during the third quarter of the 19th century; but it re-established its 
pre-eminence soon after the 1871 end of the Franco-Prussian war, with 
its peculiar capacity to handle “an enormous body of transactions on a 
small monetary base” (Kindleberger 268). The definitive displacement 
of British hegemony over international financial markets, achieved by 
the United States by the end of World War II (see Arrighi), did not put 
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an end to the City as an international financial centre. Indeed, London 
re-emerged as a global financial power with the rapid development of 
the Eurodollar bond market in the 1960s, and derivatives markets in sub-
sequent decades (Michie, “A Financial Phoenix”). 
The renewed relevance of the city of London for domestic and global 
finance in the 21st century is also the fruit of a deep-seated transfor-
mation of modern capitalism that many scholars have dubbed “finan-
cialisation” (see, for instance, Epstein; and van der Zwan, for a recent 
review). Financialisation can be broadly defined as the growing im-
portance of the financial sector and of financial transactions within the 
economy. Most financialisation scholars have interpreted it as the out-
come of policy choices made in the 1970s by advanced economies to 
overcome the severe crisis these economies were undergoing (Kripp-
ner). As a result, the relative weight of financial profits out of total prof-
its increased (Epstein), and non-financial companies increasingly tar-
geted financial performance at the expense of the non-financial part of 
their business model. The British economy is certainly among the most 
financialised economies in the world. This situation can be illustrated 
with some data about the size and importance of the British financial 
industry: in 2017, the economic output of the British financial services 
industry has been estimated to amount to £119 billion, that is, 6.5% of 
total output – down from an all-time-high of 9.0% in 2009 (Rhodes); 
London accounted for about half of the financial industry’s gross value 
added in 2017 – with the output of that industry accounting for 14% of 
London’s total economic output, far above the national average (Rhodes).  
Overall, there seems to be a strong continuity between the early con-
stitution of the London-based capital markets in the late 17th century and 
the actual physiognomy of British finance today. However, there are key 
differences as well. One of these differences consists of the degree and 
nature of integration of London-based financial markets into global fi-
nancial networks. A key to the success of the London financial markets 
in the age of Financial Revolution was their ability to tie domestic in-
vestment and speculation with domestic public debt and international 
trade finance – what Arrighi calls a “territorialist” state and a capitalist 
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elite (Arrighi). By the late 20th century, by contrast, the City was much 
more geared towards world financial flows. By 2000, 40,000 workers 
were employed in London-based foreign banks (and foreign bank sub-
sidiaries), against 25,000 who worked for domestic banks (Roberts). The 
international banking operations of UK-based banks dwarf their domes-
tic banking operations; and the City of London has now become an im-
portant hub for offshore financial flows (Shaxson). 
The City’s greater tendency to look outward today does not reduce 
the salience of the double characterisation presented above, however. It 
is part and parcel of what Saskia Sassen has named “global cities” – 
major cities that have become simultaneously “highly concentrated 
command points for the world economy” and “key locations for finance” 
(Sassen 3). Yet this City-centred and market-based view of British fi-
nance is partial only, as the following sections aim to show. 
 
 
BEYOND THE CITY: THE BRITISH STATE 
 
“You might as well, or better, try to alter the English monarchy and sub-
stitute a republic, as to alter the present constitution of the English 
money market, founded on the Bank of England, and substitute for it a 
system in which each bank shall keep its own reserve”, wrote Bagehot 
in the conclusion of his 1873 book (Bagehot 330). Throughout his stud-
ies of the British money market, indeed, Bagehot constantly pointed to 
the dependence of such markets on the Bank of England for their func-
tioning. A broader view, within a longer time frame, confirms this im-
pression. All financial historians cannot emphasise enough the central 
role played by “public” institutions such as the Bank of England (see, 
for a recent sample, Murphy; and Stasavage, Public Debt). But the Bank 
of England is, since 1997, formally independent from the British gov-
ernment. Before that date, the Bank depended on the British Treasury as 
much as money markets depended on the Bank of England – as, again, 
Bagehot put it: “[o]n the whole, therefore, the position of the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in our Money Market is that of one who deposits 
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largely in it, who created it, and who demoralised it” (111). There are, 
and were, tight links between the City and Westminster. These links 
have, of course, evolved over time, and the Bank of England did estab-
lish its autonomy from party politics in the course of its life. Autonomy 
from party politics did not imply, however, autonomy from the British 
state. In his history of banking and money in the UK, Collins did em-
phasise how much the Bank’s prestige relied on its relationship with the 
state: the Bank “had been created out of the need for state finance, 
providing loans in return for the special privileges incorporated in its 
charter; and it continued to supply funds and handle the government’s 
accounts” (Collins 169). The “privileges” Collins refers to include the 
monopoly of joint-stock banking in England and Wales conferred on the 
Bank of England in 1697 and further consolidated in 1707 (it was abol-
ished in 1826); and the monopoly of legal tender attributed to Bank of 
England notes in 1833 (Collins). 
Beyond the particular institution that was the Bank of England, 
which stood at the crossroads between the British state and the money 
markets (represented, at first, by the class of London merchants), Lon-
don-based financial markets have historically been firmly embedded in 
what we may call a state-market nexus. First, the activities of the London 
stock exchange, in its first two centuries of activity, largely revolved 
around public (e.g. state) finance. As late as 1853, as Christiane Eisen-
berg notes, British government bonds still accounted for 70% of the trad-
ing volume on the stock exchange (70). Secondly, and more broadly, 
modern financial markets have pervasive institutional roots, starting 
with the legal organisational forms and financial contracts widely used 
in London. In other words, the “corporate capitalism” of the 20th century 
had Victorian origins, both in legal and cultural terms (Johnson). Per-
haps more provocatively, in a study of British banking stability from 
1800 to the current periods, John Turner argues that “politics […] is the 
ultimate determinant of banking stability” (211). 
Another critical take on the view of British financial capitalism as 
“market-based” is that, simply put, markets are antithetical to capitalism. 
This view was first neatly expressed by French historian Fernand 
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Braudel in his Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme (1979 for 
the original French edition). Markets, in Braudel’s view, are structured 
by horizontal communications, with a “degree of automatic coordina-
tion” that “usually links supply, demand and prices.” By contrast, above 
this layer of the market economy “comes the zone of the anti-market, 
where the great predators roam and the law of the jungle operates” 
(Braudel 229). This zone, adds Braudel, is “the real home of capitalism.” 
This view was drawn upon by intellectual successors to Braudel, such 
as Giovanni Arrighi, who further identified in financial centres the “fu-
sion between state and capital” (Arrighi). This argument, then, brings us 
back to the first limitation of the “marketedness” of British finance ex-
posed above. 
As a matter of fact, it is the close interaction between capital accu-
mulation processes and political power concentration processes that has 
characterised modern capitalism in the past three or four centuries. As 
Karl Polanyi put it, thus giving the metonymy discussed here particular 
salience, “[g]old standard and constitutionalism were the instruments 
which made the voice of the City of London heard in many smaller coun-
tries which had adopted these symbols of adherence to the new interna-
tional order” (14; emphasis in the original). We should note, further-
more, that the emergence of modern nation-states, too, which can be 
considered as a process that is symmetrical to the emergence of capital-
ism, owes to a similar dialectical interaction between coercion and cap-
ital. Such is the thesis of Charles Tilly, who established a parallel be-
tween processes of concentration of capital, territorially associated with 
modern cities, on the one hand; and processes of concentration of coer-
cion, territorially associated with modern states, on the other hand 
(Tilly). It is the combination of particular patterns of concentration of 
capital and coercive means that has given the modern nation-states their 
varying flavour. Interestingly, while in Tilly’s framework high levels of 
capital concentration hinder subsequent nation-state building processes, 
London is precisely an exception in that “in England a substantial state 
formed relatively early despite the presence of a formidable trading city” 
(61). 
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A different, but complementary, argument was put forward more re-
cently by David Stasavage, who has studied the interrelations between 
the joint development of modern credit systems and representative as-
semblies in late medieval and early modern Europe (Stasavage, Public 
debt; States of Credit). In Stasavage’s account, the development of mod-
ern credit (and, by extension, financial) systems was predicated upon the 
expansion of public (i.e. government) borrowing, which depended in 
turn on the public’s trust in the polity’s capacity to monitor and disci-
pline the borrower’s behaviour. Hence the key importance of powerful 
representative assemblies, precisely able to exert such power (Stasav-
age, States of Credit). Again, as in Tilly’s case, such a framework does 
not, at first sight, fit the British case – since Stasavage associated higher, 
more efficient degrees of monitoring with the representative assemblies 
typical of European medieval city states, which differed greatly from 
territorial states such as France (Stasavage, States of Credit). Great Brit-
ain was, of course, a territorial state; but here again, the high powers 
conferred upon a representative assembly early on were a British excep-
tion and enabled the “virtuous” joint development of public credit and 
government borrowers’ accountability at the level of the nation-state. 
This view builds on the seminal article by North and Weingast on the 
decisive benefits of the 1688 Glorious Revolution for the subsequent de-
velopment of finance in 18th-century Britain (North and Weingast). 
Late 20th-century financialisation did not fundamentally alter this di-
alectical relationship between markets and the state in British finance. 
As mentioned above, several authors explained financialisation as the 
outcome of government strategies set up to escape the stagflation of the 
1970s. More specifically, successive Tory (and, after 1997, New La-
bour) governments encouraged the development of financial markets, 
liberalized banking and brokerage, adopted pro-business regulatory re-
forms (Sikka; Jessop), and directly participated in the financialisation of 
public goods, such as land (Christophers).  
Thus, finance in the UK is not (only) market-based, circumscribing 
the first characterisation implied in the City metonymy, as argued in the 
introduction. However, the arguments presented above do not help to 
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dispel the notion of a City-centred financial industry. To do so, one 
needs to turn one’s attention to the actual diversity, organisational and 
territorial, beneath the City of London.   
 
 
BENEATH THE CITY: 
THE DIVERSITY OF BRITISH FINANCE 
 
Two features of British finance further circumscribe the descriptive ac-
curacy of the “City of London” metonymy as far as the second charac-
terisation is concerned. First, the City has not always been as hegemonic 
over British finance as it may appear today. It is true that British finan-
cial services today cluster around regional centres, with London proving 
the most attractive regional cluster in the 1990s (Pandit et al.), and that 
the geographical concentration of financial services in London has not 
abated in the wake of the 2007-08 crisis (Wójcik and MacDonald-
Korth)3. Nevertheless, the history of British finance in the past three 
centuries is also the story of successful regional financial centres and 
local banks. As Collins argues, “until well into the second half of the 
nineteenth century the distinctive feature of the typical English provin-
cial bank [...] was that its business was overwhelmingly local in nature” 
(22). 
A second limitation arises out of the persistent organisational diver-
sity of British finance. In other words, the British financial industry is 
constituted by a multitude of organisational forms, each of which carry 
or embody distinct institutional logics. Organisational forms, in the or-
ganisational theory literature, are usually construed as sets of features 
(the particular governance structure of an organisation, its legal status 
and mandate, its core business model) that attribute a particular identity 
to an organisation and hence make it belong to a specific population of 
organisations. In the British context, now dominated by large joint-stock 
                                                             
3  In particular, these authors find that London’s share of financial employment 
has increased between 2008 and 2012, from 32% to 34%. 
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companies, the financial industry was heterogeneous for long periods of 
time, accommodating the presence, at the side of joint-stock banks, stock 
brokers and insurance companies, of mutual financial institutions such 
as building societies and mutual insurers, as well as Trustees savings 
banks (Casu and Gall). 
Building societies are an especially interesting type of financial in-
stitution, given that they represent the polar opposite to the large Lon-
don-based clearing banks commonly associated with the British finan-
cial system. Building societies, which first appeared in Birmingham in 
the 1770s, were mutual mortgage lenders; they underwent a very steady 
rise in numbers during the 19th century, and a rapid increase in members 
during the 20th century – especially after the 1930s (Bellman). 
By the early 1970s British building societies had reached a dominant 
position in mortgage lending, holding very high market shares through-
out the decade, reaching a peak of 82% in 1978. However, the strong 
position of building societies on various key segments of retail financial 
markets underwent significant decline in the late 1980s and, most im-
portantly, during the 1990s. On the mortgage lending market new forays 
by banks, unburdened by the restrictive regulation imposed by monetary 
authorities in the previous decades, slowly eroded societies’ market 
shares. This erosion accelerated in the late 1980s and late 1990s, due to 
the transfer of the mortgage assets of de-mutualized societies after a 
1986 reform encouraged them to do so. 
Today (as of early 2019), building societies have not completely dis-
appeared; there are 42 of them (against hundreds in the 1970s); they are 
mostly small in size, with the exception of Nationwide, the largest mu-
tual lender in the UK. Their mortgage market share is small by compar-
ison with its level in the 1970s and 1980s, but it is still very significant, 
with a 25.6% share of gross mortgage lending in 2018.4 Building socie-
ties thus epitomise persistent diversity within the British financial sys-
tem. Although such diversity has clearly receded since the 1970s, thus 
becoming an issue for policy-makers in the wake of the 2007-08 crisis, 
                                                             
4  Source: Building Societies Association. 
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it has resisted the pressures of homologation and competitive isomor-
phism. Such diversity continues to undermine a City-centred view of 
British finance. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The City is a powerful metonymy – a metaphor for the power of finance 
in modern capitalism. It also encapsulates a double characterisation of 
the British financial system, simultaneously seen as, on the one hand, 
the supreme embodiment of the power of markets and, on the other, the 
symbol of the concentration of capital in the hands of a few global insti-
tutions. This twin characterisation is potentially contradictory as well as 
misleading, as has been shown here. 
In particular, British finance is not completely market-based nor is it 
exclusively centred around London-based joint-stock behemoths. Brit-
ish finance expresses the strong interrelations of state and market and 
exhibits persistent diversity despite isomorphic pressures. This, I argue 
here, calls for a more careful characterisation of British finance and 
points to the importance of historicising both the material side of imag-
ined economies as well as their symbolic aspects. 
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 A Nation of Shopkeepers? The Idealised 
High Street in Brexit Britain 
Rebecca Bramall 
 
 
In the decade since the global financial crisis of 2007-8, thousands of 
shops have closed in high streets across the United Kingdom. Wage stag-
nation, rising business rates and competition from online retailers have 
been blamed for the consequent “death of the high street” (Marsh). Me-
dia coverage of this demise – illustrated by pictures of empty, fly-posted 
retail units – has tracked the transformation of formerly vibrant locations 
into desolate spaces recolonised by the ‘wrong’ sort of retail activity – 
charity shops, betting shops and pawnbrokers. These representations 
convey a strong sense of the retail industry and as well as the UK econ-
omy at large undergoing a period of change, “laid bare for us all to see” 
(Morrison). 
Since June 2016, when the UK voted to leave the European Union, 
the fate of Britain’s troubled high streets has become freighted with 
deeper significance. The UK’s relationship with the EU – an ‘anchor’ of 
Britain’s economic model for over four decades (Weldon 12) – became 
an object of interrogation and uncertainty, placing Britain’s economic 
future in question. Brexit was a singular event that appeared “to both 
disrupt and open up possibilities”, but it can also be understood as a more 
diffuse phenomenon that “surfaces across multiple ordinary scenes and 
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situations”, instituting a period of intense and highly contested future-
making (Anderson and Wilson 291-2). 
This chapter investigates the opportunities to imagine Britain’s eco-
nomic future that have proliferated in this moment of Brexit. It does so 
through the site of the high street and its idealisation. The dominant nar-
rative of the high street’s decline competes for our attention with a very 
different set of representations that portray renewed and thriving exam-
ples of these places (Griffiths). These ‘model’ high streets have been 
seized upon as evidence that it is possible to revive town centre shopping 
districts and the communities that are sustained by them. Through an 
analysis of various material and textual instances of the idealised high 
street, I investigate this site as a point of entry into contemporary eco-
nomic imaginaries. What kinds of desires, hopes and expectations can 
be traced in the idealised high street? And what do these aspirations tell 
us about broader economic imaginaries in Brexit Britain?  
This chapter introduces and contextualises three instances of the ide-
alised high street and identifies their shared tropes. I go on to argue that 
the site of the idealised high street supports two related but ultimately 
conflicting economic imaginaries that afford progressive and reaction-
ary visions of economic organisation and solidarity in alternative post-
Brexit futures. In the final part of the chapter I draw on my analysis of 
the idealised high street to foreground some of the obstacles that exist to 
the radical democratisation of local economies. 
 
 
IMAGINING THE ECONOMY 
 
As others have noted, a concern with the ‘imagined economy’, or ‘eco-
nomic imaginaries’, should not be dismissed as immaterial or trivial 
(Clarke 17). It follows from a recognition that economic activities can-
not be “conducted independently of systems of meaning and norms” 
(Ray and Sayer 6), and from an intention to create a space for the inter-
rogation of those signifying practices. ‘Imaginaries’ have been defined 
as “semiotic systems that frame individual subjects’ lived experience”, 
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and so an ‘economic imaginary’ is a system that “gives meaning and 
shape to the ‘economic’ field” (Jessop 344). John Clarke observes that 
the ‘invention’ of the economic “creates the conditions for things called 
economies to be imagined in different ways, involving different archi-
tectures, elements, dynamics, figures and embodiments” (19). This 
chapter is particularly concerned with the alternative possibilities pre-
figured in ‘emergent imaginaries’ (Birch), and in disentangling the co-
existence of related economic imaginaries (Swartz). 
There are countless practices, discourses, representations and spaces 
which might be studied in order to gain a deeper picture of economic 
imaginaries in Brexit Britain. This chapter focuses on a particularly rich 
site of meaning: the idealised high street. In a context in which the com-
plexity of financial markets is understood to contribute to global eco-
nomic instability, and in which economic globalisation is widely cited 
as a driver of fiscal challenges, the significance of the local, human scale 
of the high street is palpable. High streets are spaces in which citizens 
habitually engage in tangible economic transactions. These transactions 
are cognitively graspable in a way that national and global scales of eco-
nomic activity are often not, and so they provide an essential point of 
entry into public debate about ‘the economy’. Indeed, high streets are 
often portrayed as representing the economy in microcosm. A tendency 
towards the fetishisation of high streets in reporting on business and eco-
nomics presents a misleading picture of their representativeness of the 
broader economy and of the contribution of retail to GDP, yet it points 
to the significance of high streets in contemporary economic imagi-
naries. 
As Sam Griffiths notes, high streets are significant both for what they 
do – for their material, functional attributes – and what they mean – their 
symbolic resonances (32). Shopping streets, and the commercial activi-
ties that they epitomise, have long played a role in British national iden-
tity and ideas about economic well-being (Benson and Ugolini). In more 
recent years the high street has emerged as an object of “collective con-
cern” (McDonald and Cassidy 307) bound up with public debate about 
the fostering of ‘community’ in towns and cities (Hubbard; Watson and 
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Wells). Shoppers, retailers and policymakers alike perceive the high 
street as ‘the glue that binds a community together’ (Fletcher et al. 485). 
In their efforts to formulate solutions to its decline, politicians, urban 
planners and commentators (Alakeson; Harris; Sikka) recognise and re-
spond to the ‘generative qualities’ (Griffiths 41) of the high street, un-
derscoring the centrality of this cultural and economic site in contempo-
rary economic imaginaries and its status as a model of the national econ-
omy in miniature. The high street, then, is more than just a geographical 
location in which retail activity takes place. It can instead be understood 
as a site that opens up opportunities to envision and enact social, politi-
cal, and economic change. 
 
 
NOSTALGIA FOR THE HIGH STREET 
 
The current wave of intense focus on high streets and their perceived 
decline is often accompanied with expressions of nostalgia for these lo-
cations as they are imagined to have functioned in the past – whether in 
the ‘golden age’ before the financial crisis (McDonald and Cassidy), in 
post-war society (Hubbard), or further back in time (Watson and Wells). 
This nostalgia is manifested, for instance, in the way that new and exist-
ing types of commercial activity cultivate a nostalgic retail aesthetic 
(Bramall), or incorporate references to the past into their rationale for 
conducting business (Hubbard). It has also been traced in research in-
formants’ discussion about how shopping districts have changed (Wat-
son and Wells) and their aspirations for the future of these locations 
(Fletcher et al.). 
Nostalgia for the high street of the past is not a new phenomenon. It 
can be located in a longer history of collective expressions of yearning 
for the way we imagine ourselves to have shopped in bygone times (Ben-
son and Ugolini). As the cultural historian Raphael Samuel explains, 
shops have been cultivating a ‘heritage’ feel for decades (Samuel). The 
notion of the ‘period’ shopping street developed in the museum sector 
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in the 1930s and by the 1960s had become a leading attraction at muse-
ums and theme parks. In the late 1970s the renovation of Covent Garden 
in central London introduced features such as Victorian street lamps and 
cobbled paving to the market. Samuel argues that in these decades, a 
“new version of the national past” began to offer “more points of access 
to ‘ordinary people’”, and that shopping accordingly enjoyed “a new 
visibility” (159-60).  
Samuel interprets ‘period’ shopping in the 1970s and 80s as a form 
of “living history”, and as interrelated with the preoccupation of the baby 
boomer generation with “lifestyles” (196). Yet he is keen to challenge a 
contemporary critique of ‘heritage’ advanced by historians such as Pat-
rick Wright and Robert Hewison, who disparage such modes of histori-
cal engagement as delivering a sanitised, inauthentic and invariably re-
actionary picture of the past (Wright; Hewison; Samuel 259-71). Samuel 
is both considerate of the tendency for ‘heritage’ to be appropriated by 
conservatism and sensitive to the opportunities for “historical reflection 
and thought” (271) that these popular, engaging, and often embodied 
modes of encounter promote. He is ultimately confident of the openness 
of the past to political resignification: “there are no historical proposi-
tions”, he argues, “which are insulated from contrary readings” (164). 
Griffiths offers a different perspective on the imbrication of the past 
and present in the space of the high street, or the question of “how the 
past of a town, city or suburb relates to its future” (33). He draws atten-
tion to a tendency in debate about the value of ‘heritage’ – or the histor-
ical residues contained in high streets – to insist on the discrepancy be-
tween past and present. This view is challenged through an investigation 
of the function of the historical built environment (considered in the long 
term, rather than more recent historical eras) in sustaining “communal 
continuity” through “spatial co-presence” (40). Griffiths concludes that 
the high street “is not a repository of static meanings to be toyed with 
but rather a source of time-space orientations towards the world that af-
ford social memory” (50). 
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This chapter draws on these perspectives in my own analysis of the 
activation of the historical past in the idealised high street, and its func-
tion in the ‘making present of diverse futures’ in Brexit Britain.  
 
 
THE IDEALISED HIGH STREET: 
THREE INSTANCES 
 
Samuel’s mode of analysis frequently moves between the discussion of 
different kinds of illustrations and examples, from photographs to street 
furniture. In a similar way, I want to introduce and focus upon three spe-
cific instances of the idealised high street, which – along with further 
contextualisation – will serve to foreground certain common tropes.  
The High Street is a children’s picture book written and illustrated 
by Edinburgh-based artist Alice Melvin. The story’s protagonist, a girl 
called Sally, sets out on a shopping trip in search of a list of somewhat 
obscure items – a yellow rose, a garden hose, a cockatoo, a tin kazoo, 
and so on. Arriving at ‘The High Street’, she visits a series of traditional 
shops, including a toy shop, a greengrocer, a hardware shop, and a flo-
rist. Each double page spread features text on the left – composed in 
verse – and an illustration of a shop front on the right, which can be 
opened to reveal an interior depicting Sally’s retail encounter. Sally suc-
ceeds in acquiring most of the items on her list, but is disappointed when 
she is unable to buy a yellow rose in the florist. At the end of the story 
she leaves the high street with ‘memories’ of yellow roses flowering in 
the adjacent public park. Period high streets are popular settings in chil-
dren’s picture books (Griffiths), and Melvin’s illustrations evoke classic 
texts by authors such as Janet and Allan Ahlberg. 
Bishopthorpe Road (or ‘Bishy Road’) is a shopping street in York, 
in the north of England. York is a walled city with two universities and 
a population of about 205,000. Bishopthorpe Road is located to the 
southwest of the city, outside the city centre, and the area has been a 
shopping district for at least 150 years (Clements Hall). It was named 
winner of the ‘Great British High Street of the Year’ in 2015, in a scheme 
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run by the Department for Communities and Local Government. It has 
been the focus of significant and sustained media attention, with one 
headline declaring it a model of “how to bring a high street back from 
the dead” (Rushby, “How to Bring a High Street”). Bishopthorpe Road 
is both a real place – with material, functional attributes – and also an 
imagined place that has been held up as an ideal in extensive media rep-
resentation of its high street. 
The third instance of the idealised high street is contained in a plan-
ning document on shop front design issued in 2016 by the ‘Regeneration 
and Growth’ section of the London Borough of Waltham Forest, an area 
of northeast London. Aimed at encouraging more people to visit the bor-
ough’s high streets, the document gives advice on “how to achieve a 
high quality, attractive shop front”. It is illustrated by examples of ‘good 
practice’ from shopping districts in the borough, including Leyton High 
Street, Walthamstow Village, and Higham Hill Road. Many borough 
councils across the UK make similar guidance available to businesses in 
their area.  
What common elements do these instances share? And what do they 
tell us about the idealised high street? First of all, these are all examples, 
in different ways, of idealised high streets as ‘period’ streets. In each 
case there is repeated referencing and valorisation of the past, although 
no particular period is preferred or consistently evoked. The shops in 
Melvin’s book adopt different architectural styles dating from the mid-
19th century through to the 1930s. Edwardian and Victorian shop fronts 
dominate, with some Art Deco motifs. Each illustration incorporates pe-
riod features such as pilasters, corbels, mullions, fluting, plaques, and 
clocks. Stories celebrating Bishopthorpe Road emphasise its history of 
trading, dating back to the 1870s. Waltham Forest’s planning guidelines 
attach great importance to the historical built environment through an 
emphasis on the value of “original features” and “traditional elements”. 
These are not exactly the ‘period’ streets that Samuel describes: they 
are not actively seeking to recreate and immerse the visitor in a particular 
era from the past. Instead, there is an alignment with Griffiths’s obser-
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vation that British high streets tend to “escape definition in terms of con-
ventional historical periods” (35). These instances of the idealised high 
street share an aspiration to remove certain markers of the present-day 
from shop fronts, so that, in so far as it is possible, all that is left is ‘pe-
riod’. In this sense, Melvin’s high street is a perfect illustration of Wal-
tham Forest’s planning guidelines, and many of the shops in Bishop-
thorpe Road have been renewed in ways that would also meet with the 
council’s approval. The aspiration to remove markers of the present-day 
also extends into the street itself, where pedestrian, car-free space is fa-
voured. Ice cream is sold opposite Melvin’s toy shop from a vending 
tricycle, while in the Waltham Forest planning guidelines, an apron-
wearing, retro bicycle-riding delivery boy makes an appearance outside 
a strongly endorsed delicatessen.  
Second, these instances of the high street present shopkeeping as a 
decent and even aspirational way of earning a living. Retailers have his-
torically been conferred an ambiguous and often maligned social status, 
with “trade and shopkeeping […] generally associated with notions of 
greed, pettiness and narrow-mindedness” in the 19th and 20th centuries 
(Benson and Ugolini 6). Samuel contends that in the “living history” of 
late 20th-century heritage culture, labour and industry began to be “ret-
rospectively dignified”. The shopkeeper was “rehabilitated and given an 
honoured place” in the national story, becoming “an emblem of ‘knowl-
edgeable and friendly service’” (161). The shopkeepers of Bishopthorpe 
Road embody this rehabilitated image. In press coverage of the street’s 
fortunes, they are portrayed as enterprising, determined and civic-
minded, “used to rolling up their sleeves and getting on with it” (Rushby, 
“It Could be Terrible”). Fascia signs feature first and second names: ti-
tles such as Millie’s Fruit & Veg, McBride’s Opticians, and Thomas the 
Baker communicate the status of these shops as small, family enter-
prises, with owners who are proud to put their name to their business. In 
Melvin’s high street a commitment to the locality and community is em-
phasised through the depiction of shopkeepers’ quarters above their 
stores. The broader context is one in which Adam Smith’s description 
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of the English as a ‘nation of shopkeepers’ has been recuperated by Con-
servative politicians such as Iain Duncan Smith, who has praised shop-
keepers for modelling ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ (Dominiczak). 
Third, these instances of the high street express a strong commitment 
to independence, individuality, and uniqueness, qualities set in contrast 
with the blandness and homogeneity that are associated with big brands 
and retail chains. These types of businesses are of course entirely absent 
from Melvin’s book, while they are tolerated in the Waltham Forest 
planning guidelines only so long as they do not overly ‘dominate’, or 
break with the ‘cohesiveness’ of the street. The Bishopthorpe Road trad-
ers proudly proclaim that their shops are 90% independent. This feeling 
that ‘independent’ is best, and that big brands and chain stores are an 
unwanted presence on the idealised high street, can also be readily evi-
denced elsewhere. For example, in 2017 the book retailer Waterstones 
opened a series of unbranded bookshops – named ‘Southwold Books’, 
‘The Blackheath Bookshop’ and so on – in high streets across the UK. 
Managing Director of the chain James Daunt justified their approach by 
explaining that these stores were opening in “quite sensitive high streets 
with predominantly independent retailers on them […]. If you want to 
enhance a high-street you need to act as an independent” (Sayid).  
Fourth, these instances conceive of the ideal high street as delivering 
something more than retail opportunities. Media representations of 
Bishopthorpe Road ascribe its revival to the fostering of community 
spirit. Central to the narrative of the street’s recuperation is the closure 
of the road to traffic for a community street party (Rushby, “How to 
Bring a High Street”). Likewise, Melvin incorporates community spaces 
into her vision of the high street, with activities such as band practice 
and puppet shows in evidence. An emphasis on ‘social places’ can also 
be found in the 2011 Portas review – a report on Britain’s high streets 
carried out by a celebrity businesswoman. Portas describes her vision 
for high streets as “destinations for socialising, culture, health and well-
being, creativity and learning” (14), practices that we see depicted and 
given space in the idealised high street. 
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ECONOMIC IMAGINARIES IN BREXIT BRITAIN 
 
Ben Anderson and Helen Wilson note that the moment of Brexit, inau-
gurated by the outcome of the referendum in 2016, is one in which ‘di-
verse futures’ have been made present, often in ways that involve the 
activation of the past. These futures “open up an opportunity to reflect 
on how spaces for new and emerging forms of solidarity, both progres-
sive and otherwise, are created, reworked, or closed down” (Anderson 
and Wilson 293). The idealised high street can be understood as an ex-
ample of such a space, and specific instances of the tendencies I have 
described have been interpreted as fostering reactionary forms of soli-
darity. In a scathing response to Waltham Forest’s shop front scheme, 
Owen Hatherley has criticised the borough’s insistence on a unifying 
retro aesthetic, which has the effect – he claims – of purging the urban 
high street of its diversity, conviviality and appeal. “London streets don’t 
need to look like a historically illiterate retcon of a 1940s that never hap-
pened”, he argues, “they’re fine looking like what they are, hugely suc-
cessful experiments in multiculturalism” (Hatherley).  
While Hatherley offers a valid insight, it is worth testing the limits 
of this argument. Does the space of the idealised high street only serve 
to engender reactionary forms of solidarity? And are ‘period’ settings 
such as those that characterise the idealised high street inherently gener-
ative of such outcomes? In what follows, I pay close attention to the 
centrality of the idealised high street in contemporary economic imagi-
naries, emphasising the extent to which diverse constituencies make im-
aginative investments in this site. I argue that it can be understood to 
support conflicting imaginaries that afford both reactionary and progres-
sive visions of economic organisation and solidarity in alternative post-
Brexit futures. Yet, as I will discuss at the end of this chapter, a certain 
identity and overlap between these alternative visions helps us to recog-
nise the exclusions that are perpetuated in both economic imaginaries. 
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A Nice Row of Shops: The High Street in Little England 
 
It is not difficult to discern elements of the idealised high street that sup-
port visions of the future that are exclusionary, protectionist, reaction-
ary, and indeed racist. We might begin by foregrounding certain norma-
tive statements about the social that are asserted through the idealisation 
of the high street. The types of shops, the products that they sell, the 
people that sell them, and the people that buy them, all describe a world 
and imply particular shared values. Bishopthorpe Road is described in 
one news story as ‘an almost perfect parade’. That perfection is achieved 
when the right selection of unique, independent stores – each represent-
ing a distinct, ‘traditional’ trade – are assembled in a cohesive way: the 
butcher, baker, greengrocer, toy shop and so on. The assemblage of these 
traders serves to project a wider community of high street users who 
share an opinion of what the ‘perfect parade’ should offer, because they 
share values and ways of living. They need the same kinds of products 
and use them in the same kinds of ways. It is “a nice row of shops run 
by nice people for nice people” (Haywood). 
‘Nice’, here, is a way of talking about cultural and economic capital: 
the shared values and ways of living endorsed by the street are tied up 
with affluence and middle-class taste. Elsewhere, however, idealised 
high streets erect exclusionary borders that operate along both classed 
and racialised lines. Waltham Forest’s shop front design document elab-
orates key design considerations by reference to a drawing of a ‘tradi-
tional shop front’ and a series of visual examples, each designated an 
example of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ practice. The shops identified as examples 
of poor practice are invariably those serving a particular ethnic commu-
nity. They are deemed to lack the requisite ‘respect’ for original archi-
tectural features, and are criticised because they appear ‘cluttered’, ‘seek 
undue attention’, and ‘dominate their surroundings unnecessarily’. In 
this way, the design considerations expressed in this document com-
municate hierarchies of value, quality, and belonging that are bound up 
with broader nationalist imaginaries. 
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It would be highly misleading to suggest that any of these three in-
stances of the idealised high street anticipate an explicitly racist vision 
for the future. On the contrary, Melvin’s book offers an attentively mul-
ticultural depiction of the high street, incorporating shops run by people 
of apparently different ethnicities and visited by a diversity of custom-
ers. It is important to recognise, however, that such acts of inclusion are 
circumscribed by the terms and terrain on which they are made, which 
include the foregrounding and valorisation of the ‘period’ qualities of 
the built environment. Writing about ‘micropubs’ – very small public 
houses, which have been celebrated in visions of high street regeneration 
– Hubbard construes their “socially and culturally exclusive” dimension 
(20) as fostered in part through the design and decoration of these 
spaces, which are “characterised by artefacts and signs which invoke 
banal nationalism” (17). Offers of inclusion in the high street are also 
framed by the resurgence of a narrative of British self-sufficiency and 
calls for “ethnocentric consumption” (Lekakis). While this is a highly 
contested terrain of discourse – struggled over by nationalists, free mar-
keteers, and environmentalists – it is often informed by a highly selec-
tive recollection of Britain’s interrelationship with, and dependence 
upon, other countries and places, and in particular with the countries that 
made up its former Empire (Virdee and McGeever). 
 
‘Our Town’: The High Street in a Democratised Economy 
 
In addition to the reactionary vision of economic solidarity I have just 
detailed, the idealised high street also supports an alternative and much 
more progressive imaginary, and serves as a site of investment in hopes 
and desires for a radically reconfigured economy. These desires can be 
traced, for a start, in the positive vision of good, meaningful labour that 
the idealised high street nurtures. As I have already discussed, the ideal-
ised high street configures shopkeeping as a decent and civic-minded 
way of earning a living. This model of autonomy over one’s working 
life offers a sharp point of contrast with other present-day media narra-
tives about employment conditions in the United Kingdom, with their 
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tales of exhausted warehouse workers and destitute food delivery dri-
vers. An emphasis on autonomy, control, and meaningful influence over 
the economy can also be traced in the assertion (in all three instances) of 
the more-than-economic value of retail activity to a local community, 
and – in the case of Bishopthorpe Road – is extended to explicit engage-
ment with the social ownership movement (Clements Hall). Finally, the 
status of the idealised high street as an imagined microcosm of a broader 
national economy means that it is a site through which the challenge of 
combating wealth extraction by multinationals can be defined and ad-
dressed at a local level. London Borough of Waltham Forest, for in-
stance, express a commitment to “retaining more wealth in the borough” 
(13) in their planning guidance document. 
These tentative investments in models and practices that might trans-
form local economies and communities resonate very strongly with the 
Labour Party’s current ‘institutional turn’, which has been defined in 
terms of an “emerging new political economy [that] is circulatory and 
place-based” (Guinan and O’Neill, “From Community Wealth”). For 
Joe Guinan and Martin O’Neill, “decentralised public control of the 
economy” could offer a means of co-opting Brexiteers’ aspiration to 
‘take back control’: it could “reconstitute the basis for democratic par-
ticipation by giving people real decision-making power over the forces 
that affect their lives” (Guinan and O’Neill, “The Institutional Turn” 10). 
A widely discussed example of this new political economy is the so-
called Preston model (Guinan and O’Neill, “From Community 
Wealth”), named after the town in the Northwest where the council have 
introduced local wealth-building strategies. ‘Anchor’ institutions such 
as colleges, housing associations and universities have been encouraged 
to contract local companies, generating a multiplier effect: “pounds cir-
culate and recirculate throughout the local economy, creating jobs which 
in turn lead to more spending on goods and services, which then leads 
to the creation of more jobs, and so on” (Hanna et al.). The council has 
also supported co-operatives and other alternative forms of ownership 
that deliver opportunities for workers to “participate in the economic de-
cisions that affect their lives and the future of their city” (Hanna et al.). 
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The Preston model itself has been recognised as an “important form 
of prefiguration”, and has been construed as a template which can help 
people to “imagine, experience, and get involved with systemic eco-
nomic transformation” (Guinan and O’Neill, “From Community 
Wealth” 390). Because of its centrality to everyday economic imagi-
naries and its status as an imagined microcosm of a broader local or na-
tional economy, the site of the high street could also provide a terrain 
for the elaboration of radical ideas such as social ownership or commu-
nity wealth building. 
 
 
BEYOND THE HIGH STREET 
 
Guinan and O’Neill describe community wealth building as “a left alter-
native to both extractive neoliberalism and xenophobic nationalism” 
(“From Community Wealth” 383). Should we be surprised, then, that 
the idealised high street provides the imaginative resources to expound 
both their radical vision and a reactionary economic nationalism? James 
Meek has argued that it is a mistake to assume that “‘good’ localism (the 
ideal of the ‘thriving local community’, locally sourced food, preserva-
tion of vernacular local architecture and the traditional local landscape) 
can be neatly separated from ‘bad’ localism (hostility to immigrants and 
new ways of doing things)” (16). Similarly, reactionary and progressive 
economic imaginaries can be fostered on the shared terrain of the ideal-
ised high street. The challenge, then, is to identify the obstacles that exist 
to the left’s annexation of the site of the high street – and discourses of 
localism more generally – for the purpose of elaborating a radical eco-
nomic vision. The analysis of idealisations of the high street initiated in 
this chapter can help us to recognise some of the barriers that exist to the 
radical democratisation of local economies. 
One of the most pressing issues is the question of whose ideal is rep-
resented in The High Street, Bishopthorpe Road, and Waltham Forest’s 
planning guidance, and in a more generalised idealisation of the high 
street. Who gets to desire and imaginatively invest in the high street and 
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local economies at large? Who gets to debate “the kind of high street 
they would like” (Griffiths 39)? It is clear from my analysis that the ide-
alised high street is a site in which affluent constituencies’ desires are 
prioritised and in which classed and racialised exclusions are perpetu-
ated. The identity and overlap between the alternative visions I have 
sketched out – the ‘bad’ localism of the Little Englander imaginary, and 
the ‘good’ localism of the Preston model – help us to recognise the ex-
clusions in operation when it comes to the preferred subjects of domi-
nant economic imaginaries. As Guinan and O’Neill note, social and eco-
nomic inequalities prevent certain citizens from participation in the col-
lective imagination of shared futures: “economic instability precludes 
active determination of a community’s economic development, making 
the ambition to shape our collective future seem unattainable” (“From 
Community Wealth” 389). Those who seek the radical democratisation 
of the economy must therefore instigate democratic participation in acts 
of imagination vis-à-vis the economy. They must identify new ways of 
articulating and representing socially and economically marginalised 
subjects’ desires for their local high streets and communities (Watson 
and Wells), and of bringing these imaginaries into dialogue with domi-
nant idealisations. 
My analysis also points to the limitations of the model of the high 
street as a microcosm of the local or national economy. Suzanne Hall 
has noted the tendency for ‘the local’ to be treated as a “confined terri-
torial entity where parochial concerns are legitimised over broader con-
cerns” (2585). Relatedly, the high street is fetishised in contemporary 
economic imaginaries to the extent that the significance of retail is over-
emphasised, and the economic transactions that shopping involves can 
appear disconnected from the wider economy. In order to support pro-
posals for the radical democratisation of local economies, it will be nec-
essary to develop a vision of the idealised high street that decentres the 
spaces and practices of retail while bringing a more extensive range of 
economic processes into focus. Emergent research on the institutional 
turn emphasises the importance of institutions that are publicly owned 
or working for the collective good. While the site of the high street and 
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the transactions that take place in it provide a tangible point of entry into 
public debate about ‘the economy’, it is imperative to build a vision of 
local economies that extends beyond retail, animating its relationship to 
other sectors of the economy and other kinds of economic transaction.  
In so doing, there is also an opportunity to extend the emerging ex-
pectation that high streets must make a ‘more-than-economic’ contribu-
tion to local communities, to posit other ways of measuring that contri-
bution beyond traditional indicators such as GDP, and ultimately to dis-
place the “imagined autonomy of the economy” (Clarke 30). In relation 
to this challenge, the dénouement of Melvin’s picture book presents a 
timely reminder of the interconnectedness of the high street and local 
public infrastructure, and of the fact that shared experiences of collective 
goods – such as memories of yellow roses admired in a public park – 
can be much more valuable than private acquisition. 
Third, my analysis of the idealised high street underscores the neces-
sity of interrogating the role of nostalgia in contemporary economic im-
aginaries. The idealised high street sustains both reactionary and radical 
visions of national identity and of the role of the economy in a future 
society. Both have a nostalgic dimension, and so it is vital to scrutinise 
the ways in which nostalgia for former modes of economic organisation 
can naturalise exclusions on the basis of race or class. As my discussion 
of the Waltham Forest planning guidance makes clear, an understanding 
of the built environment of the high street as ‘heritage’ can certainly be 
used to reinforce such exclusions. Yet, if we look beyond this overly-
thematised issue, and if we take a cue from Griffiths’s emphasis on the 
“historical potential of the high street to generate patterns of social co-
presence, encounter and engagement” (41), this functional and symbolic 
site can be understood to harbour ‘historical’ resources that are poten-
tially far more disruptive and challenging. For example, high streets are 
sites where the exclusions and divisions of the past (Watson and Wells) 
might in fact be reactivated and traced through to the present moment. 
The incorporation of the desires and investments of socially and eco-
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nomically marginalised subjects for their local high streets and commu-
nities could activate their potential to deliver meaningful “cross-cultural 
contact and related economic experimentation” (Hall 2573). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The idealised high street is a compromised site of meaning in which di-
verse hopes and desires for a shared economic future are invested. This 
means that it is open to contestation. It can be articulated to progressive 
politics – to Labour’s institutional turn, for example – but it can also be 
articulated to reactionary, protectionist and ultimately racist visions of 
Britain’s future. If we are to achieve ‘economic system change’, it will 
be necessary to foster economic imaginaries that sustain such a transfor-
mation. The extension of democracy into economic life will necessitate 
meaningful critical scrutiny and redress of the ways in which economic 
imaginaries sustain deep exclusions. The idealised high street is a cor-
nerstone of contemporary economic imaginaries and it will remain a 
space that opens up opportunities to envision and enact social, political, 
and economic change. 
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 The New Democratic Economy:  
An Imaginary and Real Alternative 
Luke Martell 
 
 
An alternative economy is being built in the UK and beyond. It comes 
out of radical imagination, yet is material and real and draws on but 
breaks with previous paradigms. It is complex, detailed and practical, 
based in pluralities, governmental and civil society, political and eco-
nomic, and in its regenerative capacities can appeal across the political 
spectrum. People are talking about it and doing it, from local govern-
ments, to think tanks, academics, and national political parties, moving 
beyond globalisation and neoliberalism. But can something localised 
avoid parochialism and competition, represent the interests of the public 
as a whole and work nationally and beyond? Will the alternative econ-
omy’s embeddedness across institutions and via plural actors protect it 
from reversal? Can the democratic economy survive as an imagine-and-
do, not just imagining, approach? 
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LABOUR, CONSERVATIVES AND SOCIAL 
OWNERSHIP 
 
In 1945, the Labour Party came to power in the UK, nationalised major 
industries and established the National Health Service (NHS). 34 years 
later Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister and instigated wide-
spread privatisation of state assets. This direction of policy continued 
under Tony Blair, who removed the commitment to public ownership 
from the Labour Party constitution. The private sector and market be-
came default policy choices, until the 2015 victory of Jeremy Corbyn as 
Labour leader brought back the value of public ownership as mainstream 
rather than marginal. Socialism and social democracy have long es-
poused social ownership of production and greater equality in the distri-
bution of income and services. Corbyn’s proposals see these as linked. 
Rather than allowing inequality to grow and be equalised through redis-
tribution, ownership of assets is seen as key to equality of wealth and 
income (Guinan and O’Neill, “The Institutional Turn”).  
Labour’s manifesto for the 2017 general election proposed socially 
owned local energy companies as alternatives to big corporate providers, 
and the nationalisation of energy, water and the Royal Mail. Labour ar-
gue for insourcing council services, municipal social ownership, assis-
tance for the growth of the co-operative sector and transferring company 
shares to workers. The emphasis is on decentralised social ownership; 
and when national ownership then in a democratised form. A report for 
the party on alternative models of ownership discusses co-ops, munici-
pal and national state ownership, community wealth building, procure-
ment by anchor institutions and the model of local economic regenera-
tion practiced by Preston’s Labour Council (Labour Party, For the 
Many; Alternative Models).  
What I am considering in this chapter, though, are not only party 
policies. Proposals for social ownership and local wealth building are 
also being discussed by think tanks like The Democracy Collaborative 
in the USA and the UK Centre for Local Economic Strategy (CLES). 
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These do not just produce policy but are hands-on and guide implemen-
tation. Much talked about sites for carrying out social ownership poli-
cies, with the assistance of such think-and-do tanks, are in Cleveland, 
Ohio in the USA and Preston in the UK. Key principles in such ap-
proaches are: community and collaboration, place and locality, demo-
cratic ownership and systemic and institutional change, inclusion, good 
work and the workforce, multiplier effects, and sustainability and ethical 
finance (Kelly et al.; Kelly and Howard). 
 
 
COMMUNITY WEALTH BUILDING: FROM AN 
EXTRACTIVE TO A CIRCULATORY ECONOMY 
 
These initiatives involve community wealth building, where wealth is 
generated and retained locally, with political intervention to support so-
cially owned business and build links between community business and 
anchor institutions in communities (Kelly et al.; Brown et al.; Guinan 
and O’Neill, The Case for Community). Anchor institutions are those 
like hospitals, universities or councils more or less tied to the locality. 
They can be encouraged to shift the outsourcing of services from large 
corporations to local, sometimes socially owned, providers. The result 
is that, rather than flowing away to big corporations and their sharehold-
ers, money is kept in the community.  
Proponents say this moves away from an extractive economy, where 
money is taken out of localities by capitalist corporations, to a circula-
tory one, where it stays in the locality. For Matthew Brown, leader of 
Preston City Council, it is about creating an alternative economic system 
at a local level (Brown and O’Neill). Brown et al. argue that finance 
focuses on property and land instead of employment-rich investments in 
manufacturing and services, and that investment in automation leads to 
wealth being held less by society in the form of jobs and more by capital 
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extracted by investors (Brown et al. 134; Labour Party, Alternative Mod-
els).1 Retaining money locally, however, can help generate work in the 
community. The approach is also a method of responding to local gov-
ernment cuts by looking at remaining wealth in the community and try-
ing to keep it there. Furthermore, by the economy being tied increasingly 
to the locality, rather than to international investors, it is more insulated 
from global economic shocks like the financial crisis (Brown and 
O’Neill 73). There is an equality element because wealth is captured for 
workers, community owners and reinvestment, instead of being allowed 
to disappear away to capital and shareholders. In this sense community 
wealth-building is not just a technical approach for fostering local econ-
omies but also about power, re-balancing it away from international cap-
ital to local more democratic entities, such as government-owned or so-
cially owned enterprises (O’Neill and Howard 52). 
These approaches fit with a trend towards remunicipalisation 
wherein services are returned to the local public sector, reversing out-
sourcing and replacing privatisation and the public-private partnerships 
favoured by New Labour (Kishimoto et al.). Preston Council’s assess-
ment is that between 2012/13 and 2016/17 procurement spend retained 
in the city rose from £38.3m (5%) to £112.3m (18.2%), and within sur-
rounding Lancashire from £288.7m (18.2%) to £488.7m (79.2%), de-
spite declining overall by 15%. 4,000 extra employees are receiving the 
‘living wage’, and Preston has won awards for its improvement on var-
ious social and economic indicators, moved up its position on an index 
of social mobility, been lifted out of the 20% most deprived areas in the 
UK, and unemployment has dropped below the national average (CLES 
and Preston City Council 12-13, 20-21). 
 
 
                                                             
1  Alternative Models of Ownership focuses on social ownership of automation 
to make sure the benefits go to workers and society.  
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INSTITUTIONAL, OWNERSHIP AND SYSTEM 
CHANGE: A ROAD TO SOCIALISM? 
 
For Guinan and O’Neill, Corbyn’s approach involves an institutional 
turn, democratic economy proposals being focused on structure, design 
and system, a predistribution and asset-based more than redistributional 
approach to equality (Guinan and O’Neill, “The Institutional Turn”). Ra-
ther than income inequalities growing and being corrected, a more equal 
ownership of assets and equitable distribution is encouraged from the 
start. Equality is pursued through social ownership of wealth and rela-
tions between community institutions instead of the focus being on in-
come distribution. This involves a shift of power as well as income be-
cause ordinary people are empowered in ownership which is not always 
the case in social democratic redistribution. 
Part of the case for this approach is on democratic grounds, that we 
do not have democracy unless it is widened to the economy as well as 
politics, and that political democracy is undermined if economic power 
can shape political decisions thereby reducing accountability of politi-
cians to citizens who voted for them (Beckett; Guinan and O’Neill, From 
Community Wealth; Labour Party, Alternative Models; New Socialist). 
The democracy envisaged is often quite participatory, with people play-
ing a greater role in the governance of businesses and utilities, especially 
where decentralised. A question this raises is whether there is enough of 
a participatory consciousness in society for this to work. Insofar as par-
ticipation happens it may be biased to those with agency, time and 
money (Heslop et al. 11). The pressure group We Own It argue that peo-
ple will participate if they have the chance to in an inspiring way (We 
Own It 9; Guinan and O’Neill, From Community Wealth). But there 
have been problems motivating, for example, parents and members of 
the community to be involved in school governance; and offering mean-
ingful participation in co-ops does not necessarily lead to it being taken 
up (Carter 8, 3). Democratic participation may need more than struc-
tures, but also a change in consciousness, a cultural and not just a polit-
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ical shift. This involves constructing a narrative and discourse about par-
ticipation that links to people’s real lives and interests and mobilises 
them behind its material structure, a hegemonic strategy (Hall).2  
Are democratic economy proposals socialist and intended to replace 
capitalism or are they social democratic and aiming for change within 
the boundaries of capitalism? They are not in themselves an approach to 
overthrow capitalism, at least not yet, so in that sense are social demo-
cratic as much as socialist (Brown et al. describe it as social democratic, 
134-5). Reducing the contracting of international capitalist companies in 
favour of local community procurement does not go after capital so 
much as sidestep or exclude it to favour local wealth and to parallel so-
cial ownership. It competes with international capital rather than nation-
alising capital and creates democratic capital more than democratising 
existing capital. 
But the democratic economy reduces the role of international capital, 
builds social ownership and tries to direct investment to social ends. It 
involves systemic change to wider public local forms. Asking whether 
these proposals are about either changing capitalism or abolishing it is 
too binary a question because while they live with capitalism, they also 
reduce it by building non-capitalist forms. They are about replacing in-
ternational corporate control where possible with local, socially owned 
democracy. Hence Guinan and O’Neill see Corbyn’s proposals as so-
cialist (Guinan and O’Neill, “The Institutional Turn”; Guinan and 
Hanna; New Socialist 109, 113; Labour Party, Alternative Models 32). 
The democratic economy is more structural than redistributional and in-
volves a shift in power and equality through social ownership, as in so-
cialist perspectives, as opposed to after the fact redistribution and regu-
lations of a social democratic kind. These accept a privately owned cap-
italist economy but try to control and correct for its maldistributions.  
                                                             
2  This was advocated by Stuart Hall, drawing on Gramsci, in relation to the 
left in the Thatcher period.   
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Beckett, however, asks whether the regeneration of local economies 
by community wealth building helps save capitalism in a moderated, di-
luted, pluralised form that allows it to regroup and come back more red 
in tooth and claw (Beckett). This is a significant point, however, local 
democratic economy proposals can, and do in Labour Party policy, com-
bine with the nationalisation of privately owned companies and so com-
plement a politics that does not just dilute capitalism but also takes it 
over collectively. 
 
 
PLURALITY OF INSTITUTIONS: 
COMPLEXITY AND REVERSIBILITY 
 
The democratic economy involves a plurality of institutions: socially 
owned enterprises of various sorts, community or government created, 
with local and national government input to support social ownership 
and build relations between them and anchor institutions. Government 
can facilitate leadership, tax breaks, loans, investment, procurement, and 
shelter organisations that fund, promote and support social ownership. 
There are the anchor institutions themselves and their local procurement 
policy. Then think tanks are involved as in Preston and Cleveland. Insti-
tutions in proposals also include municipal enterprise, land trusts, public 
trusts, public banks and participatory budgeting. Initiatives may rise out 
of social movements and support comes also from philanthropy and 
trade unions. This departs from narrower approaches based on, say, gov-
ernment action or anti-political alternatives. More social agents and in-
stitutions are involved which makes the restructured economy more 
complex as well as making it more systemic and institutional. 
One aim is that such institutional interrelatedness makes democratic 
economy systems difficult to dismantle in the way nationalised industry 
and utilities were in the UK. Embedding change in society, it is hoped, 
is more likely to outlast changes of government and reversals by subse-
quent unsympathetic politicians. For Beckett, democratic economy pro-
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posals are for something more systemic and permanent than nationalisa-
tion and tax (Beckett). If less centrally linked to the state, as tax and 
nationalisation are, then it is more difficult for a change of government 
to reverse them.3 This also comes from plurality of forms of ownership, 
actors and approaches and from potential attractiveness across the polit-
ical spectrum.  
However, publicly owned companies could be sold, and local and 
municipal social ownership and procurement policy can be blocked or 
reversed by competition regulation or changes in political control of a 
local council or national government. The new democratic economy 
would be more complex to unravel than nationalisations or regulations 
but this would still be possible for a new government willing to change 
policy and dismantle relations and support. The question of reversibility 
is not clearly answered by appeals to the changes as systemic and insti-
tutionalised because systems and institutions can be politically changed. 
Furthermore, the case is often focused on changes of government rolling 
back democratic economic systems, an answer being that subsequent ad-
ministrations may like the local regenerative effects of circulatory com-
munity wealth building and so keep it. But key actors who are disadvan-
taged are international capital. Even if the local economy stays capitalist 
and for-profit, global capital still gets increasingly sidelined. The latter 
may be as much a threat to the circulatory economy, and its economic 
power as much a challenge as political changes of government. Faced 
with global corporate opposition political governments might become 
less supportive of local wealth retention. 
So, community wealth building may need a strategy beyond sys-
temic embeddedness for maintaining its initiatives. It might need to in-
clude a basis in social movements and popular consciousness as well as 
in institutions and political and economic systems. The editors of New 
Socialist emphasise the importance of values, culture and movements in 
supporting democratic economy changes in the face of opposition from 
                                                             
3  Wainwright (27) and We Own It (9 and 38) argue for institutionalising to 
make it difficult for public services to be dismantled in the future. 
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international capital, from inside government institutions, like the civil 
service, and from within the Labour Party (New Socialist). They argue 
that culture and socialisation are as important as economic control and 
planning. New Socialist also mention values like co-operation, solidar-
ity, empathy and charity as important bedrocks for the democratic econ-
omy. They argue that democratic structures are important not just in 
themselves but for bringing in and sustaining support for that which is 
democratised. However, it will take more than structures to build culture 
and values that help the democratic economy work and protect it from 
the threat of reversal discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND SCALING UP 
 
One question is whether experiments like Preston and Cleveland can be 
widened and scaled up to large scale transformation. Local approaches 
can be experimental, testing to see whether the idea works; if it does, 
then they can be demonstrative to others that the idea works and how. 
There is a prefigurative element (see Wainwright), building alternatives 
within capitalism, but as a basis for a wider non-capitalist economy 
along the same lines. Initiatives like those in Preston can and do grow 
into good practice spreading across local authorities (see Leibowitz and 
McInroy). That such approaches are in Labour’s manifesto is a sign of 
examples like Preston widening outwards and rising upwards. Further-
more, the democratic economy can develop, not only by showing things 
can work through experiment and demonstration, encouraging adoption 
and scaling up from below, but also through political leadership at gov-
ernment level and through mainstream public sector anchor institutions.4 
The Preston Model is more in mainstream society than on its margins or 
in separate spaces; it is more in politics and public-public relationships 
than other social alternatives, so less outside politics; and it is open to 
                                                             
4  Creating what Common Wealth call public-commons partnerships: see Mil-
burn and Russell.  
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being developed and scaled up by means additional to prefiguration, 
through a political and not just a social basis for change.  
Cumbers and Hanna discuss the role of government in scaling up 
local initiatives (Cumbers and Hanna 18ff.). Government can pursue 
change through: top-down nationalisations and remunicipalisation; tax 
and funding support for social ownership and allowing first refusal for 
employees to buy companies at risk of closure or takeover; and public 
procurement policies that favour co-ops and social and environmental 
goals. A number of these are Labour policies under Corbyn. This is built 
on on-the-ground experimentation to be promoted at national level by 
government. A community wealth building unit being established in 
Corbyn’s office shows the potential for the approach nationally.5 De-
mocratic economy proposals in Labour's 2017 manifesto and its report 
on Alternative Models of Ownership have been important in re-incorpo-
rating public ownership on to the national agenda even if Labour do not 
come to power.6  
As the approaches discussed involve funds being reinvested locally, 
rather than leaving the area, they may also appeal to Conservatives con-
cerned with local economic regeneration, although we shall see that 
from another perspective this is problematic.7 New Socialist argue that 
Labour’s policies have a ‘sober practicality’ to them and can appeal to 
the right (New Socialist). They do not necessarily involve higher tax or 
public spending or nationalisation which could be off-putting from a 
                                                             
5  Howard’s speech at the launch of Corbyn’s community wealth unit (“The 
Democracy Collaborative”) discusses widening out and scaling up of the ap-
proach as do Guinan and O’Neill in “The Institutional Turn”. Beckett also 
charts such policies taking form in the hands of John McDonnell and the 
Labour leadership.  
6  See Hanna, “The Next Economic”, and Guinan and Hanna on how public 
ownership is back for the Labour Party and back on the agenda more gener-
ally.  
7  See O’Neill and Howard, 46-7, on the argument that community wealth 
building can appeal across the political spectrum. 
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right-wing perspective. This makes them easier to spread, implement 
and sustain across changes in government. However, the appeal may 
only be to those on the right that value place-based wealth building and 
local economic development. Conservatives in class terms, as represent-
atives of international capital, will be less convinced as global capital is 
undermined by this approach in which it loses contracts to local contrac-
tors. Many on the right will be put off by some of this as being overly 
co-operative, non-capitalist enterprise, eroding the place of private cap-
ital and seen by them as less efficient.  
 
 
LOCALISM AND ITS LIMITS? COMMUNITY, 
COMPETITION AND INEQUALITY 
 
There may be limits in the localism of democratic economy proposals. 
They might be suited to areas with local identity, attachment to place 
and place-based entities that can be anchor institutions, but less viable 
in areas lacking these.8 Retention of wealth by the community rather 
than extraction by corporate capital will be welcomed by most with left-
wing and community concerns. More contentious may be its retention 
locally at the expense of the community beyond. Proposals can be seen 
to be concerned with local interests, and so parochial and insular, and 
not with the interests and welfare of the wider community nationally and 
globally. It is about fostering local interests potentially to the disad-
vantage of other localities.  
For poor areas retaining wealth for local regeneration may make 
sense. But as a policy implemented more widely localism could mean 
wealth is retained in better off areas when its spread to poorer commu-
nities would be desirable. One solution is pursuing the approach within 
a more redistributive approach at national or supra-national levels. So, 
in areas where wealth builds up some of it could be redistributed to 
                                                             
8  Heslop et al., 9, on Swansea. Brown says Preston is lucky with its anchor 
institutions, see Brown and O’Neill. 
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poorer places. This requires local wealth generators not losing the incen-
tive to create and retain wealth locally if they know some will be redis-
tributed away. However, this does not mean it is not do-able or done 
already under existing redistributive structures.   
Ted Howard of The Democracy Collaborative rejects the ‘beggar thy 
neighbour’ criticism for this stage of spreading community wealth build-
ing which he says is about resetting the balance between local commu-
nities and international capital, as much as localities versus localities 
(O’Neill and Howard 49-50). O’Neill argues that local government has 
to promote local economic development in the absence of other ap-
proaches and given national government’s lack of commitment to reduc-
ing inequality. Furthermore, what the community wealth approach re-
places is, for Howard, itself protectionism where cities compete to attract 
investment at the expense of other cities (O’Neill and Howard 49-50). 
The difference from community wealth building is that this allows prof-
its to go out of the area to international shareholders not committed in 
an ongoing way to the local community. 
O’Neill suggests there are two paths: one is favouring local institu-
tions and the other those with more ethical standards (Brown and 
O’Neill). The two can go together but the emphasis on ethical and social 
business implies supporting alternative economic structures as much as, 
or sometimes rather than, local regeneration. Favouring social business 
over local business where the two do not coincide is hard for a local 
authority but gives an ethical rather than localist slant to the approach. 
Preston Council say choosing suppliers based on social value has not 
always meant the local one. Furthermore, the Preston policy led to a shift 
in contracts away from London and the south-east, but not from the rest 
of the country, so did not mean abandoning a commitment to a wider 
community beyond the local one (CLES and Preston City Council 23). 
A related issue is that the community wealth approach can lead to 
competition and inequality. In locally focused wealth creation and reten-
tion approaches areas may be focused on their interests and become 
competitive with other areas, and in competition there are winners and 
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losers, so inequalities grow. Competition can lead to wasteful duplica-
tion, and reluctance to share resources or information, such as research 
and design. This can be the case with local authorities or local co-ops 
competing. Hanna says competition and whether this is a good thing is 
an issue as much as ownership is (Hanna, “The Next Economic” 22). A 
further dimension is that co-ops run the risk of being as biased to the 
sectional group that owns them, for instance workers, as localism can be 
to the locality. Wider forms of ownership can help to counter sectional-
ism and competitive inequality that arises from specific ownership or 
localism. 
 
 
NATIONAL AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
 
National forms of public ownership may be desirable, so there is less 
replication of activities and more sharing of information than under de-
centralised forms (see Hanna, “The Next Economic”; Our Common 
Wealth). This need not replace local ownership. Pluralism is desirable 
for various reasons, and in many cases local accountability and partici-
pation is positive. Another possible approach is networks between co-
ops and local authorities with agreements not to compete or conceal re-
sources and information.  
Hobbs argues that public ownership represents the public as a whole 
and all those affected by a company’s actions, not just particular groups 
(such as workers in worker’s co-ops) or communities (as in localism). 
Similarly, for Cumbers and Hanna municipal ownership is better than 
other local forms because it covers all groups in the area. Public owner-
ship can overcome insularity and sectionalism and oversee equality be-
tween areas, so some do not grow better off at the expense of others. 
New Socialist editors argue public ownership can also ensure greater 
equality of service nationally. A further question, that there is not space 
to discuss here, concerns the development of equality internationally.  
For Hobbs and We Own It we should not denigrate state ownership 
too much. It has been equated too easily with centralised, bureaucratic, 
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inefficient, top-down organisation, despite evidence of efficiency 
(Hobbs 42; We Own It; Cumbers and Hanna 9). State ownership has 
worked for rail in other European countries and for the NHS, for exam-
ple, and beyond the UK it is widespread, even in the free market USA 
(Hanna, Our Common Wealth; “The Next Economic”; Guinan and 
Hanna 118ff.). It allows economies of scale, consistency, equality and 
cross-subsidy (Hobbs; New Socialist; We Own It; Cumbers and Hanna). 
Furthermore, more sectional groups face greater market pressures so 
may externalise environmental costs (Cumbers and Hanna 12, 15-16). 
State ownership can be better on environmental grounds. Because of its 
scale it can have a large impact if pursuing green policies.9  
The Legatum Institute found that three quarters of the UK public, 
with support across generations and party allegiance, believe water, 
electricity, gas and rail should be publicly owned, and 50% feel the 
banks should be nationalised (Elliott and Kanagasooriam 14-17). A 
YouGov poll shows lower but still majority support for nationalisation 
of Royal Mail, water, rail, and energy, across age, class and region 
(Smith). Labour’s report on alternative models discusses national own-
ership and arguments for it, acknowledging its pitfalls and the case for 
democratisation through the inclusion of involved and affected groups 
in governance: local and national states, workers, consumers, managers, 
experts and community groups (Labour Party, Alternative Models 27-
31; see also We Own It). Public ownership may need to be reformed 
from forms it has taken in the past. Its problems, such as they have been, 
could be addressed by investigating forms of management as much as 
by a shift to private ownership. Reform of public ownership can involve 
both democratising it and reforming management and these may be re-
lated and go hand in hand.   
 
 
                                                             
9  For New Socialist national public ownership is the level at which to tackle 
issues like climate change. 
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THE IMAGINARY AND REAL ALTERNATIVE 
 
How is the economy imagined in democratic economy proposals? It is 
about local value, economic and social, not international corporate 
value, the creation and retention of wealth in the community rather than 
extracting it from outside for shareholders over citizens. It involves in-
stitutionalisation of the alternative and change through a system and as-
sets, rather than leaving these and compensating by redistributional cor-
rection. The democratic economy is pluralist. It marries political and 
civil society, the mainstream and the margins. There is a politicisation 
of alternatives, social alternatives built on and linked with political in-
tervention, a role for the entrepreneurial state, local and national, instead 
of rejection of active government, in alliance with various institutions 
including the mainstream public sector. It involves alternatives, not in 
isolated experiments on the fringes of society, but through conventional 
politics, set up downwards and scaled across as well as scaled up from 
below.  
The democratic economy is perhaps not socialism replacing social 
democracy, but rather socialist as well as social democratic. It is more 
Old Labour than New Labour but with a greater role for the local and 
decentralised. Local reinvestment can also appeal to local communities 
and non-socialists. This is part of its practical edge, although it may en-
courage parochial self-interest. The democratic economy is imaginary 
but also real, involving think-and-do action and not just thinking. For 
Howard it is a materially emerging economy, rather than theoretical 
(Howard, “The Making of”). For Guinan and Hanna it is not a fantasy 
but involves real-world alternative democratic economy institutions in-
ternationally, some charted by them (Guinan and Hanna 110, 114ff.).  
A question with alternatives is how they can be realised, entrenched 
and institutionalised. Can the democratic economy have appeal beyond 
the left, be ingrained to resist reversal and can it challenge capitalism as 
opposed to diluting it? The democratic economy involves the materiali-
sation, politicisation and pluralisation, through institutions and broad 
support, of an alternative economy. Its potential for scaling up is being 
154 | Martell 
realised. But even if the political right can be convinced, this economy 
will face opposition from international capital as it would find itself at a 
disadvantage. Complacency over parochialism, resistance and the po-
tential for reversal needs to be avoided. To ensure embeddedness in so-
ciety in the face of opposition from global capital, there will need to be 
a popular consciousness and social movement basis behind the demo-
cratic economy, as well as institutionalisation. 
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 Imaginary Economies: 
Narratives for the 21st Century 
Melissa Kennedy 
 
 
In Aesop’s famous fable, “The Ant and the Grasshopper,” first told 
about 2,500 years ago, the fun-loving grasshopper sings all summer 
while the industrious ant puts away stores for winter. When winter 
comes, the starving grasshopper begs the ant for food. The ant refuses, 
and the story stops there, leaving the reader to assume that the grasshop-
per dies of hunger. The moral of the story, often written at the bottom of 
the page in print editions, is the importance of saving now in order to 
put something away for hard times later. As literature, Aesop’s fable 
gives a uniquely literary perspective on old economic arguments, an an-
cient reminder of how the economy is always storied into being. The tale 
follows a narrative arc, complete with dramatic tension and closure at 
the end. The third-person narrative viewpoint gives equal agency to the 
two characters that both tell the reader how they think and feel. Having 
given us both sides of the story, Aesop’s fable puts readers in a difficult 
position, asking us first to identify and empathise with both characters, 
then forcing us to choose our allegiance to one at the expense of the 
other: should the cheerful grasshopper die or should we recognise the 
hard work and foresight (with embedded ideas of ambition, good up-
bringing and seeming intelligence) of the ant? Faced with this moral di-
lemma, the easiest reader response is to close the book, relieved that this 
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story is only fiction. We might further suspect that the story’s sketchy, 
obscure, inconclusive message illustrates the restricted usefulness of art 
to interpreting the real world we live in: luckily we are not often con-
fronted with making such moral judgements and decisions as the ant in 
the story does. 
Aesop’s parable illustrates one aspect of what we might call “imag-
inary economics”: it is a story, the function of which is to convey an 
economic narrative. Encoded in it are certain mechanisms of abundance 
and scarcity, supply and demand, saving and expenditure, the value of 
labour and cultural work, independence and trust, and of potential recip-
rocal trading arrangements – here foreclosed by the selfish ant. As a para-
ble, it has a socio-cultural function telling us how the world works. It 
suggests that life is unfair; that nothing grows in winter; that one can’t 
rely on a neighbour to help; and it even contains speciest or racist over-
tones that a certain ethnicity is attractive but lazy and another is hard-
working and deserving. Like all good fairy tales, it is a warning con-
tained in a threat. 
Certainly, there are many ways to read the fable, depending on both 
historical and individual perspectives and values. Over its 2,500-year 
life, the simple story has been interpreted differently according to chang-
ing value systems. This chapter uses “The Ant and the Grasshopper” to 
illustrate the usefulness of bringing together two disciplines commonly 
held apart: the social science of economics and the humanities field of 
literary and cultural studies. As economics is a narrative of human inter-
action, invented and imagined into being with the help of figurative lan-
guage and dominant story tropes, literary studies’ interpretative and crit-
ical approaches open new ways of framing and engaging with economic 
criticism. Thus, I argue that the dominant interpretation of Aesop’s fable 
reflects contemporary critiques of both the justice and the sustainability 
of neoliberal free-market global capitalism. In the spirit of recent calls 
by economists to rethink the dominant narratives of economics, I end by 
proposing a rereading and rewriting of “The Ant and the Grasshopper” 
to fit the 21st century shift to an ethical, sustainable economic narrative.  
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There are several grounds on which to claim that the disciplines of 
literature and economics are closely related. The historical roots of clas-
sical economics lie in ethics and philosophy. Before they were labelled 
the fathers of economics, John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith 
were known for their considerations of human well-being within the 
Greco-Roman philosophical tradition of virtue ethics. Locke’s An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Hume’s An Enquiry Con-
cerning the Principles of Morals (1751) and Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) are no longer widely read. Instead, aspects of their 
work that have become keystones of classical economics misrepresent 
their writers’ beliefs. These include: Locke on private property, 
misattributed in the US Declaration of Independence; Hume’s form of 
early utilitarianism, applied in social policy by Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill; and Smith’s much misunderstood expression “the in-
visible hand.” Since the 2008 financial crisis, a growing body of critics 
of current economic thought and policy have called attention to these 
and other such flawed foundations and disciplinary biases. Thomas 
Piketty recalls that the origin of economics is the word Oikonomia from 
the Greek for household management and agriculture, which stems from 
the most intimate, collaborative form of human togetherness in the 
home. Calling attention to the specific language of economics, Tomáš 
Sedláček argues “modern economic theories based on rigorous model-
ling are nothing more than … metanarratives retold in different (mathe-
matical?) language” (Sedláček 5). He goes on to emphasise that  
 
there is at least as much wisdom to be learned from our own philosophers, 
myths, religions, and poets as from exact and strict mathematical models of 
economic behaviour […] there is more religion, myth, and archetype in eco-
nomics than there is mathematics. (9) 
 
Whereas I have chosen Aesop’s tale to illustrate the economic beliefs 
encoded in storytelling, Sedláček uses the 5,000-year old Sumerian epic 
The Tale of Gilgamesh and parables from the Bible, Old Testament and 
the Torah.  
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The above lineage demonstrates the centre of economics as con-
cerned with human interaction, based on relationships and informed by 
values, morals, and opinions, such as feelings of obligation, and gen-
erosity. If we understand the economy not in the narrow sense of finance 
and market that dominates today, but in the broader sociological and an-
thropological sense of human economies, then the similarities with lit-
erary studies becomes clear: both disciplines model, interpret, analyse, 
and critique the symbolic, cultural, social, and political expressions of 
human exchange and interaction. Though the turn to mathematical for-
mulae, empirical and statistical data as the language of modern econom-
ics makes it hard for the discipline to see its underlying constructions, 
the notion of “imagined economies,” as John Clarke points out in the 
first chapter of this collection, reopens space for critical consideration. 
As Clarke also mentions, “imagined economies” also references Bene-
dict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983), which in turn nods in 
the direction of Frankfurt School structuralists in order to deconstruct 
the hegemonic common-sense reality that is, nevertheless, founded on 
particular ideologies, perpetuated in governmental, educational and 
other state apparatuses and promulgated by social and cultural mores.  
Another commonality between imagined economies and Anderson’s 
imagined communities is the importance of the rise of the novel. Ander-
son, and later Timothy Brennan, in Salman Rushdie and the Third 
World: Myths of the Nation (1989) and Edward Said, in Culture and 
Imperialism (1993), argue that the nation and the novel are unimaginable 
without each other. Literary economists similarly claim that the rise of 
the novel coincides with the invention of modern economics, ensuring 
thereby the normalisation of the new economic mode into the form of 
cultural expression that came to dominate until eclipsed by visual media 
in the late 20th century (Osteen and Woodmansee).1  
                                                             
1  What I do not mean by “imaginary” is either a Lacanian psychoanalysis aim-
ing to separate out the symbolic and real, or an analysis of dystopian fantasy 
or science fiction, as suggested by Jameson (“Future City”) on what he calls 
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By the time of the 2008 financial crisis, the range of textual formats 
engaging with the (un)believability of the global financial system had 
extended to include film, TV series, and documentaries, as well as an 
emerging form of popular, journalistic writing for a general readership 
by professors of economics themselves. When reviewers of Thomas 
Piketty’s book tour of Capital in the Twenty-First Century dub the Pa-
risian professor a “rock-star economist” (Tett 2014) and imagine a 
movie in which Piketty is played by Colin Firth (Moore 2014), and when 
the fictionalised documentary of the 2008 sub-prime collapse, The Big 
Short (2015), features actor Margot Robbie breaking the fourth wall to 
explain mortgage bonds to a captivated but bewildered audience, all 
sense of a split between “real” and “imagined” economics is rendered 
nonsensical.  
Indeed, since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been an outpouring 
of film, TV series, documentaries, fiction and non-fiction about the 
economy.2 Yet while all these media texts identify structural problems 
of global capitalism, and even though they often rigorously critique its 
inbuilt inequality and unfairness, they offer very few constructive alter-
natives: it is after all easier to criticise the system than to fully imagine 
its replacement. As George Monbiot sets out in the opening lines of Out 
of the Wreckage: A New Politics for an Age of Crisis: 
 
                                                             
“the attempt to imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the 
world.” 
2  Financial crisis fiction includes novels by well-known authors, including 
John Lanchester, Marina Lewycka, Lionel Shiver, C. K. Stead, and Sebas-
tian Faulks. British film includes I, Daniel Blake (dir. Ken Loach, 2016) and 
Born Equal (dir. Dominic Savage, 2006); televised series include Billions 
(prod. Showtime, 2016) and Follow the Money (prod. Danmark Radio, 
2016); documentary-style film includes The Wolf of Wall Street (dir. Martin 
Scorsese, 2013), The Big Short (dir. Adam McKay, 2015), Inequality for All 
(dir. Jacob Kornbluth, 2013), Capitalism: A Love Story (dir. Michael Moore, 
2009).   
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[Y]ou cannot take away someone’s story without giving them a new one. It 
is not enough to challenge an old narrative, however outdated and discredited 
it may be. Change happens only when you replace it with another. […] Those 
who tell the stories run the world. (1)  
 
Paraphrasing Frederic Jameson, it seems easier to imagine the end of the 
world than the end of capitalism (Jameson). The imagination required to 
think of alternative forms of socio-economic relations would appear to 
be in short supply. 
Several critics diagnose a lack of imagination as the problem behind 
seeming paralysis to tackle pressing global issues such as runaway cap-
italism and its resultant impact on people and the environment (see 
Frase; Harvey; Mason). Anthropologist David Graeber, in his long-
range 5,000-year history of the concept of debt, diagnoses today 
 
[a] certain collapse of our collective imaginations. It’s almost as if people 
had been led to believe that the era’s technological advances and its greater 
overall social complexity ha[s] had the effect of reducing our political, so-
cial, and economic possibilities, rather than expanding them. Instead of un-
leashing visions, it ha[s] made visionary politics of any sort impossible. 
(393-94; italics in original) 
 
Yet, if social scientists such as Graeber seem to be calling for more in-
terdisciplinary help with figuring the imaginary, little input can be ex-
pected from the humanities, which are also suffering from stultification 
following 40 years of Margaret Thatcher’s “there is no alternative” nar-
rative that established neoliberalism in the late 1970s. In today’s increas-
ingly neoliberalising university, the humanities are under pressure to 
justify their value in economic terms, in which concepts of the imagina-
tion, critical thinking, ‘soft’ skills, literacy and foreign languages have 
little use-value. In the current late-capitalist, developed world that has 
almost fully succeeded in attributing financial values to formerly non-
financialised things – including the commons, water, air, education, 
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knowledge, and ideas – the humanities have been so sidelined, and lit-
erature so devalued,3 that it is hard to even imagine that these disciplines 
might have an important role to play as interpreting or critiquing eco-
nomic beliefs. Within this context of an apparent cultural, social, politi-
cal and economic impasse arises the challenge for literature and eco-
nomics to work together to figure and reconfigure our present and po-
tential imagined economies. 
Indications of fruitful collaboration appear in the increasing fre-
quency of the word “narrative” in both specialist and mainstream dis-
course. The term refers most clearly to the domain of literary and cul-
tural studies, but when applied to economics works to shift seemingly 
objective information into the realm of subjective interpretation, which 
opens space for ethical questions of the economy’s role in human flour-
ishing to emerge. To remember that the economy does not exist without 
people at its centre, who create and shape the economic narrative ac-
cording to various, shifting, and plural belief systems, taps into the eth-
ical and broader philosophical foundations of the discipline. Recasting 
the hitherto accepted facts of free-market globalisation rather as con-
structed narratives motivated by encouraged greed is a strategy for de-
constructing the hegemony of mainstream political economy by turning 
truth into story. Examples of neoliberal tenets questioned or even dis-
credited include: the supposed self-balancing mechanism of an unregu-
lated financial market, the derailing of which caused the 2008 financial 
crisis; the belief in eternal growth that makes it impossible to respond to 
the planet’s finite resources; the emphasis on human labour in the work-
place as the highest social value at the same time as jobs are becoming 
more precarious and more automated; and the myths of the “rising tide 
lifts all boats” and of “trickle-down economics,” used to support tax 
breaks and investment incentives for the super-rich yet debunked by ev-
idence of growing wealth inequality. Deconstructing truths into their 
                                                             
3  In the US context, Morson and Schapiro claim: “In the late 1960s, nearly 18 
percent of bachelor’s degrees came from the humanities, but by 2010 this 
number had shrunk to 8 percent” (201). 
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driving narratives is even evident in the titles of popular economics 
books such as Zombie Economics (Quiggin), Animal Spirits (Akerlof 
and Shiller), Kicking Away the Ladder (Chang), and The Great Divide 
(Stiglitz).  
Post-financial crisis, such popular economics texts aimed at a non-
specialist reading public openly draw on literary imagery and cultural 
images in their challenges to the dominant narrative about how the econ-
omy works. Emphasis on the use of imagery in the above literature re-
view suggests that thinking of economic alternatives has to start in the 
imaginary and upturn the reality we know and experience. Herein lies 
not only a space for new ways of thinking the form and function of the 
economy, but also offers a reinvigorated role for the humanities, partic-
ularly literary studies. Gary Saul Morson and Morton Schapiro, a literary 
scholar and an economist who teach and write together, are emphatic 
that literature, by foregrounding ethical and critical judgements, is cru-
cial to fostering understanding of what the economy is for. In Cents and 
Sensibility: What Economics Can Learn from the Humanities, they make 
the audacious claim that literature should be brought to bear on govern-
ance, policy-making, and economic data: “[b]y using stories, we don’t 
mean that they should be employed simply to illustrate the results of 
behavioural models, but instead that they be used to inform the creation 
of models themselves” (Morson and Schapiro 13). Their advocacy of 
interdisciplinary work that brings together humanities and social sci-
ences offers one important model for imaginary economics.  
While all the above attempts to view economics from a literary and 
cultural standpoint have been influential in my thinking for the present 
chapter, the exercise in interpreting and re-imagining “The Ant and the 
Grasshopper” is most directly inspired by Kate Raworth’s recent Dough-
nut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. 
Raworth begins from the premise that the narrativity of economics is 
self-evident: “[e]verybody’s saying it: we need a new economic story, a 
narrative of our shared economic future that is fit for the twenty-first 
century” (Raworth 12). Her text marks a departure from the common 
technique of popular economic texts that predominantly critique the 
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economy in great detail, ending on a note of optimism in a final chapter 
that vaguely gestures towards solutions. Rather, Raworth’s book from 
the beginning argues for constructive change. Her book may be part of 
a shift in popular economic writing from critique to creativity, as evi-
denced in the titles of other very recently published texts, including Peter 
Frase’s Four Futures: Life after Capitalism, Paul Mason’s Postcapital-
ism: A Guide to Our Future, Jeffrey Sachs’s Building the New American 
Economy: Smart, Fair, & Sustainable, and Mary Robinson’s Climate 
Justice: Hope, Resilience, and the Fight for a Sustainable Future. In 
thinking outside of current economic parameters, imagination neces-
sarily comes to the fore, a point most clearly made by Raworth, who 
replaces the images that define 20th-century economics with new meta-
phors and visual images, including the doughnut of her book’s title, that 
represent the sustainable, safe, just, and fair economic practices she ad-
vocates. Such change in economic criticism goes hand in hand with ac-
tivism within university economics departments for curriculum change, 
notably the Rethinking Economics movement.4  
To return, then, to economic readings of “The Ant and the Grasshop-
per,” is an exercise in revealing the hidden biases and beliefs of our cur-
rent neoliberal times. To heed the call from critical economists to ques-
tion the foundations that at first seem self-evident opens up space to al-
low and encourage a questioning of the factual inevitability and ethical 
desirability of accepting the story as it first appears. Finally, by practic-
ing the kind of imaginary economics that drives Raworth’s call to re-
write the economic story fit for the 21st century, readers are invited to 
become co-writers to update and redraw “The Ant and the Grasshopper.” 
Aesop’s fables are remarkable for having remained in public circu-
lation, notably in ecclesiastical and educational circles, since their first 
                                                             
4  www.rethinkeconomics.org/; the German-speaking world association is the 
Network for Pluralist Economics: www.plurale-oekonomik.de/netzwerk-
plurale-oekonomik/. 
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record in Greek literature and philosophy in the 5th century BC.5 Today, 
Jean de la Fontaine’s collected Fables (1668), which updated and mod-
ernised the stories in verse in the early-modern period, are perhaps the 
most well-known early examples of the craze for oral tales and fairy tales 
that were so instrumental in developing the “imagined community” (An-
derson) of emergent nations. La Fontaine’s “The Ant and the Grasshop-
per” introduces finance overtly to the tale: the grasshopper, or cicada in 
the French version, asks her “neighbour” ant for a loan: 
 
Asking for a loan of grist, 
A seed or two so she’d subsist 
Just until the coming spring. 
She said, “I’ll pay you everything 
Before fall, my word as animal, 
Interest and principal.” (Spector n.p.) 
 
The ant, whose “finest virtue” is that she is “no hasty lender,” refuses 
the loan, and the story ends on a note of moral superiority from the smug 
ant, which mocks the starving grasshopper with the final words, “you 
sang? […] / Now dance the winter away.”  
As all readings of history are necessarily informed by norms of the 
present, interpretations of Aesop stories starting from La Fontaine’s ver-
sions are framed within the capitalist context of social relations: the per-
spective that enables publications to add the moral punchline to save 
now in order to have something to spend later. Although obviously no 
government is going to cite this – or any – story as an economic model, 
many policies are based on exactly this kind of moral judgement. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the decline of the welfare state and crim-
inalisation of poverty and unemployment by austerity politics send the 
message that welfare beneficiaries are useless grasshoppers partying 
                                                             
5  Analysis of pre-capitalist interpretations lies outside the scope of this paper, 
although certainly interpretations of Aesop’s fables predate modern econom-
ics. 
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away their benefit money earned by hard-working, tax-paying ants. 
Within the national ant nest, the opportunistic grasshopper is easily con-
strued as an immigrant, a foreign species towards which citizens are not 
expected to show any affinity or obligation. A Marxist reading, however, 
could invert the power relations to construe a different division of la-
bour, one in which the ants are the exploited working-class overseen by 
a leisured class of singing grasshoppers living off inherited and invested 
wealth. In this reading, the grasshopper expects to be given food that it 
does not expect to work for. From this perspective, the ant’s refusal may 
be seen as a triumph of the many over the few.  
By contrast with the above meritocratic or even Darwinian reading 
that rewards self-sufficiency and hard work, the fable can also stimulate 
empathy for the outcast grasshopper, calling on readers’ social values of 
shared responsibility to protect life and well-being. The influence of 
20th-century socialist and welfare-state values, as well as the modern 
turn away from violence and unhappy endings in children’s stories, are 
also evident in adaptations of the fable. In both, Walt Disney’s 1934 an-
imated version and Leo Lionni’s popular children’s book Frederick 
(1967), the workers share their provisions with the artist.6 Although 
these stories overtly claim that culture, music, and art are also valued in 
society, the covert construction of the grasshopper figure as the weaker 
member of society – Disney’s grasshopper catches a bad cold and Li-
onni’s distracted daydreamer needs constant help from the others – rep-
resents an unequal dynamic based on benevolence and charity. Disney’s 
grasshopper is even successfully re-educated of its work ethic. Having 
begun the story singing “the world owes me a living,” the grasshopper 
thanks the ants for their hospitality by performing a song for them, “I 
owe the world a living” (Baxter). 
                                                             
6  Lionni’s version features one community of mice rather than the usual two 
groups of ants and grasshopper. Here, Frederick is a dreamer that appreciates 
the beauty of nature and poetry all summer. When winter comes and the mice 
have eaten all their supplies, Frederick keeps them entertained with beautiful 
stories of nature.  
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Regardless of one’s reading, all the above versions of the fable result 
in uncomfortable reading experiences, without clear resolutions or 
happy endings. Within a competitive model of life as a Darwinian strug-
gle in which there will be winners and losers, the rational individual 
man, homo economicus, would conclude that the grasshopper is doomed 
to die out. Indeed, the real-world analogue of mass extinction of animals 
– particularly insects – brought about by human destruction of habitat 
exactly for the increased production of human supplies, suggests the 
truth of Aesop’s ancient fable. Within the neoliberal primacy of the mar-
ket at the expense of the state, household and commons, the hope con-
tained within the story, that the grasshopper’s cultural labour can be 
traded for the ant’s productive labour, is largely foreclosed. Since the 
drawback of the state under neoliberalism, culture, arts and music have 
suffered drastic funding cuts, are today almost absent in schools (Jef-
freys), and as argued above, increasingly squeezed out of academia. 
As a narrative with a 2,500-year history of rewriting, however, we 
do not have to accept “The Ant and the Grasshopper” as a classical eco-
nomics story of competition and natural attrition. To envisage a scenario 
with an ethical and sustainable outcome, in which both the ant and the 
grasshopper can survive and thrive, requires thinking anew our relation-
ships with other people, other species, and nature. Contextualising and 
thus interpreting Aesop’s fable is an exercise in using the imaginary to 
rethink economics. Following Monbiot’s call to replace the dominant 
story and Raworth’s bid to write the economic narratives fit for the 21st 
century, we can rewire Aesop’s fable to fit alternative values. In the 
same vein as critical economists’ exposure of falsehoods and myths te-
naciously embedded in mainstream economics, Aesop’s limited know-
ledge of insect ecology requires correcting.  
Like much about classical economics, a capitalist interpretation of 
Aesop’s fable, such as those above, contain glaring ignorance of the non-
market aspects of the economy that, having no direct financial value, are 
often absent from economic models: namely the commons, the social 
reproduction of unpaid household labour, and the state. Certainly, the 
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insects’ ecological niches are not paid and their motivations are not fi-
nancial. Rather, the ant and the grasshopper meet in spaces which Karl 
Polanyi called the “embedded” economy, here in the commons while 
taking care of social reproduction in participating in and providing for 
their respective communities. Anthropomorphising the insects as indi-
vidual rational economic man further fails on other accounts – not least 
because the ‘worker’ ants that forage for food are female. In nature, an 
adult grasshopper does not live more than a few weeks and its larvae 
overwinter underground. Thus, it is neither going to steal from the ant 
(assuming that they even shared an ecological niche) nor die of hunger.  
For the ant’s part, as synergistic superorganisms, that which the 
Greeks called Eusocial (‘good’ social), like bees and coral, ants do not 
collect food for themselves but for the colony. Aesop’s female worker 
ant will spend part of her adult life gathering food and feeding larvae, 
and in winter she will hibernate in the colony to collectively keep it 
warm. Most ant species do not store any food in their nests, so there is 
no hoarding for winter as Aesop imagined.7 Indeed, the idea that one 
individual works only for its own future, as encoded in the dialogue be-
tween one ant and one grasshopper, is anathema to both species. In this 
light, the insects’ social worlds offer prosocial models that humans 
might take heed of. Indeed, the current push towards sustainable futures 
                                                             
7  As the focus of this paper is interpretative and literary rather than factual and 
entomological, facts about insects were sourced online, including from Na-
tional Geographic’s Photo Ark project, Pest World for Kids, and relevant 
Wikipedia pages. While I recognise the flaws and biases of such unsubstan-
tiated, popular knowledge sources, particularly Wikipedia collaborative 
writing, the availability today of non-expert, non-academic information is 
important to my project’s aim to break down academic and disciplinary 
boundaries. Both economics and English suffer from an elitist reputation as 
being “too hard” for non-experts to approach and engage with (see Ken-
nedy). On the contrary, imagining alternative economies requires an im-
mense effort in collective, collaborative thinking open to the public.  
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geared not to instant consumer gratification but rather the stewardship 
of the earth for future generations work in this direction. 
Instead of anthropomorphising the ant and grasshopper, with its im-
plied anthropogenic centring of humans in the web of life, a better ap-
proach might be to zoomorphise the humans. We might find inspiration 
by thinking of humans more as insects, as interconnected to a huge in-
tergenerational community of which we only ever see one small part, 
working not only for each other now, but participating in building a 
home for future generations we will never live to see. We might also do 
well to remember that grasshoppers (along with cicadas, crickets, and 
cockroaches) are some of the oldest creatures on earth: predating the 
dinosaurs, it is likely they will outlive us as well. Such deep-time think-
ing underpins the current shift even in economics to strive for sustaina-
ble ecological balances for the safety of future generations. Precepts of 
the circular economy, such as those expounded in Doughnut Economics, 
similarly reject unnatural expectations of indefinite economic growth in 
favour of regenerative, distributive and dynamic circular flows owned 
and controlled not by homo economicus but by the entire community 
network.  
To illustrate the kind of thinking needed to imagine such different 
ways of imagining economics, Raworth draws, as this chapter does, 
from imagery inspired by nature. She argues for a change in understand-
ing economics away from images of the masculine, the mechanical and 
the linear.8 Instead she posits visual and metaphorical images of the fem-
inine,9 of nature, and of circularity. For example, she reconsiders system 
                                                             
8  Raworth’s examples include: the figure of rational economic man and the 
dominance of men throughout the history of economic thought; Paul Samu-
elson’s Circular Flow Diagram; and linear graphs representing theories of 
GDP growth, supply-demand equilibrium, and Kuznets’s inequality bell-
curve.  
9  By feminine, I mean Raworth’s emphasis throughout her book on feminist 
economics (and economists) and her insistence on the centrality of the “core” 
economy (78) of the household and the commons to all human well-being. 
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theory within an extended metaphor of gardening (127, 156), and re-
places boom-and-bust dynamics with an equilibrium model wittily rep-
resented by the chicken-and-egg (139-40). Her model is rooted firmly in 
a particular sense of ethics that recalls the moral philosophy at the root 
of early modern economics. Raworth imagines an economist’s version 
of the Greek Hippocratic Oath taken by doctors to “minimise the risk of 
harm – especially to the most vulnerable – in the face of uncertainty,” 
and “work with humility, by making transparent the assumptions and 
shortcomings of your models, and by recognising alternative economic 
perspectives and tools” (161). Reading Aesop’s fable through these and 
other such sustainable and ethical frameworks rejects the inequality cre-
ated by competition in which the ant wins in resource allocation, to in-
stead foster and maintain an oscillating equilibrium with reinforcing and 
balancing feedback loops in which both ant and grasshopper fill their 
respective ecological niches.  
To consider the story not as thinly disguised allegories of human 
character encourages readers to marvel at the insects’ unique abilities, 
such as the elaborate mating rituals that produce the grasshopper’s “mu-
sic,” and ants’ ability to carry huge loads and communicate via their 
complex hive minds. To accept that growth also entails degrowth, and 
that generation engenders both re- and degeneration, allows the reader 
to accept the natural end of the grasshopper’s life-cycle, having safely 
laid its eggs to hatch in spring, and the ant’s labour for the complex so-
cial structure and architecture of its city-like colony. Finally, to read 
                                                             
The book outlines various economic aspects of gender inequality, including 
the relative absence of female economists in the history of the discipline, and 
the gendered nature of unpaid labour, the care economy, and social repro-
duction. Her focus, however, is not to critique the marginalisation of women 
or suggest gender roles or stereotypes, but rather to introduce her general 
readership to central aspects required for an economy focused on human 
well-being, flourishing nature and planetary balance. 
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“with humility” means resisting making the kind of final moral judge-
ment often printed in modern editions of Aesop Fables, in recognition 
of the plurality of perspectives brought to this ancient tale. 
This chapter has argued for imaginary economics as a mechanism 
through which to recognise the changing disciplines of both literary 
studies and economics. At the same time as “narrative” has become a 
buzz-word across disciplines and in media and journalism, there has 
been a concomitant call from across the social sciences to remember 
both the philosophical roots of economics and the historical importance 
of literary and cultural studies in shaping social, political and economic 
formations. The exercise of rereading and rewriting “The Ant and the 
Grasshopper” taps into these trends to illuminate the common references 
of shared narratives through which we each make sense of the world, a 
reminder that we can all contribute to activating the imagination and 
promoting – indeed creating – a robust economic imaginary that is ethi-
cally and sustainably fit for the 21st century. 
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